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Wells Fargo & Co. v. City of Miami 
15-1112 
Ruling Below: City of Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co., 801 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2015) 
The City of Miami filed suit against Wells Fargo, on the grounds that the company had engaged 
discriminatory lending practices (i.e. predatory loans, “redlining”) which violated the Fair 
Housing Act and Florida law pertaining to unjust enrichment. The US District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff appealed. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the city had in fact adequately alleged 
injury from the allegedly discriminatory lending, that the city had adequately alleged a chain of 
causation from the allegedly discriminatory lending, and that the term “aggrieved person” in the 
Fair Housing Act can be construed as broadly as is allowed under Article III. 
Question Presented: Whether the term “aggrieved” in the Fair Housing Act imposes a zone-of-
interests requirement more stringent than the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III; and 
whether the City is an “aggrieved person” under the Fair Housing Act. 
 
CITY OF MIAMI, a Florida municipal corporation, Plaintiff–Appellant, 
v. 
WELLS FARGO & CO., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Defendants–Appellees. 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit 
Decided on September 1, 2015 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
MARCUS, Circuit Judge: 
  
On December 13, 2011, the City of Miami 
brought three separate fair housing lawsuits 
against Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and 
Citigroup. Each alleged that the bank in 
question had engaged in a decade-long 
pattern of discriminatory lending by targeting 
minorities for predatory loans. The 
complaints in each case were largely 
identical, each identifying the same pattern of 
behavior and supported by empirical data 
specific to each defendant. Moreover, each 
complaint contained the same two causes of 
action: one claim arising under the Fair 
Housing Act (FHA), as well as an attendant 
unjust enrichment claim under Florida law. 
 
The three cases were heard by the same judge 
in the Southern District of Florida, and were 
resolved in the same way based on the district 
court's order in the Bank of America case. In 
this case, like the others, the district court 
dismissed the City's FHA claim with 
prejudice on three grounds: the City lacked 
statutory standing under the FHA because its 
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alleged injuries fell outside the statute's “zone 
of interests”; the City had not adequately pled 
that Wells Fargo's conduct proximately 
caused the harm sustained by the City; and, 
finally, the City had run afoul of the statute of 
limitations and could not employ the 
continuing violation doctrine. Each of the 
three cases was appealed separately. 
 
After thorough review, we are constrained to 
disagree with the district court's legal 
conclusions about the City's FHA claims. 
  
The most detailed account of our reasoning is 
set out in the companion case City of Miami 
v. Bank of America Corp.. The same 
conclusions of law apply here. As a 
preliminary matter, we find that the City has 
constitutional standing to pursue its FHA 
claims. Furthermore, under controlling 
Supreme Court precedent, the “zone of 
interests” for the Fair Housing Act extends as 
broadly as permitted under Article III of the 
Constitution, and therefore encompasses the 
City's claim. While we agree with the district 
court's conclusion that the FHA contains a 
proximate cause requirement, we find that the 
City has adequately alleged proximate cause. 
Finally, the “continuing violation doctrine” 
would apply to the City's claims, if they are 
adequately pled. 
 
Because the district court imposed too 
stringent a zone of interests test and wrongly 
applied the proximate cause analysis, it erred 
in dismissing the City's federal *1261 claims 
with prejudice and in denying the City's 
motion for leave to amend on the grounds of 
futility. As for the state law claim, we affirm 
the dismissal because the benefits the City 
allegedly conferred on the defendants were 
not sufficiently direct to plead an unjust 




On December 13, 2013, the City of Miami 
brought this complex civil rights action in the 
United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Florida against Wells Fargo & Co. 
and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (collectively 
“Wells Fargo” or “the Bank”) containing two 
claims. First, it alleged that the defendants 
violated sections 3604(b) and 3605(a) of the 
Fair Housing Act by engaging in 
discriminatory mortgage lending practices 
that resulted in a disproportionate and 
excessive number of defaults by minority 
homebuyers and caused financial harm to the 
City. It also alleged that the Bank unjustly 
enriched itself by taking advantage of 
“benefits conferred by the City” while, at the 
same time, engaging in unlawful lending 
practices, which “denied the City revenues it 
had properly expected through property and 
other tax payments and ... cost[ ] the City 
additional monies for services it would not 
have had to provide ... absent [the Bank's] 
unlawful activities.”  
 
This complaint accused Wells Fargo of 
engaging in both “redlining” and “reverse 
redlining.” Redlining is the practice of 
refusing to extend mortgage credit to 
minority borrowers on equal terms as to non-
minority borrowers. Reverse redlining is the 
practice of extending mortgage credit on 
exploitative terms to minority borrowers. The 
City alleged that the bank engaged in a 
vicious cycle: first it “refused to extend credit 
to minority borrowers when compared to 
white borrowers,” then “when the Bank did 
extend credit, it did so on predatory terms.” 
When minority borrowers then attempted to 
refinance their predatory loans, they 
“discover[ed] that [the Bank] refused to 
extend credit at all, or on equal terms as 
refinancing similar loans issued to white 
borrowers.”  
 
The City claimed that this pattern of 
providing more onerous loans—i.e., those 
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containing more risk, carrying steeper fees, 
and having higher costs—to black and Latino 
borrowers (as compared to white borrowers 
of identical creditworthiness) manifested 
itself in the Bank's product placements and its 
wholesale mortgage broker fees. It also 
averred that the Bank's internal loan officer 
and broker compensation systems 
encouraged its employees to give out these 
types of loans even when they were not 
justified by the borrower's creditworthiness. 
 
The City said that the Bank's conduct violated 
the Fair Housing Act in two ways. First, the 
Bank intentionally discriminated against 
minority borrowers by targeting them for 
loans with burdensome terms. And second, 
the Bank's conduct had a disparate impact on 
minority borrowers, resulting in a 
disproportionate number of foreclosures on 
minority-owned properties, and a 
disproportionate number of exploitative 
loans in minority neighborhoods.  
 
The City employed statistical analyses to 
draw the alleged link between the race of the 
borrowers, the terms of the loans, and the 
subsequent foreclosure rate of the underlying 
properties. Drawing on data reported by the 
Bank about loans originating in Miami from 
2004–2012, the City claimed that a Wells 
Fargo loan in a predominantly (greater than 
90%) minority neighborhood of Miami was 
6.975 times more likely to result in 
foreclosure than such a loan in a majority-
white neighborhood. According to the City's 
regression analysis (which purported to 
control for objective risk characteristics such 
as credit history, loan-to-value ratio, and 
loan-to-income ratio), a black Wells Fargo 
borrower in Miami was 4.321 times more 
likely to receive a loan with “predatory” 
features3 than a white borrower, and a Latino 
borrower was 1.576 times more likely to 
receive such a loan. Moreover, black Wells 
Fargo borrowers with FICO scores over 660 
(indicating good credit) in Miami were 2.572 
times more likely to receive a predatory loan 
than white borrowers, while a Latino 
borrower was 1.875 times more likely to 
receive such a loan. 
  
The City's data also suggested that from 
2004–2012, 11.1% of loans made by Bank of 
America to black and Latino customers in 
Miami were high-cost, compared to just 3.2% 
of loans made to white customers. Data cited 
in the complaint showed significantly 
elevated rates of foreclosure for loans in 
minority neighborhoods. While 50.5% of 
Wells Fargo's Miami loan originations were 
in “census tracts” that are at least 75% black 
or Latino, 63.9% of loan originations that had 
entered foreclosure by June 2013 were from 
such census tracks. Likewise, 24.3% of Wells 
Fargo's loans in predominantly black or 
Latino neighborhoods resulted in foreclosure, 
compared to only 4.4% of its loans in non-
minority (at least 50% white) neighborhoods. 
 
The complaint also alleged that the bank's 
loans to minorities resulted in especially 
quick foreclosures. The average time to 
foreclosure for Wells Fargo's black and 
Latino borrowers was 2.996 years, while for 
white borrowers it was 3.266 years. The City 
also gathered data from various non-Miami-
based studies (some nationwide, some based 
on case studies in other cities) to demonstrate 
the elevated prevalence of foreclosure, 
predatory loan practices, and higher interest 
rates among black and Latino borrowers, and 
the foreseeability of foreclosures arising from 
predatory lending practices and their 
attendant harm. 
 
The City's charges were further amplified by 
the statements of several confidential 
witnesses who claimed that the Bank 
deliberately targeted black and Latino 
borrowers for predatory loans. For example, 
one former loan officer attested that Wells 
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Fargo management steered low- and middle-
income borrowers away from less expensive 
Community Reinvestment Act loans and 
toward more expensive Fair Housing Act and 
Freddie Mac loans. Another claimed that the 
Bank targeted minority churches and their 
congregations for subprime loans. A third 
claimed that Hispanic borrowers' 
applications for refinancing were 
disproportionately denied: “a Rodriguez in 
the last name was treated differently than a 
Smith,” he stated. The witness also claimed 
that loan officers would not fully inform low- 
and middle-income Hispanic customers of 
the financial repercussions of their 
mortgages, and would submit false 
documents that exaggerated the borrowers' 
incomes in order to place them in loans that 
they should not have qualified for. One 
witness also alleged that the Bank would 
change its paperwork to disguise which 
branches were originating loans to minorities 
in order to avoid federal scrutiny.  
 
The City sought damages based on reduced 
property tax revenues. It claimed that the 
Bank's lending policies caused minority-
owned property to fall into unnecessary or 
premature foreclosure. The foreclosed-upon 
properties lost substantial value and, in turn, 
decreased the value of the surrounding 
properties, thereby depriving the City of 
property tax revenue. The City alleged that 
“Hedonic regression” techniques could be 
used to quantify the losses the City suffered 
that were attributable to the Bank's conduct. 
The City also sought damages based on the 
cost of the increased municipal services it 
provided to deal with the problems attending 
the foreclosed and often vacant properties—
including police, firefighters, building 
inspectors, debris collectors, and others. 
These increased services, the City claimed, 
would not have been necessary if the 
properties had not been foreclosed upon due 
to the Bank's discriminatory lending 
practices. The City also sought a declaratory 
judgment that the Bank's conduct violated the 
FHA, an injunction barring the Bank from 
engaging in similar conduct, and punitive 
damages, as well as attorneys' fees. 
  
On July 9, 2014, the district court granted 
defendants' motion to dismiss, adopting and 
incorporating its order from the companion 
case between the City of Miami and Bank of 
America. First, the court found that the City 
of Miami lacked statutory standing to sue 
under the FHA. The court determined that, 
based on this Court's earlier opinion in 
Nasser v. City of Homewood, the City's claim 
fell outside the FHA's “zone of interests,” 
and, therefore, the City lacked standing to 
sue. In particular, the trial court determined 
that the City had alleged “merely economic 
injuries” that were not “affected by a racial 
interest.” Like the plaintiffs in Nasser, the 
court suggested, the City was seeking redress 
under the FHA for “an economic loss from a 
decrease in property values,” and as with the 
plaintiffs in Nasser, this was insufficient. The 
City's goal went far beyond the purpose of the 
FHA, which is to “provide, within 
constitutional limitations, for fair housing 
throughout the United States.”  
 
The court also concluded that the FHA 
contains a proximate cause requirement, but 
that the City had not adequately pled 
proximate cause. The City had not 
sufficiently traced any lending disparities to 
the defendants' conduct, as opposed to 
confounding background variables such as “a 
historic drop in home prices and a global 
recession,” and “the decisions and actions of 
third parties, such as loan services, 
government entities, competing sellers, and 
uninterested buyers.” The court also 
determined that the City had not shown that 
the Bank's mortgage practices caused the 
City any harm. It was unimpressed with the 
“statistics and studies” the City cited, noting 
187 
 
that some were not based on data from 
Miami, some were not limited to the 
defendants' practices, and others “d[id] not 
control for relevant credit factors that 
undoubtedly affect lending practices.” 
Moreover, some of the harm to the City 
stemmed directly from “the actions of 
intervening actors such as squatters, vandals 
or criminals that damaged foreclosed 
properties.” 
 
The district court also concluded that the 
City's federal claim ran afoul of the statute of 
limitations. It noted that for the FHA, a 
plaintiff must bring his claim “not later than 
2 years after the occurrence” of the 
discriminatory housing practice, and that for 
discriminatory loans the statute of limitations 
begins to run from the date of the loan 
closing. But the City had not alleged that any 
loans were made later than 2008, a full five 
years before its complaint was filed. The 
court was not persuaded by the City's 
invocation of the continuing violation 
doctrine—which can allow plaintiffs, under 
some circumstances, to sue on an otherwise 
time-barred claim—since the City had not 
alleged sufficient facts to support any claim 
that the specific practices continued into the 
statutory period. The district court dismissed 
the City's FHA claim with prejudice, 
reasoning that even if the statute of 
limitations deficiencies could be cured by an 
amended pleading, the City's lack of statutory 
standing could not be. 
 
Finally, the district court rejected the City's 
unjust enrichment claim on several grounds. 
As a preliminary matter, the City had failed 
to draw the necessary causal connection 
between the Bank's alleged discriminatory 
practices and its receipt of undeserved 
municipal services. Moreover, the City had 
failed to allege basic elements of an unjust 
enrichment claim under Florida law. The 
court determined that any benefit the Bank 
received from municipal services was not 
direct but “derivative” and, therefore, 
insufficient to support an unjust enrichment 
claim. Moreover, the City had failed to allege 
that the Bank was not otherwise entitled to 
those services as a Miami property owner. 
Finally, the court rejected the City's argument 
that Miami was forced to pay for the Bank's 
externalities (the costs of the harm caused by 
its predatory lending), holding that paying for 
externalities cannot sustain an unjust 
enrichment claim. The unjust enrichment 
claim was dismissed without prejudice, 
leaving the City free to amend its complaint. 
The City chose not to proceed on its unjust 
enrichment claim alone “because the two 
claims are so intimately entwined and based 
on largely the same underlying misconduct.” 
Instead, it moved for reconsideration and for 
leave to file an amended complaint, arguing 
that it had standing under the FHA and that 
the amended complaint would cure any 
statute of limitations deficiency. The 
proposed amended complaint alleged that the 
Bank's discriminatory lending practices 
“frustrate[ ] the City's longstanding and 
active interest in promoting fair housing and 
securing the benefits of an integrated 
community,” thereby “directly interfer[ing]” 
with one of the City's missions. It also made 
more detailed allegations about properties 
that had been foreclosed upon after being 
subject to discriminatory loans. Specifically, 
the proposed amended complaint identified 
ten foreclosed properties that corresponded to 
predatory loans that originated between 2004 
and 2012. Notably, it also identified 11 
properties that corresponded to predatory 
loans that the Bank had issued after 
December 13, 2011 (within two years of 
filing the suit) that had not yet been 
foreclosed upon but were likely to 
“eventually enter the foreclosure process,” 




The district court denied the City's motion for 
reconsideration and for leave to amend, as it 
did in each of the companion cases, relying 
upon its reasoning in the Bank of America 
case. 
 
The City timely appealed the court's final 




As explained, our reasoning is set forth in 
detail in the companion case Bank of America 
Corp. Our legal conclusions in that case 
apply equally here, and dictate the same 
results. We briefly summarize those 
conclusions. 
 
A. Standard of Review 
 
We review the district court's grant of a 
motion to dismiss with prejudice de novo, 
“accepting the [factual] allegations in the 
complaint as true and construing them in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff.” We 
generally review the district court's decision 
to deny leave to amend for an abuse of 
discretion, but we will review de novo an 
order denying leave to amend on the grounds 
of futility, because it is a conclusion of law 
that an amended complaint would necessarily 
fail. Finally, we review de novo whether 
plaintiffs have Article III standing.  
 
B. Fair Housing Act Claim 
 
1. Article III Standing 
 
For the reasons we set forth in Bank of 
America Corp., the City has constitutional 
standing to bring its FHA claim. Just as in 
that case, the City here claims injury on the 
basis of lost property tax revenue due to 
premature or unnecessary foreclosure 
resulting from predatory loans. In Gladstone 
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, the Supreme 
Court held that a village had Article III 
standing to bring an FHA claim for 
discriminatory renting practices partly on the 
basis of “[a] significant reduction in property 
values,” because such a reduction “directly 
injures a municipality by diminishing its tax 
base, thus threatening its ability to bear the 
costs of local government and to provide 
services.” The City of Miami alleges the 
same kind of injury here. Thus, like the 
Village of Bellwood, the City of Miami had 
adequately alleged an injury in fact. 
 
As for Article III causation, again, we find 
that at this stage in the proceeding the City's 
alleged chain of causation is perfectly 
plausible: taking the City's allegations as true, 
the Bank's extensive pattern of 
discriminatory lending led to substantially 
more defaults on its predatory loans, leading 
to a higher rate of foreclosure on minority-
owned property and thereby reducing the 
City's tax base. Moreover, the complaint 
supports its allegations with regression 
analyses that link the Bank's treatment of 
minority borrowers to predatory loans, 
predatory loans to foreclosure, and 
foreclosure to reduced tax revenue. All told, 
the City has “allege[d] ... facts essential to 
show jurisdiction.”  
 
2. “Statutory Standing” 
 
The district court dismissed the City's claim 
because it lacked what the court 
characterized as “statutory standing.” It 
found that the City fell outside the FHA's 
“zone of interests,” and that its harm was not 
proximately caused by the Bank's actions. 
Ultimately, for the reasons fully explained in 
Bank of America Corp., we disagree with the 
district court's legal conclusions. 
 




This case, too, requires us to define the 
breadth of the term “aggrieved person” as it 
is used in the FHA. As explained in detail in 
the companion case, we are bound by the 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the FHA in 
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance, 
Gladstone, and Havens Realty Corp. v. 
Coleman: statutory standing “under [the 
FHA] ... is ‘as broad as is permitted by Article 
III of the Constitution.’ ” Although the 
Supreme Court has suggested that it may be 
prepared to reconsider that holding, we must 
“follow the case which directly controls, 
leaving to the Supreme Court[ ] the 
prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” 
Moreover, our circuit precedent in Nasser is 
not to the contrary; that case stands for the 
unremarkable proposition that a plaintiff has 
no cause of action under the FHA if he makes 
no allegation of discrimination (or disparate 
impact) on the basis of race (or one of the 
FHA's other protected characteristics: color, 
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, and 
national origin). In this case, however, the 
complaint explicitly alleged race-based 
discrimination in the Bank's predatory 
lending practices. 
 
Thus, we agree with the City that the term 
“aggrieved person” in the FHA sweeps as 
broadly as allowed under Article III. To the 
extent a zone of interests analysis applies to 
the FHA, it encompasses the City's 
allegations in this case. 
 
b. Proximate Cause 
 
As we explained at some length in the 
companion case, we agree with the district 
court that a plaintiff bringing an action for 
damages under the Fair Housing Act must 
plead proximate cause between his injury and 
the defendant's unlawful conduct. The 
Supreme Court has instructed that such a 
claim is “in effect, a tort action,” governed by 
general tort rules, and proximate cause is a 
classic element of a tort claim. 
 
And we look to the law of torts to guide our 
proximate cause analysis, using 
foreseeability as our touchstone. Under this 
standard, we conclude again that the City has 
made an adequate showing. Proximate cause 
“is not ... the same thing as ... sole cause,” and 
the fact that there are multiple plausible, 
foreseeable links in the alleged causal chain 
is not fatal to the City's claim. 
 
3. Statute of Limitations and Remand 
 
The district court dismissed the City's FHA 
claims with prejudice (and denied its motion 
for leave to amend) because it concluded that 
the City fell outside the statute's zone of 
interests and had not adequately pled 
proximate cause, and that these deficiencies 
were incurable. Resolving a plaintiff's motion 
to amend is “committed to the sound 
discretion of the district court,” but that 
discretion “is strictly circumscribed” by Rule 
15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which instructs that leave to 
amend should be “freely give[n] when justice 
so requires.” Because the district court 
wrongly concluded that the City was outside 
the FHA's zone of interests and had not 
adequately pled proximate cause, its 
determination that any amended complaint 
would be futile was legal error and therefore 
an abuse of discretion. On remand, the City 
should be granted leave to amend its 
complaint. 
 
In its original complaint, the City failed to 
allege that any of the offending loans closed 
within the limitations period (between 
December 13, 2011, and December 13, 
2013). On appeal, the City does not contend 
that its original complaint was adequate; 
rather, it argues that it could readily cure the 
statute of limitations flaws if given the 
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opportunity. The City points to its proposed 
amended complaint for support, in which it 
identified five specific properties 
corresponding to predatory loans issued after 
December 13, 2011. On remand, the district 
court will have the opportunity to evaluate 
whether the City's new pleadings satisfy the 
statute of limitations, in a manner consistent 
with our explanation of the continuing 
violation doctrine in the companion case. 
 
C. Unjust Enrichment Claim 
 
As for the City's state law unjust enrichment 
claim, we agree with the district court and 
affirm its ruling for the reasons detailed in the 
companion case. We have not found—and 
the City has not provided—a single Florida 
case supporting an unjust enrichment claim 
in these circumstances, and the City's claims 
do not fit within an unjust enrichment 
framework. Missing tax revenue is in no way 
a benefit that the City has conferred on the 
Bank. Municipal expenditures, meanwhile, 
do not appear to be among the types of 
benefits that can be recovered in an unjust 
enrichment action under Florida law. They 
are also not a benefit directly conferred on the 
Bank, as is required for an unjust enrichment 
claim under Florida law. Finally, the City has 
provided no arguments and cited no Florida 
caselaw explaining why the Bank would not 
be entitled to such services like any other 
property owner.  
 
The judgment of the district court is 
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, 
and REMANDED for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
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Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami 
15-1111 
Ruling Below: City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2015) 
The City of Miami filed suit against Bank of America, on the grounds that the company had 
engaged discriminatory lending practices (i.e. predatory loans, “redlining”) which caused 
economic harm to the city. The US District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed 
for failure to state a claim and denied reconsideration. Plaintiff appealed. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the city had in fact adequately alleged 
injury from the allegedly discriminatory lending, that the city had adequately alleged a chain of 
causation from the allegedly discriminatory lending, that the term “aggrieved person” in the Fair 
Housing Act can be construed as broadly as is allowed under Article III, that the proper standard 
for proximate causation on a Fair Housing Act claim is based on foreseeability, that the city 
adequately alleged that the harm was reasonably foreseeable, and that the city failed to allege 
that the city had given a direct benefit to the lender to which the lender was not otherwise 
entitled. 
Question Presented: Whether, by limiting suit to “aggrieved person[s],” Congress required that 
a Fair Housing Act plaintiff plead more than just Article III injury-in-fact; and whether 
proximate cause requires more than just the possibility that a defendant could have foreseen that 
the remote plaintiff might ultimately lose money through some theoretical chain of 
contingencies. 
 
CITY OF MIAMI, a Florida Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff–Appellant, 
v. 
BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION, Bank of America, N.A., et al., Defendants–
Appellees. 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit 
Decided on September 1, 2015 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
MARCUS, Circuit Judge: 
 
The City of Miami has brought an ambitious 
fair housing lawsuit against Bank of 
America, alleging that it engaged in a decade-
long pattern of discriminatory lending in the 
residential housing market that caused the 
City economic harm. The City claims that the 
bank targeted black and Latino customers in 
Miami for predatory loans that carried more 
risk, steeper fees, and higher costs than those 
offered to identically situated white 
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customers, and created internal incentive 
structures that encouraged employees to 
provide these types of loans. The predatory 
loans, as identified by the City, include: high-
cost loans (i.e., those with an interest rate at 
least three percentage points above a 
federally established benchmark), subprime 
loans, interest-only loans, balloon payment 
loans, loans with prepayment penalties, 
negative amortization loans, no 
documentation loans, and adjustable rate 
mortgages with teaser rates (i.e., a lifetime 
maximum rate greater than the initial rate 
plus 6%). The City alleged that by steering 
minorities toward these predatory loans, 
Bank of America caused minority-owned 
properties throughout Miami to fall into 
unnecessary or premature foreclosure, 
depriving the City of tax revenue and forcing 
it to spend more on municipal services (such 
as police, firefighters, trash and debris 
removal, etc.) to combat the resulting blight. 
The City asserts one claim arising under the 
Fair Housing Act (FHA) as well as an 
attendant unjust enrichment claim under 
Florida law. 
  
The district court dismissed the City's FHA 
claim with prejudice on three grounds: the 
City lacked statutory standing under the FHA 
because it fell outside the statute's “zone of 
interests”; the City had not adequately pled 
that Bank of America's conduct proximately 
caused the harm sustained by the City; and, 
finally, the City had run afoul of the statute of 
limitations and could not employ the 
continuing violation doctrine. We disagree 
with each of these conclusions. 
 
As a preliminary matter, we find that the City 
has constitutional standing to pursue its FHA 
claims. We also conclude that under 
controlling Supreme Court precedent, the 
“zone of interests” for the Fair Housing Act 
extends as broadly as permitted under Article 
III of the Constitution, and therefore 
encompasses the City's claim. While we 
agree with the district court that the FHA 
contains a proximate cause requirement, we 
find that this analysis is based on principles 
drawn from the law of tort, and that the City 
has adequately alleged proximate cause. 
Finally, we conclude that the “continuing 
violation doctrine” can apply to the City's 
claims, if they are adequately pled. 
 
Because the district court imposed too 
stringent a zone of interests test and wrongly 
applied the proximate cause analysis, we 
conclude that it erred in dismissing the City's 
federal claims with prejudice and in denying 
the City's motion for leave to amend on the 
grounds of futility. As for the state law claim, 
we affirm the dismissal because the benefits 
the City allegedly conferred on the 
defendants were not sufficiently direct to 





On December 13, 2013, the City of Miami 
brought this complex civil rights action in the 
United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Florida against Bank of America 
Corporation, Bank of America N.A., 
Countrywide Financial Corporation, 
Countrywide Home Loans, and Countrywide 
Bank, FSB (collectively “Bank of America” 
or “the Bank”) containing two claims. First, 
it alleged that the defendants violated 
sections 3604(b) and 3605(a) of the Fair 
Housing Act by engaging in discriminatory 
mortgage lending practices that resulted in a 
disproportionate and excessive number of 
defaults by minority homebuyers and caused 
financial harm to the City. It also alleged that 
the Bank unjustly enriched itself by taking 
advantage of “benefits conferred by the City” 
while, at the same time, engaging in unlawful 
lending practices, which “denied the City 
revenues it had properly expected through 
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property and other tax payments and ... cost[ 
] the City additional monies for services it 
would not have had to provide ... absent [the 
Bank's] unlawful activities.” 
 
The complaint accused Bank of America of 
engaging in both “redlining” and “reverse 
redlining.” Redlining is the practice of 
refusing to extend mortgage credit to 
minority borrowers on equal terms as to non-
minority borrowers. Reverse redlining is the 
practice of extending mortgage credit on 
exploitative terms to minority borrowers. The 
City alleged that the Bank engaged in a 
vicious cycle: first it “refused to extend credit 
to minority borrowers when compared to 
white borrowers,” then “when the bank did 
extend credit, it did so on predatory terms.” 
When minority borrowers then attempted to 
refinance their predatory loans, they 
“discover[ed] that [the Bank] refused to 
extend credit at all, or on terms equal to those 
offered ... to white borrowers.”  
 
The City claimed that this pattern of 
providing more onerous loans—i.e., those 
containing more risk, carrying steeper fees, 
and having higher costs—to black and Latino 
borrowers (as compared to white borrowers 
of identical creditworthiness) manifested 
itself in the Bank's retail lending pricing, its 
wholesale lending broker fees, and its 
wholesale lending product placement. It also 
averred that the Bank's internal loan officer 
compensation system encouraged its 
employees to give out these types of loans 
even when they were not justified by the 
borrower's creditworthiness. The City 
claimed that Bank of America's practice of 
redlining and reverse redlining constituted a 
“continuing and unbroken pattern” that 
persists to this day. 
 
The City said that the Bank's conduct violated 
the Fair Housing Act in two ways. First, the 
City alleged that the Bank intentionally 
discriminated against minority borrowers by 
targeting them for loans with burdensome 
terms. Second, the City claimed that the 
Bank's conduct had a disparate impact on 
minority borrowers, resulting in a 
disproportionate number of foreclosures on 
minority-owned properties, and a 
disproportionate number of exploitative 
loans in minority neighborhoods. 
 
Among other things, the City employed 
statistical analyses to draw the alleged link 
between the race of the borrowers, the terms 
of the loans, and the subsequent foreclosure 
rate of the underlying properties. Drawing on 
data reported by the Bank about loans 
originating in Miami from 2004–2012, the 
City claimed that a Bank of America loan in 
a predominantly (greater than 90%) minority 
neighborhood of Miami was 5.857 times 
more likely to result in foreclosure than such 
a loan in a majority-white neighborhood. 
According to the City's regression analysis 
(which purported to control for objective risk 
characteristics such as credit history, loan-to-
value ratio, and loan-to-income ratio), a black 
Bank of America borrower in Miami was 
1.581 times more likely to receive a loan with 
“predatory” features than a white borrower, 
and a Latino borrower was 2.087 times more 
likely to receive such a loan. Moreover, black 
Bank of America borrowers with FICO 
scores over 660 (indicating good credit) in 
Miami were 1.533 times more likely to 
receive a predatory loan than white 
borrowers, while a Latino borrower was 
2.137 times more likely to receive such a 
loan.  
 
The City's data also suggested that from 
2004–2012, 21.9% of loans made by Bank of 
America to black and Latino customers in 
Miami were high-cost, compared to just 8.9% 
of loans made to white customers. Data cited 
in the complaint showed significantly 
elevated rates of foreclosure for loans in 
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minority neighborhoods. While 53.3% of 
Bank of America's Miami loan originations 
were in “census tracts” that are at least 75% 
black or Latino, 95.7% of loan originations 
that had entered foreclosure by June 2013 
were from such census tracks. And 32.8% of 
Bank of America's loans in predominantly 
black or Latino neighborhoods resulted in 
foreclosure, compared to only 7.7% of its 
loans in non-minority (at least 50% white) 
neighborhoods. Likewise, a Bank of America 
borrower in a predominantly black or Latino 
census tract was 1.585 times more likely to 
receive a predatory loan as a borrower with 
similar characteristics in a non-minority 
neighborhood.  
 
The complaint also alleged that the bank's 
loans to minorities resulted in especially 
quick foreclosures. The average time to 
foreclosure for Bank of America's black and 
Latino borrowers was 3.144 years and 3.090 
years, respectively, while for white 
borrowers it was 3.448 years. The allegations 
also gathered data from various non-Miami-
based studies (some nationwide, some based 
on case studies in other cities) to demonstrate 
the elevated prevalence of foreclosure, 
predatory loan practices, and higher interest 
rates among black and Latino borrowers, and 
the foreseeability of foreclosures arising from 
predatory lending practices and their 
attendant harm.  
 
The City's charges were further amplified by 
the statements of several confidential 
witnesses who claimed that the Bank 
deliberately targeted black and Latino 
borrowers for predatory loans. Thus, for 
example, one mortgage loan officer with 
Bank of America who worked on loans in the 
Miami area claimed that the bank targeted 
less savvy minorities for negative 
amortization loans. Another noted that Bank 
of America paid higher commissions to loan 
officers for Fair Housing Act loans as 
opposed to the allegedly more advantageous 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) loans, 
incentivizing officers to steer borrowers 
away from the CRA loans. Still another noted 
that back-end premiums (a premium earned 
by the loan officer equal to the difference 
between the borrower's loan rate and the rate 
the bank pays for it) on loans were not 
disclosed and “often eluded less educated, 
minority borrowers.” One of the witnesses 
explained that from 2011–2013, Bank of 
America did not offer regular refinancing to 
persons with mortgages at over 80% of the 
value of the house (including many negative 
amortization loans), which 
disproportionately affected minorities in 
danger of losing their homes.  
 
Notably, the City sought damages based on 
reduced property tax revenues. It claimed that 
the Bank's lending policies caused minority-
owned property to fall into unnecessary or 
premature foreclosure. The foreclosed-upon 
properties lost substantial value and, in turn, 
decreased the value of the surrounding 
properties, thereby depriving the City of 
property tax revenue. The City alleged that 
“Hedonic regression” techniques could be 
used to quantify the losses the City suffered 
that were attributable to the Bank's conduct. 
The City also sought damages based on the 
cost of the increased municipal services it 
provided to deal with the problems attending 
the foreclosed and often vacant properties—
including police, firefighters, building 
inspectors, debris collectors, and others. 
These increased services, the City claimed, 
would not have been necessary if the 
properties had not been foreclosed upon due 
to the Bank's discriminatory lending 
practices. The City also sought a declaratory 
judgment that the Bank's conduct violated the 
FHA, an injunction barring the Bank from 
engaging in similar conduct, and punitive 
damages, as well as attorneys' fees.  
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On July 9, 2014, the district court granted 
defendants' motion to dismiss. First, the court 
found that the City of Miami lacked statutory 
standing to sue under the FHA. The court 
determined that, based on this Court's earlier 
opinion in Nasser v. City of Homewood, the 
City's claim fell outside the FHA's “zone of 
interests,” and therefore the City lacked 
standing to sue under this statute. In 
particular, the trial court determined that the 
City had alleged “merely economic injuries” 
that were not “affected by a racial interest.” 
Like the plaintiffs in Nasser, the court 
suggested, the City was seeking redress under 
the FHA for “an economic loss from a 
decrease in property values,” and as with the 
plaintiffs in Nasser, this was insufficient. The 
City's goal went far beyond the purpose of the 
FHA, which is to “provide, within 
constitutional limitations, for fair housing 
throughout the United States.” 
 
The court also concluded that the FHA 
contains a proximate cause requirement, but 
that the City had not adequately pled 
proximate cause. The City had not 
sufficiently traced any foreclosures to the 
defendants' conduct, as opposed to 
confounding background variables such as “a 
historic drop in home prices and a global 
recession,” and “the decisions and actions of 
third parties, such as loan services, 
government entities, competing sellers, and 
uninterested buyers.” The court also 
determined that the City had not shown that 
the Bank's mortgage practices caused the 
City any harm. It was unimpressed with the 
“statistics and studies” the City cited, noting 
that some were not based on data from 
Miami, some were not limited to the 
defendants' practices, and others “d[id] not 
control for relevant credit factors that 
undoubtedly affect lending practices.” Id. 
Moreover, some of the harm to the City 
stemmed directly from “the actions of 
intervening actors such as squatters, vandals 
or criminals that damaged foreclosed 
properties.”  
 
The district court also concluded that the 
City's federal claim ran afoul of the statute of 
limitations. It noted that for the FHA, a 
plaintiff must bring his claim “not later than 
2 years after the occurrence” of the 
discriminatory housing practice, and that for 
discriminatory loans the statute of limitations 
begins to run from the date of the loan 
closing. But the City had not alleged that any 
loans were made later than 2008, a full five 
years before its complaint was filed. The 
court was not persuaded by the City's 
invocation of the continuing violation 
doctrine—which can allow plaintiffs, under 
some circumstances, to sue on an otherwise 
time-barred claim—since the City had not 
alleged sufficient facts to support its 
allegation that the specific practices 
continued into the statutory period. The 
district court dismissed the City's FHA claim 
with prejudice, reasoning that even if the 
statute of limitations deficiencies could be 
cured by an amended pleading, the City's lack 
of statutory standing could not be. 
 
Finally, the district court rejected the City's 
unjust enrichment claim on several grounds. 
As a preliminary matter, the City had failed 
to draw the necessary causal connection 
between the Bank's alleged discriminatory 
practices and its receipt of undeserved 
municipal services. Moreover, the court 
found that the City had failed to allege basic 
elements of an unjust enrichment claim under 
Florida law. It determined that any benefit the 
Bank received from municipal services was 
not direct but “derivative” and, therefore, 
insufficient to support an unjust enrichment 
claim. It also found that the City had failed to 
allege that the Bank was not otherwise 
entitled to those services as a Miami property 
owner. Finally, it rejected the City's argument 
that Miami was forced to pay for the Bank's 
196 
 
externalities (the costs of the harm caused by 
its mortgage lending), holding that paying for 
externalities cannot sustain an unjust 
enrichment claim. The district court 
dismissed the unjust enrichment claim 
without prejudice, leaving the City free to 
amend its complaint. 
 
The City chose not to proceed on its unjust 
enrichment claim alone “because the two 
claims are so intimately entwined and based 
on largely the same underlying misconduct.” 
Instead, it moved in the district court for 
reconsideration and for leave to file an 
amended complaint, arguing that it had 
standing under the FHA and that the amended 
complaint would cure any statute of 
limitations deficiency. The proposed 
amended complaint alleged that the Bank's 
discriminatory lending practices “frustrate[ ] 
the City's longstanding and active interest in 
promoting fair housing and securing the 
benefits of an integrated community,” 
thereby “directly interfer[ing]” with one of 
the City's missions. It also made more 
detailed allegations about properties that had 
been foreclosed upon after being subject to 
discriminatory loans. Specifically, the 
proposed amended complaint identified five 
foreclosed properties that corresponded to 
predatory loans that originated between 2008 
and 2012, and three that originated between 
2004 and 2008. It also identified seven 
properties that corresponded to predatory 
loans that the Bank had issued after 
December 13, 2011 (within two years of 
filing suit) that had not yet been foreclosed 
upon but were likely to “eventually enter the 
foreclosure process,” based on expert 
analysis. The complaint continued to invoke 
the continuing violation doctrine and claimed 
that the statute of limitations had not run. 
 
The district court denied the City's motion for 
reconsideration and for leave to amend. As 
for statutory standing, the court explained 
that “[a]rguing that this Court's reasoning 
was flawed is not enough for a motion for 
reconsideration.” 
  
And the court was unimpressed by the City's 
new argument that it “has a generalized non-
economic interest ... in racial diversity,” 
ruling that these were “claims [the City] 
never made and amendments it did not 
previously raise or offer despite ample 
opportunity,” and were therefore “improperly 
raised as grounds for reconsideration.” 
Finally, the court noted that these 
“generalized allegations [do not] appear to be 
connected in any meaningful way to the 
purported loss of tax revenue and increase in 
municipal expenses allegedly caused by 
Defendants' lending practices.”  
 
The City timely appealed the court's final 




A. Standard of Review 
 
We review the district court's grant of a 
motion to dismiss with prejudice de novo, 
“accepting the [factual] allegations in the 
complaint as true and construing them in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff.” We 
generally review the district court's decision 
to deny leave to amend for an abuse of 
discretion, but we will review de novo an 
order denying leave to amend on the grounds 
of futility, because it is a conclusion of law 
that an amended complaint would necessarily 
fail. Finally, we review de novo whether 
plaintiffs have Article III standing.  
 
B. Fair Housing Act Claim 
 
1. Article III Standing 
 
We come then to the first essential question 
in the case: whether the City of Miami has 
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constitutional standing to bring its Fair 
Housing Act claim. Although the district 
court addressed only the issue of so-called 
“statutory standing,” the Bank contests both 
Article III standing and statutory standing, 
and we address each in turn. 
 
 “[S]tanding is an essential and unchanging 
part of the case-or-controversy requirement 
of Article III.” It is by now axiomatic that to 
establish constitutional standing at the 
pleading stage, the plaintiff must plausibly 
allege: (1) an injury in fact that is concrete, 
particularized, and actual or imminent; (2) “a 
causal connection between the injury and the 
conduct complained of,” such that the injury 
is “fairly traceable to the challenged action of 
the defendant”; and (3) that a favorable 
judicial decision will “likely” redress the 
injury. The “line of causation” between the 
alleged conduct and the injury must not be 
“too attenuated.” The party invoking federal 
jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing 
these elements. At the pleading stage, 
“general factual allegations of injury 
resulting from the defendant's conduct may 
suffice” to demonstrate standing. 
 
The district court did not address whether the 
City had Article III standing because it 
granted the Bank's motion to dismiss on other 
grounds. On appeal, the Bank argues that the 
City lacked Article III standing because it had 
not adequately alleged the causal 
connection—that is, the “traceability”—
between its injury and the Bank's conduct. 
We are unpersuaded. 
 
To recap, the City claims that the Bank's 
discriminatory lending practices caused 
minority-owned properties to fall into 
foreclosure when they otherwise would not 
have, or earlier than they otherwise would 
have. This, in turn, decreased the value of the 
foreclosed properties themselves and the 
neighboring properties, thereby depriving the 
City of property tax revenue, and created 
blight, thereby forcing the City to spend 
additional money on municipal services. We 
have little difficulty in finding, based on 
controlling Supreme Court caselaw, that the 
City has said enough to allege an injury in 
fact for constitutional standing purposes. Our 
analysis is guided by Gladstone, Realtors v. 
Village of Bellwood. In that case, the Village 
of Bellwood sued a real estate firm under the 
FHA for discriminatory renting practices that 
caused racial segregation. The Supreme 
Court held that the village had Article III 
standing to bring its claim partly on the basis 
of “[a] significant reduction in property 
values,” because such a reduction “directly 
injures a municipality by diminishing its tax 
base, thus threatening its ability to bear the 
costs of local government and to provide 
services.” Like the Village of Bellwood, the 
City of Miami claims that an allegedly 
discriminatory policy has reduced local 
property values and diminished its tax base. 
Thus, like the Village of Bellwood, the City 
of Miami has adequately alleged an injury in 
fact. 
 
As for Article III causation, the Bank claims 
that the City's harm is not fairly traceable to 
the Bank's conduct. Specifically, it suggests 
that a myriad of other factors cause 
foreclosure and blight—including the state of 
the housing market and the actions of third 
parties like other property owners, competing 
sellers, vandals, etc.—thereby breaking the 
causal chain. While we acknowledge the real 
possibility of confounding variables, at this 
stage in the proceeding the City's alleged 
chain of causation is perfectly plausible: 
taking the City's allegations as true, the 
Bank's extensive pattern of discriminatory 
lending led to substantially more defaults on 
its predatory loans, leading to a higher rate of 
foreclosure on minority-owned property and 
thereby reducing the City's tax base. 
Moreover, the complaint supports its 
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allegations with regression analyses that link 
the Bank's treatment of minority borrowers to 
predatory loans, predatory loans to 
foreclosure, and foreclosure to reduced tax 
revenue. 
 
Of course, the City has limited its claim only 
to those damages arising from foreclosures 
caused by the Bank's lending practices. At a 
subsequent stage in the litigation it may well 
be difficult to prove which foreclosures 
resulted from discriminatory lending, how 
much tax revenue was actually lost as a result 
of the Bank's behavior, etc. But at this early 
stage, the claim is plausible and sufficient. 
The City has said enough to establish Article 
III standing. 
 
2. “Statutory Standing” 
 
The district court dismissed the City's claim, 
however, not on the basis of Article III 
standing, but because it lacked what the court 
characterized as “statutory standing.” It 
found that the City fell outside the FHA's 
“zone of interests,” and that its harm was not 
proximately caused by the Bank's actions. 
Ultimately, we disagree with the district 
court's legal conclusions. As for the zone of 
interests, we conclude that we are bound by 
Supreme Court precedent stating that so-
called statutory standing under the FHA 
extends as broadly as Article III will permit, 
and find that this includes the City. As for 
proximate cause, we agree that it must be 
pled for a damages claim under the FHA, but 
find that the City has adequately done so 
here. 
 
Notably, the Supreme Court recently 
clarified in Lexmark International, Inc. v. 
Static Control Components, Inc. that the 
longstanding doctrinal label of “statutory 
standing” (sometimes also called “prudential 
standing”) is misleading. The proper inquiry 
is whether the plaintiff “has a cause of action 
under the statute.” But that inquiry isn't a 
matter of standing, because “the absence of a 
valid ... cause of action does not implicate 
subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the court's 
statutory or constitutional power to 
adjudicate the case.” Instead, it is “a 
straightforward question of statutory 
interpretation.” 
 
This issue comes before the Court on a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 
and the City's pleadings are evaluated for 
plausibility using the standard set forth in 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. “The 
complaint must contain enough facts to make 
a claim for relief plausible on its face; a party 
must plead ‘factual content that allows the 
court to draw the reasonable inference that 
the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged.’ ” Of course, in evaluating the 
plausibility of the claim we must take all of 
the plaintiff's factual allegations as true. 
 
a. Zone of Interests 
 
In general, a statutory cause of action 
“extends only to those plaintiffs whose 
interests ‘fall within the zone of interests 
protected by the law invoked.’ ” The 
Supreme Court has instructed us that this test 
“applies to all statutorily created causes of 
action,” but its application is not uniform: 
“certain statutes ... protect a more-than-
usually ‘expansive’ range of interests.”  
 
The FHA provides that: 
 
[a]n aggrieved person may 
commence a civil action in an 
appropriate United States district 
court or State court not later than 2 
years after the occurrence or the 
termination of an alleged 
discriminatory housing practice ... to 
obtain appropriate relief with respect 
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to such discriminatory housing 
practice or breach. 
 
It defines an “aggrieved person” as anyone 
who “claims to have been injured by a 
discriminatory housing practice,” or 
“believes that such person will be injured by 
a discriminatory housing practice that is 
about to occur.”  
 
The Bank claims that the City is not an 
“aggrieved person,” and, therefore, falls 
outside the statute's zone of interests and 
cannot state a cause of action under the FHA. 
The City argues, however, that “FHA 
statutory standing is as broad as the 
Constitution permits under Article III,” and 
therefore it is within the statute's zone of 
interests. Older Supreme Court cases appear 
to support the City's view, while certain more 
recent cases—as well as an older decision of 
this Court—have cast some doubt on the 
viability of those holdings. The answer 
requires carefully parsing both Supreme 
Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent, and a 
review of the relevant cases is instructive. 
 
i. Early Supreme Court cases 
 
The first major FHA case explicated by the 
Supreme Court is Trafficante v. Metropolitan 
Life Insurance. Two tenants of an apartment 
complex—one black, one white—alleged 
that the landlord discriminated against 
minorities on the basis of race when renting 
units, in violation of the FHA. The Court held 
that standing under the Act was defined “as 
broadly as is permitted by Article III of the 
Constitution ... insofar as tenants of the same 
housing unit that is charged with 
discrimination are concerned.” “The 
language of the Act is broad and inclusive,” 
the Court wrote, and “the alleged injury to 
existing tenants by exclusion of minority 
persons from the apartment complex is the 
loss of important benefits from interracial 
associations.” 
 
Seven years later, in Gladstone, the Village 
of Bellwood brought suit under the FHA 
against two real estate firms for “steering” 
black and white homeowners into targeted, 
race-specific neighborhoods, thereby 
“manipulat[ing] the housing market,” 
“affecting the village's racial composition,” 
and causing “[a] significant reduction in 
property values.” The Court concluded that 
the village had stated a cause of action under 
the FHA and reaffirmed, based on the 
legislative history and purpose of the statute, 
that statutory standing under the FHA “is as 
broad as is permitted by Article III of the 
Constitution.” 
 
Next came Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 
in which—along with other plaintiffs—a 
nonprofit corporation whose purpose was “to 
make equal opportunity in housing a reality 
in the Richmond Metropolitan Area” brought 
an FHA claim against a realty firm for racial 
steering (i.e., fostering racial segregation by 
guiding prospective buyers towards or away 
from certain apartments based on the buyer's 
race). In the clearest and most unambiguous 
terms, the Supreme Court reiterated the 
holding of Gladstone: “Congress intended 
standing under [the FHA] to extend to the full 
limits of Art. III and ... the courts accordingly 
lack the authority to create prudential barriers 
to standing in suits brought under [the 
FHA].” As the Court explained, “the sole 
requirement for standing to sue under [the 
FHA] is the Art. III minima of injury in fact: 
that the plaintiff allege that as a result of the 
defendant's actions he has suffered ‘a distinct 
and palpable injury.’ ” The organization's 
allegation that the racial steering “perceptibly 
impaired [its] ability to provide counseling 
and referral services for low- and moderate-
income homeseekers” was sufficient to 
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constitute injury in fact for purposes of 




Less than a month after Havens, the Eleventh 
Circuit issued an opinion in Nasser, on which 
the district court and the Bank principally 
rely. In Nasser, property owners challenged a 
zoning ordinance that rezoned their property 
from multi-family residential to single-
family residential, alleging, inter alia, that the 
ordinance violated the FHA. In 1976, the 
plaintiffs entered into an agreement with a 
developer for the construction of a multi-
family housing complex on their property. 
The developer had looked into the possibility 
of making some units of this complex 
available for low- and moderate-income 
families via rent subsidies, and had inquired 
with the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development. But the development never 
materialized. A detailed affidavit from a 
member of the county planning commission 
stated that the plaintiffs had never suggested 
that their purpose “was to build a multi-
family project for the use and benefit of low 
income or minority groups.” Instead, the 
affidavit claimed that the plaintiffs had 
represented their project as “an exclusive-
high rent apartment complex.” The Court 
found that there was no “evidence that the 
1976 project was in any way affected by or 
related to racial or other minority interests.” 
 
Three years later, the land was re-zoned. The 
plaintiffs claimed that the re-zoning had 
reduced the value of their property by more 
than 50% (from $285,000 to $135,000). A 
panel of this Court concluded that the 
plaintiffs lacked statutory standing under the 
FHA despite this purported economic injury. 
In making this determination, the Court 
considered Trafficante and Gladstone, and 
concluded: “There is no indication that the 
[Supreme] Court intended to extend standing, 
beyond the facts before it, to plaintiffs who 
show no more than an economic interest 
which is not somehow affected by a racial 
interest.” The Nasser Court found that the 
property owners lacked an economic interest 
affected by a racial interest, and therefore 
lacked standing to sue under the FHA.  
 
iii. Newer Supreme Court cases on statutory 
standing 
 
Two recent Supreme Court cases have cast 
some doubt on the broad interpretation of 
FHA statutory standing in Trafficante, 
Gladstone, and Havens. In Thompson v. 
North American Stainless, LP, the Court 
considered whether an employee had a cause 
of action under Title VII, which uses nearly 
identical statutory language to the FHA. The 
Court rejected the argument that this 
language expanded statutory standing to the 
limits of Article III. Instead, it drew an 
analogy to the Administrative Procedure Act 
(which contains similar language) and held 
that plaintiffs must “fall[ ] within the ‘zone of 
interests' sought to be protected by the 
statutory provision whose violation forms the 
legal basis for his complaint.”  
 
The Court acknowledged that this analysis 
was in some tension with Trafficante and 
Gladstone. But in glossing Trafficante, the 
Thompson Court focused on language in the 
opinion that arguably limited the holding to 
its facts: the Trafficante Court stated that 
standing under the FHA was coextensive 
with Article III only “insofar as tenants of the 
same housing unit that is charged with 
discrimination are concerned.” The 
Thompson Court acknowledged that later 
cases (such as Gladstone ) reiterated that 
standing under the FHA “reaches as far as 
Article III permits” without any limiting 
language, but it stated that “the holdings of 
those cases are compatible with the ‘zone of 
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interests' limitation” that the Court went on to 
read into Title VII.  
 
Finally, the Supreme Court's recent opinion 
in Lexmark (interpreting the Lanham Act) 
discarded the labels “prudential standing” 
and “statutory standing,” and clarified that 
the inquiry was really a question of statutory 
interpretation, and not standing at all. One 
aspect of this interpretation, the Court 
explained, was a zone of interests analysis, 
which “requires [the court] to determine, 
using traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation, whether a legislatively 
conferred cause of action encompasses a 
particular plaintiff's claim.” The Court went 
on to say that this zone of interests test 
“applies to all statutorily created causes of 
action.” Lexmark did not mention the FHA or 




The scope and role of the zone of interests 
analysis in the FHA context is a difficult 
issue, and one that has sharply divided the 
courts that have considered it. Ultimately, we 
disagree with the district court, and hold that 
the phrase “aggrieved person” in the FHA 
extends as broadly as is constitutionally 
permissible under Article III. 
 
Simply put, Trafficante, Gladstone, and 
Havens have never been overruled, and the 
law of those cases is clear as a bell: 
“[statutory] standing under [the FHA] 
extends ‘as broadly as is permitted by Article 
III of the Constitution.’ ” While Thompson 
has gestured in the direction of rejecting that 
interpretation, a gesture is not enough. The 
rule governing these situations is clear: “if a 
precedent of the Supreme Court has direct 
application in a case, yet appears to rest on 
reasons rejected in some other line of 
decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow 
the case which directly controls, leaving to 
the Supreme Court[ ] the prerogative of 
overruling its own decisions.” In other words, 
“the Supreme Court has insisted on reserving 
to itself the task of burying its own 
decisions.” 
Notably, Thompson itself was a Title VII 
case, not a Fair Housing Act case. Thompson 
surveyed Trafficante and Gladstone, but did 
not explicitly overrule them—nor could it, 
given the different statutory context in which 
it arose. Instead, the Court held that any 
suggestion drawn from the FHA cases that 
Title VII's cause of action is similarly broad 
was “ill-considered” dictum. It's true that 
Title VII contains nearly identical statutory 
language to the FHA, and therefore the 
Thompson Court's interpretation of Title VII 
may signal that the Supreme Court is 
prepared to narrow its interpretation of the 
FHA in the future. (The dicta in Thompson 
indicating that its Title VII interpretation is 
“compatible” with the Court's previous FHA 
holdings suggests as much.) But that day has 
not yet arrived, and until it does, our role as 
an inferior court is to apply the law as it 
stands, not to read tea leaves. The still-
undisturbed holding of the Supreme Court's 
FHA cases is that the definition of an 
“aggrieved person” under the FHA extends 
as broadly as permitted under Article III. 
 
This Court's binding precedent in Nasser is 
not to the contrary. Nasser stands for the 
unremarkable proposition that a plaintiff has 
no cause of action under the FHA if he makes 
no allegation of discrimination (or disparate 
impact) on the basis of race (or one of the 
FHA's other protected characteristics: color, 
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, and 
national origin). The allegation of 
discrimination provides the “racial interest” 
Nasser requires to bring an economic injury 
within the scope of the statute. The Nasser 
plaintiffs' claim was unrelated to race (or any 
protected FHA characteristic) altogether; 
they simply objected to the rezoning of their 
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property because it cost them money. As the 
Nasser Court put it, the plaintiffs' “interest in 
[the] value of the property in no way 
implicate [d] [the] values protected by the 
Act.”  
 
Indeed, this is exactly how subsequent 
Eleventh Circuit caselaw has treated Nasser. 
In Baytree of Inverrary Realty Partners v. 
City of Lauderhill—the only case of this 
Court to revisit or reference Nasser's 
treatment of the FHA—we held that a non-
minority real estate developer, Baytree, 
stated a claim under the FHA when it 
challenged the city's decision to rezone its 
property, alleging that the decision was 
racially motivated and rendered the property 
worthless. We distinguished Nasser as a case 
“in which plaintiffs alleged only an economic 
injury unaffected by any racial interest,” and 
found it inapposite because Baytree had 
properly alleged that its injury “result[ed] 
from racial animus.” The same is true of the 
City of Miami's claim. Like Baytree, the City 
claims to have suffered an economic injury 
resulting from a racially discriminatory 
housing policy; in neither case does Nasser 
prevent the plaintiff from stating a claim 
under the FHA. 
 
In sum, we agree with the City that the term 
“aggrieved person” in the FHA sweeps as 
broadly as allowed under Article III; thus, to 
the extent a zone of interests analysis applies 
to the FHA, it encompasses the City's 
allegations in this case. The City's claim does 
not suffer from the same flaw as the Nasser 
plaintiffs', because the City has specifically 
alleged that its injury is the result of a Bank 
policy either expressly motivated by racial 
discrimination or resulting in a disparate 
impact on minorities. 
 
b. Proximate Cause 
 
The district court also concluded that the 
City's pleadings did not sufficiently allege 
that the Bank's lending practices were a 
proximate cause of the City's injury. It 
determined that the City had not “allege[d] 
facts that isolate Defendants' practices as the 
cause of any alleged lending disparity” 
compared to the background factors of a 
cratering economy and the actions of 
independent actors such as “loan services, 
government entities, competing sellers, and 
uninterested buyers.” 
  
It also found that the City's statistical 
analyses indicating that foreclosures caused 
economic harm were “insufficient to support 
a causation claim,” because some of the 
studies were not limited to Miami, some were 
not limited to the defendants' practices, and 
some did not control for relevant credit 
factors. The plaintiffs disagree, arguing that 
they need not plead proximate causation at 
all, only the lesser “traceability” required by 
Article III. In the alternative, they say that 
their pleadings were sufficient under either 
standard. Although we agree with the Bank 
and the district court that proximate cause is 
a required element of a damages claim under 
the FHA, we find that the City has pled it 
adequately. 
 
In Lexmark, the Supreme Court illuminated 
the doctrine of proximate cause as it relates 
to statutory causes of action. “[W]e generally 
presume that a statutory cause of action is 
limited to plaintiffs whose injuries are 
proximately caused by violations of the 
statute.” This principle reflects “the reality 
that the judicial remedy cannot encompass 
every conceivable harm that can be traced to 
alleged wrongdoing,” as well as the Court's 
assumption that Congress is familiar with the 
traditional common-law rule and “does not 
mean to displace it sub silentio.” The Court 
made clear that proximate causation is not a 
requirement of Article III, but rather an 
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element of the cause of action under a statute, 
and it “must be adequately alleged at the 
pleading stage in order for the case to 
proceed.” The Supreme Court has read a 
variety of federal statutory causes of action to 
contain a proximate cause requirement.  
 
Although proximate cause “is not easy to 
define,” the basic inquiry is “whether the 
harm alleged has a sufficiently close 
connection to the conduct the statute 
prohibits.” The requirement is “more 
restrictive than a requirement of factual cause 
alone,” and we have said that it demands 
“something [more]” than Article III 
traceability. But the nature of the proximate 
cause requirement differs statute by statute: it 
is “controlled by the nature of the statutory 
cause of action,” so the scope of liability 
depends on the statutory context.  
 
No case of the Supreme Court or this Court 
has ever dealt directly with the existence or 
application of a proximate cause requirement 
in the FHA context. But certain statements by 
the Supreme Court suggest that proximate 
cause must exist for a damages action 
brought under the FHA. First, the Lexmark 
Court characterized proximate cause as a 
“general[ ] presum[ption]” in statutory 
interpretation. Moreover, the Supreme Court 
has observed that an FHA damages claim is 
“in effect, a tort action,” governed by general 
tort rules, and proximate cause is a classic 
element of a tort claim. If the City's claim is 
functionally a tort action, then presumably 
the City must adequately plead proximate 
cause, just like any other plaintiff raising any 
tort claim. At least two of our sister circuits 
appear to have reached the same conclusion.  
 
The Bank argues that proximate cause creates 
a “directness requirement” within the FHA, 
and that the City's pleadings, therefore, fail 
because they do not allege that the Bank's 
actions directly harmed the City. The City 
does not accuse the Bank of discriminating 
against the City itself in its lending practices; 
instead, it claims that the Bank's 
discriminatory practices led the City to lose 
tax revenue and spend money combating the 
resulting blight. This harm, the Bank claims, 
is too indirect to have been proximately 
caused by the Bank's conduct. 
 
We disagree. The Bank proposes to draw its 
proximate cause test from other statutory 
contexts, primarily from the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in 
Holmes. In that case, the Court read a 
proximate cause requirement into RICO, 
reasoning that its statutory language mirrored 
language used in the antitrust statutes, which 
had long been interpreted to contain such a 
requirement. One of the “central elements” of 
proximate cause in the RICO and antitrust 
context, the Court explained, is “a demand 
for some direct relation between the injury 
asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.” 
The Bank argues that proximate cause in the 
FHA context must be the same. 
 
But the Supreme Court in Lexmark made 
clear that proximate cause is not a one-size-
fits-all analysis: it can differ statute by 
statute. Thus, for example, Lexmark involved 
an allegation of false advertising under the 
Lanham Act brought by one company against 
a rival. As the Court noted, all such injuries 
“are derivative of those suffered by 
consumers who are deceived by the 
advertising.” A claim based on such a 
derivative injury might not satisfy proximate 
cause under a statute that strictly requires a 
direct connection between the plaintiff's harm 
and the defendant's conduct. Nevertheless, 
the Court found that the claim satisfied 
proximate causation under the Lanham Act: 
because the statute authorized suit “only for 
commercial injuries,” the derivative nature of 
the plaintiff's claim could not be “fatal” to the 
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plaintiff's cause of action. In other words, the 
statutory context shaped the proximate cause 
analysis. So, too, in this case. 
 
The FHA's proximate cause requirement 
cannot take the shape of the strict directness 
requirement that the Bank now urges on us: 
indeed, such a restriction would run afoul of 
Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit caselaw 
allowing entities who have suffered indirect 
injuries—that is, parties who have not 
themselves been directly discriminated 
against—to bring a claim under the FHA. 
Notably, the Village of Bellwood in 
Gladstone was permitted to bring an FHA 
claim even though it was not directly 
discriminated against. So, too, was the non-
profit corporation in Havens, which alleged 
impairment of its organizational mission and 
a drain on its resources, not direct 
discrimination. And in our own Circuit, the 
same is true of the plaintiff in Baytree, a non-
minority developer who challenged a city's 
zoning decision as racially discriminatory. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Havens 
instructed that the distinction between direct 
and indirect harms—or, as the Havens Court 
characterized it, the difference “between 
‘third-party’ and ‘first-party’ standing”—
was “of little significance in deciding” 
whether a plaintiff had a cause of action 
under the FHA.  
 
In examining RICO and the antitrust statutes, 
the Supreme Court has looked to the statutory 
text and legislative history to determine the 
scope and meaning of the proximate cause 
requirement. Neither party has presented any 
argument based on these considerations. 
However, the Supreme Court has observed 
that the language of the FHA is “broad and 
inclusive,” and must be given “a generous 
construction.” What's more, while the 
Supreme Court has cautioned that “[t]he 
legislative history of the [the FHA] is not too 
helpful” in determining the scope of its cause 
of action, it observed that the FHA's 
proponents “emphasized that those who were 
not the direct objects of discrimination had an 
interest in ensuring fair housing, as they too 
suffered.” In short, nothing in the text or 
legislative history of the FHA supports the 
Bank's cramped interpretation. 
 
As we've noted, damages claims arising 
under the FHA have long been analogized to 
tort claims. Thus, we look to the law of torts 
to guide our proximate cause analysis in this 
context. We agree with the City that the 
proper standard, drawing on the law of tort, is 
based on foreseeability. 
 
Under this standard, the City has made an 
adequate showing. The complaint alleges that 
the Bank had access to analytical tools as well 
as published reports drawing the link 
between predatory lending practices “and 
their attendant harm,” such as premature 
foreclosure and the resulting costs to the City, 
including, most notably, a reduction in 
property tax revenues. The district court 
rejected the plaintiffs' claim partly because it 
failed to “allege facts that isolate Defendants' 
practices as the cause of any alleged lending 
disparity.” But as we have said even in the 
more restrictive RICO context, proximate 
cause “is not ... the same thing as ... sole 
cause.” Instead, a proximate cause is “a 
substantial factor in the sequence of 
responsible causation.” The City has surely 
alleged that much: it claims that the Bank's 
discriminatory lending caused property 
owned by minorities to enter premature 
foreclosure, costing the City tax revenue and 
municipal expenditures. Although there are 
several links in that causal chain, none are 
unforeseeable. And, as we noted in the 
context of Article III traceability, the City has 
provided the results of regression analyses 
that purport to draw the connection between 
the Bank's conduct toward minority 
borrowers, foreclosure, and lost tax revenue. 
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This empirical data is sufficient to “raise the 
pleadings above the speculative level.”  
 
In the face of longstanding caselaw drawn 
from the Supreme Court and this Court 
permitting FHA claims by so-called third 
party plaintiffs who are injured by a 
defendant's discrimination against another 
person, it is clear that the harm the City 
claims to have suffered has “a sufficiently 
close connection to the conduct the statute 
prohibits.” Of course, whether the City will 
be able to actually prove its causal claims is 
another matter altogether. At this stage, it is 
enough to say that the City has adequately 
pled proximate cause, as required by the 
FHA. 
 
3. Statute of Limitations 
 
The FHA also requires that claims be filed 
“not later than 2 years after the occurrence or 
the termination of an alleged discriminatory 
housing practice.” The district court 
concluded, and the parties do not contest, that 
an FHA claim for issuing a discriminatory 
loan begins to run from the date that the loan 
closes.  
 
This lawsuit was filed on December 13, 2013. 
Thus, in a traditional statute of limitations 
analysis, the complained-of loans must have 
closed after December 13, 2011. The City 
maintains that it has alleged a pattern and 
practice of discriminatory lending by the 
Bank, and its claims, therefore, qualify for 
the application of the “continuing violation 
doctrine.” The district court disagreed, 
finding that the City had not alleged facts 
sufficient to support its allegation that the 
specific practices continued into the statutory 
period. We remain unpersuaded. 
 
The complaint alleged that the City had 
identified 3,326 discriminatory loans issued 
by the Bank in Miami between 2004 and 
2012 that had resulted in foreclosure. It then 
listed ten specific property addresses that it 
claimed “corresponded to these 
foreclosures,” but provided no specific 
information (e.g., the *1284 type of loan, the 
characteristics that made it predatory or 
discriminatory, when the loan closed, when 
the property went into foreclosure, etc.) for 
each address. (The City also claimed that 
“with the benefit of discovery,” it 
“anticipate[d] ... be[ing] able to identify more 
foreclosures resulting from the issuance of 
discriminatory loans.”) As the district court 
noted, however, the City failed to allege that 
any of the loans closed within the limitations 
period (between December 13, 2011, and 
December 13, 2013). 
 
On appeal, the City does not contend that its 
original complaint was adequate; rather, it 
argues that it could readily cure the statute of 
limitations flaws if given the opportunity. In 
support, the City points to the proposed 
amended complaint that it provided along 
with its motion for reconsideration and 
motion to amend. The district court 
acknowledged that the City might indeed be 
able to remedy its statute of limitations 
deficiencies with an amendment, but the 
court never considered whether the City's 
proposed amended complaint was sufficient, 
because it concluded that the City remained 
outside the statute's zone of interests and had 
not adequately pled proximate cause. 
Because the district court erred both as to the 
zone of interests and proximate cause, we are 
obliged to remand the cause of action in the 
first instance to determine whether or not the 
City could remedy any statute of limitations 
deficiency. We decline to evaluate the City's 
proposed amended complaint before the 
district court has had the opportunity to do so.  
 
In order to provide guidance on remand, we 
offer this discussion of the application of the 
continuing violation doctrine to this case. In 
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addition to noting that the City never alleged 
that any particular loan closed within the 
limitations period (a deficiency that may well 
be cured in an amended pleading), the district 
court also seemingly held that the City's 
claim could not qualify for the application of 
the continuing violation doctrine because the 
complaint did not identify a singular and 
uniform practice of continuing conduct. 
 
The continuing violation doctrine applies to 
“the continued enforcement of a 
discriminatory policy,” and allows a plaintiff 
to “sue on otherwise time-barred claims as 
long as one act of discrimination has occurred 
... during the statutory period.” The 
governing law on the continuing violation 
doctrine in the FHA context is drawn from 
the Supreme Court's decision in Havens. In 
that case, three plaintiffs—a black individual 
looking to rent an apartment, a black “tester,” 
and a white “tester”—brought FHA claims. 
Their lawsuit was filed on January 9, 1979. 
At the time, the limitations period under the 
FHA was 180 days. The plaintiffs identified 
five separate incidents of discrimination: on 
March 14, March 21, March 23, July 6, and 
July 13 of 1978. Only the incident on July 13 
was within the limitations period. 
 
On March 14, March 21, and March 23, the 
two testers asked Havens about available 
apartments. Each time, the black tester was 
told that nothing was available, while the 
white tester was told that there were 
vacancies. On July 6, the black tester made a 
further inquiry and was told that there were 
no vacancies, while another white tester (not 
a party to the suit) was told that there were 
openings. Finally, on July 13—the only 
incident within the limitations period—the 
black plaintiff who was genuinely looking to 
rent asked Havens about availability and was 
falsely told that there was nothing. 
 
All three plaintiffs alleged that Havens's 
practices deprived them of the benefits of 
living in an integrated community. The 
Supreme Court held that the claims were not 
time-barred for any of the plaintiffs because 
they alleged a “continuing violation” of the 
FHA, despite the fact that only one 
discriminatory incident was within the 
limitations window, and that incident 
involved only one of the three plaintiffs. “[A] 
‘continuing violation’ of the Fair Housing 
Act should be treated differently from one 
discrete act of discrimination,” the Court 
explained. The Court reasoned that “[w]here 
the challenged violation is a continuing one,” 
there is no concern about the staleness of the 
plaintiff's claims. Moreover, the Court 
emphasized “the broad remedial intent of 
Congress embodied in the [Fair Housing] 
Act” in rejecting the defendants' “wooden 
application” of the statute of limitations. Id. 
The Court concluded: “where a plaintiff, 
pursuant to the Fair Housing Act, challenges 
not just one incident of conduct violative of 
the Act, but an unlawful practice that 
continues into the limitations period, the 
complaint is timely when it is filed within 
[the limitations period, starting at] the last 
asserted occurrence of that practice.” 
 
The case before us—if the City is able to 
identify FHA violations within the 
limitations period—is on all fours with 
Havens. The City has alleged “not just one 
incident ... but an unlawful practice that 
continues into the limitations period.” The 
City alleges that the Bank has engaged in a 
longstanding practice of discriminatory 
lending in which it extends loans to minority 
borrowers only on more unfavorable terms 
than those offered to white borrowers. The 
predatory qualities of the loans have taken 
slightly different forms over time (e.g., 
higher interest rates, undisclosed back-end 
premiums, higher fees, etc.), but the essential 
discriminatory practice has remained the 
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same: predatory lending targeted at 
minorities in the City of Miami. The fact that 
the burdensome terms have not remained 
perfectly uniform does not make the 
allegedly unlawful practice any less 
“continuing.” The various instances of 
discriminatory lending comprise the practice, 
which continues into the limitations period. 
At least at the pleading stage, this is enough 





Resolving a plaintiff's motion to amend is 
“committed to the sound discretion of the 
district court,” but that discretion “is strictly 
circumscribed” by Rule 15(a)(2) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
instructs that leave to amend should be 
“freely give[n] when justice so requires.” 
 
As we have explained, we find that the City 
is within the FHA's zone of interests and has 
sufficiently alleged proximate causation 
between its injury and the Bank's conduct. 
The district court's refusal to allow the City 
to amend, and its conclusion that any 
amended complaint would be futile, was 
legal error and therefore an abuse of 
discretion. On remand, the City should be 
granted leave to amend its complaint. 
 
We also note that while this appeal was 
pending, the Supreme Court handed down a 
decision that may materially affect the 
resolution of this case. In Texas Department 
of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive 
Communities Project, Inc., a non-profit 
organization brought a Fair Housing Act 
claim against the Texas Department of 
Housing and Community Affairs, alleging 
that the Department's allocation of low-
income housing tax credits caused racial 
segregation by “granting too many credits for 
housing in predominantly black inner-city 
areas and too few in predominantly white 
suburban neighborhoods.” The claim was 
brought on a disparate-impact theory, 
alleging not that the Department's practice 
was driven by a discriminatory intent, but 
rather that it had a “ ‘disproportionately 
adverse effect on minorities' and [was] 
otherwise unjustified by a legitimate 
rationale.” The question before the Court was 
whether disparate-impact claims are 
cognizable under the FHA. The Court held 
that they are. 
 
However, in dicta, the Court announced the 
“proper[ ] limit[s]” on disparate impact 
liability under the FHA, needed both to avoid 
serious constitutional issues and to protect 
potential defendants from abusive disparate-
impact claims. Specifically, the Court noted 
that defendants must be allowed to “explain 
the valid interest served by their [challenged] 
policies,” and that courts should insist on a 
“robust causality requirement” at the “prima 
facie stage” linking the defendant's conduct 
to the racial disparity. The Court emphasized 
that disparate-impact claims must be aimed at 
“removing artificial, arbitrary, and 
unnecessary barriers,” rather than 
“displac[ing] valid governmental and private 
priorities.” Any newly pled complaint must 
take into account the evolving law on 
disparate impact in the FHA context. Without 
the new pleadings before us, we have no 
occasion to pass judgment on how Inclusive 
Communities will impact this case, but we 
flag the issue both for the parties and for the 
district court on remand. 
 
C. Unjust Enrichment Claim 
 
As for the City's state law unjust enrichment 
claim, we agree with the district court and 
affirm its ruling. In deciding this claim, we 
are obliged to apply Florida's substantive law. 
Where the highest state court has not 
provided the definitive answer to a question 
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of state law, “we must predict how the 
highest court would decide this case,” 
looking to the decisions of the lower state 
courts for guidance. Under Florida law, the 
doctrine of unjust enrichment (sometimes 
called a “contract implied in law,” “quasi-
contract,” and various other terms) governs 
the situation in which one party has conferred 
a valuable benefit on another in the absence 
of a contract, but “under circumstances that 
ma[ke] it unjust to retain it without giving 
compensation.” There are three elements of 
an unjust enrichment claim under Florida 
law: first, the plaintiff has conferred a benefit 
on the defendant; second, the defendant 
voluntarily accepted and retained that 
benefit; and, finally, the circumstances are 
such that it would be inequitable for the 
defendants to retain the benefit without 
paying for it. As for the first element, the 
benefit must be conferred directly from the 
plaintiff to the defendant. “At the core of the 
law of restitution and unjust enrichment is the 
principle that a party who has been unjustly 
enriched at the expense of another is required 
to make restitution to the other.”  
 
The City alleged that the Bank “received and 
utilized benefits derived from a variety of 
municipal services, including police and fire 
protection, as well as zoning ordinances, tax 
laws, and other laws and services that have 
enabled [the Bank] to operate and profit 
within the City of Miami.” It went on to 
allege that “[a]s a direct and proximate result 
of [the Bank's] predatory lending practices, 
[the Bank] ha[s] been enriched at the City's 
expense” by utilizing those benefits while 
denying the City tax revenue and costing it in 
additional municipal expenditures required to 
address foreclosed properties. The Bank 
“failed to remit those wrongfully obtained 
benefits,” the complaint claimed. The City 
also alleged that it had paid for the Bank's 
externalities (the costs of the harm caused by 
the discriminatory lending patterns), that the 
Bank was aware of this benefit, and that its 
retention would be unjust. 
 
The district court dismissed the claim without 
prejudice, in part because the City had not 
alleged that it had conferred a direct benefit 
onto the Bank to which they were not 
otherwise legally entitled, as required under 
Florida law. As for the denied tax revenues, 
the district court noted that such a denial is 
not a direct benefit conferred on the Bank by 
the City. As for the municipal services, the 
district court found that they did not create an 
unjust enrichment claim for two reasons. 
First, the municipal services were not 
benefits conferred directly on the Bank—the 
services were provided to the residents of 
Miami, not to the Bank, and any benefit the 
Bank received was merely derivative. 
Second, the City had not adequately alleged 
that the Bank, as a Miami property owner, 
was not legally entitled to those services. We 
agree. 
 
The City maintains that its complaint states a 
cause of action under Florida law, but it has 
not cited to a single Florida case. The City 
relies primarily on White v. Smith & Wesson 
Corp., where the mayor and City of 
Cleveland sued various gun manufacturers 
and dealers alleging, inter alia, unjust 
enrichment on the ground that the city had 
conferred a benefit on the defendants by 
paying for their “externalities”: “the costs of 
the harm caused by Defendants' failure to 
incorporate safety devices into their 
handguns and negligent marketing 
practices.” The Ohio law of unjust 
enrichment essentially tracks Florida law. 
(“In order to maintain a cause of action for 
unjust enrichment under Ohio law, a plaintiff 
must allege: (1) a benefit conferred by a 
plaintiff upon a defendant; (2) knowledge by 
the defendant of the benefit; and, (3) retention 
of the benefit by the defendant under 
circumstances where it would be unjust to do 
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so without payment.”). Without citing to a 
single Ohio state court case in its unjust 
enrichment analysis, the district court 
determined that plaintiffs had stated such a 
claim under Ohio law. 
 
The City cites only two other cases, neither 
of which were from Florida. None of these 
cases, obviously, governs our application of 
Florida law. 
 
We have not found any case—and the City 
has provided none—supporting an unjust 
enrichment claim of this type under Florida 
law. First, the City alleges that the Bank must 
pay the City for the tax revenue the City has 
been denied due to the Bank's unlawful 
lending practices. Although a deprivation of 
tax revenue may create an injury in fact under 
Article III, such an injury does not fit within 
the unjust enrichment framework. The 
missing tax revenue is in no way a benefit 
that the City has conferred on the Bank. The 
City has provided no explanation for this 
incongruity on appeal. 
 
Instead, the City focuses on the municipal 
services—including police, firefighters, 
zoning ordinances, and tax laws—that it 
claims it would not have had to provide if not 
for the Bank's predatory lending. But this 
version of the unjust enrichment claim fares 
no better, for three independent reasons. For 
starters, it's not clear that municipal 
expenditures are among the types of benefits 
that can be recovered by unjust enrichment 
under Florida law. We have found no Florida 
case in which a municipality recovered its 
expenditures on an unjust enrichment theory. 
Indeed, at least one case suggests that a 
municipality cannot recover such 
expenditures without express statutory 
authorization, which the City has never 
alleged.  
 
Moreover, the benefits provided by these 
municipal services were not directly 
conferred on the Bank, as is required for an 
unjust enrichment claim under Florida law. 
As the district court correctly noted, 
municipal police and fire services directly 
benefit the residents and owners of homes in 
the City of Miami, not the financial 
institution that holds the loans on those 
properties. And tax laws and zoning 
ordinances are quite clearly not direct 
benefits conferred on Bank of America: they 
are laws of general applicability that, indeed, 
apply to all residents of Miami. No Florida 
caselaw suggests that these benefits are direct 
enough to sustain an unjust enrichment claim. 
Finally, the City has failed to allege facts to 
show that circumstances are such that it 
would be inequitable for the Bank to retain 
such benefits without compensation. Even 
assuming that these municipal services did 
confer a cognizable benefit on the Bank as the 
owner of foreclosed property, the City does 
not challenge the district court's 
determination that the Bank was legally 
entitled to those services. The City has 
provided no arguments and cited no Florida 
caselaw explaining why the Bank would not 
be entitled to police and fire protection like 
any other property owner. 
 
The Florida Supreme Court has not ruled on 
whether an unjust enrichment claim exists 
under these circumstances. But given the 
complete lack of supporting Florida caselaw, 
we decline to invent a novel basis for unjust 
enrichment under Florida law today. 
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's 





Nothing we have said in this opinion should 
be taken to pass judgment on the ultimate 
success of the City's claims. We hold only 
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that the City has constitutional standing to 
bring its FHA claims, and that the district 
court erred in dismissing those claims with 
prejudice on the basis of a zone of interests 
analysis, a proximate cause analysis, or the 




The judgment of the district court is 
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, 
and REMANDED for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
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June 28, 2016 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Tuesday agreed 
to decide whether Miami can pursue lawsuits 
accusing major banks of predatory mortgage 
lending to black and Hispanic home buyers 
resulting in loan defaults that drove down city 
tax revenues and property values. 
The justices will hear appeals filed by Bank 
of America Corp and Wells Fargo & Co of a 
lower court's decision to permit the lawsuits 
by the Florida city against the banks. They 
were filed under the Fair Housing Act, a 
federal law outlawing discrimination in 
housing. 
Bank of America spokesman Lawrence 
Grayson said that although the bank is 
committed to the aims of the Fair Housing 
Act, "We believe that a municipality seeking 
purely monetary recovery is not covered by 
the statute, and we welcome the Supreme 
Court's scrutiny and clarity." 
Last September, the Atlanta-based 11th U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a lower 
court's decision to dismiss such lawsuits by 
the city against Bank of America, Wells 
Fargo and Citigroup Inc. Citigroup decided 
not to appeal to the Supreme Court. 
Miami accused the banks of a decade of 
lending discrimination in its residential 
housing market. The city accused Wells 
Fargo, Bank of America and Citigroup of 
steering non-white borrowers into higher-
cost loans they often could not afford, even if 
they had good credit. 
It said the banks' conduct caused Miami to 
lose property tax revenues, drove down 
property values and required the city to pay 
the costs of repairing and maintaining 
properties that went into foreclosure due to 
discriminatory lending. 
Several U.S. cities, including Baltimore, 
Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles and 
Memphis, have accused banks, with mixed 
success, of discriminatory mortgage lending 
that prolonged the nation's housing crisis. 
San Francisco-based Wells Fargo is the 
largest U.S. mortgage lender and includes the 
former Wachovia. Bank of America, based in 
Charlotte, North Carolina, includes the 
former Countrywide Financial. 
The Supreme Court ruled last year in a major 
Fair Housing Act case, upholding on a 5-4 
vote a broad interpretation of discrimination 
claims allowed under the Fair Housing Act. 
That decision was in a Texas case and 
delivered a setback to lenders and insurers 




Business interests have sought to narrow the 
scope of the law in a bid to fend off costly 
litigation. 
The Supreme Court will hear oral arguments 
in the Miami litigation and issue a ruling in 
its next term, which begins in October and 











July 8, 2016 
 
An upcoming battle before the U.S. Supreme 
Court between the city of Miami and two of 
the world’s largest banks could go a long way 
toward determining whether municipalities 
will be able to bring claims related to the 
financial crisis, experts say. 
The Supreme Court in late June granted a 
petition from Bank of America Corp. and 
Wells Fargo & Co. to consider whether the 
Eleventh Circuit wrongly ruled in Miami’s 
favor when it revived a fair lending lawsuit 
the city filed under the Fair Housing Act. 
Miami is just one of many cities to file similar 
claims against big banks in recent years 
alleging that their mortgage lending units 
doled out shoddy loans to black and Latino 
borrowers, leading to a wave of foreclosures 
that lowered municipal tax revenues even as 
the costs of maintaining and protecting those 
properties rose. If the banks are successful in 
overturning the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, 
cities around the country will see one of their 
only avenues for both recovering lost 
revenues and protecting their citizens cut off, 
said Lawrence Rosenthal, a former attorney 
for the city of Chicago who helped bring 
cases against tobacco, firearms and other 
companies. 
“The industry would like to have to only deal 
with Congress and federal regulators. It’s 
much easier to capture those people who 
aren’t accountable to the residents of 
communities that are destabilized by these 
practices,” said Rosenthal, who is now a 
professor at Chapman University’s Dale E. 
Fowler School of Law. 
Miami sued Bank of America, Wells Fargo 
and Citigroup Inc. in three separate 
complaints alleging that they engaged in a 
pattern of discriminatory mortgage lending in 
minority neighborhoods and to minority 
borrowers that wreaked havoc on 
neighborhoods in in the city. Miami had the 
highest foreclosure rate among the 20 largest 
metropolitan areas in the country at the time 
the complaints were filed. 
Miami alleged that the banks’ actions 
resulted in a serious shortfall in tax revenues. 
After seeing a federal district court judge 
dismiss its complaint, Miami appealed to the 
Eleventh Circuit, which in September 2015 
ruled that the city had standing to bring its 
complaint and remanding the cases to the 
district court for further proceedings. 
The two banking powerhouses argued in 
separate petitions for writs of certiorari that 
the Eleventh Circuit did not follow Supreme 
Court decisions from 2011 and 2014 when it 
revived Miami's FHA complaints. 
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Without the Supreme Court weighing in on 
the question, lower courts could feel 
compelled to rely on cases stretching back to 
the 1970s when determining standing 
questions in FHA-related cases, even though 
the high court has since made decisions that 
pared down the definition of aggrieved 
parties who have standing to bring a 
discrimination case, the banks said. 
Miami argues that earlier rulings clearly set 
out that they have standing under the FHA to 
sue. 
At the center of the case are two related 
questions. The first is whether cities meet the 
standard of “aggrieved person” under the Fair 
Housing Act, allowing them to sue over lost 
tax revenues. The second is whether the cities 
can sufficiently argue that a long chain of 
events beginning with bad mortgage loans to 
citizens led to the tax losses. 
“This is not that the Supreme Court is ruling 
whether the cities can recover or not. They’re 
really asking, are the allegations in the 
complaint sufficient to warrant being heard?” 
said Kathleen Engel, a professor at Suffolk 
University Law School. 
Those questions are vital not just to Miami, 
but also to a host of other municipalities like 
Los Angeles, Baltimore and Birmingham, 
Alabama, which have filed similar 
complaints, as well as to the banks subject to 
those court actions. 
The banks argue that the municipalities are 
stretching the reaches of the law with their 
arguments about how lending decisions led to 
increased costs for fire prevention and other 
protections for foreclosed properties as well 
as lower tax bases. 
Those claims should be blocked because the 
cities themselves were not the direct victims 
of the alleged discriminatory lending 
practices and are thus not in a position to sue 
because the Fair Housing Act should be 
subject to the same standing limitations as 
other federal statutes, the banks argue. 
“These plaintiff municipalities seek relief for 
no alleged victim of discrimination,” said 
Valerie Hletko, a partner with 
BuckleySandler LLP, a firm that represents 
banks in cases similar to the one headed to the 
high court.  
“Instead, they assert that alleged victims of 
discriminatory mortgage lending practices 
defaulted on their loans and went into 
foreclosure; and that their properties became 
vacant; and that these vacant properties 
attracted criminals and became blighted; and 
that this injured the plaintiff municipalities 
by increasing the costs of providing 
government services and decreasing property 
tax revenues,” Hletko added. 
Much of the fight between the banks and 
Miami has focused on three cases. 
The banks argue that the most recent of those 
cases, the 2014 Lexmark Inc. v. Static 
Control Components Inc., limited standing 
and the definition of direct harm, foreclosing 
the city’s claims. 
The city of Miami relies on older cases, 
including the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision 
in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Co. and its 1979 ruling in Gladstone, 
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood. Both of those 
cases allow for broader standing 
interpretations under the FHA than the banks 
concede, the city says. 
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If the Supreme Court overturns the Eleventh 
Circuit and relies on the more recent rulings, 
“the bottom would fall out” of the remaining 
cases filed by municipalities, Hletko said. 
And the damage may not be limited to the 
ability of cities and counties to sue. 
Nonprofit housing groups may also face the 
challenge of proving direct harm if they want 
to sue on behalf of groups of homeowners 
who allege discriminatory lending practices, 
said Robert Peck of the Center for 
Constitutional Litigation, one of the attorneys 
representing Miami before the Supreme 
Court. 
“You would limit FHA cases to the federal 
government, potentially to the states and to 
individual borrowers” who may not have the 
resources or knowledge to file such litigation, 
he said. 
The current wave of litigation filed by cities 
and counties marks one of the last areas 
where municipalities can take action against 
corporations and other actors for harm 
allegedly perpetrated against citizens. 
Congress has taken steps to stop 
municipalities from bringing litigation 
against the tobacco, firearms and other 
industries, rendering that level of government 
with few powers, Engel said. 
“Cities are powerless because they can only 
act on their own behalf,” she said. 
If Miami prevails at the Supreme Court, it 
would still face the prospect of getting a third 
amended complaint to survive a motion to 
dismiss, a trial and then a seemingly 
inevitable appeal. 
But at least the courthouse doors would 
remain open, Rosenthal said. 
“What Miami has found is really a very 
creative and interesting piece of lawyering in 
my view. They found a rear-door to 
municipal activity in this field that the 
industry forgot to have Congress bolt shut,” 
he said. 
--Editing by Sarah Golin and Philip Shea.
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September 1, 2015 
 
A federal appeals court on Tuesday revived 
three lawsuits in which the City of Miami 
accused Wells Fargo & Co, Bank of America 
Corp and Citigroup Inc of predatory 
mortgage lending to black and Hispanic 
borrowers. 
By a 3-0 vote, the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals said a lower court erred in 
dismissing the city's claims under the federal 
Fair Housing Act, over what Miami called a 
decade of lending discrimination in its 
residential housing market. 
"It is clear that the harm the city claims to 
have suffered has a sufficiently close 
connection to the conduct the statute 
prohibits," Circuit Judge Stanley Marcus 
wrote. 
U.S. cities including Baltimore, Chicago, 
Cleveland, Los Angeles and Memphis have 
with mixed success accused banks of biased 
mortgage lending that prolonged the nation's 
housing crisis. 
Miami alleged that Wells Fargo, Bank of 
America and Citigroup steered non-white 
borrowers into higher-cost loans they often 
could not afford, even if they had good credit. 
The city said this "reverse redlining" led to a 
large number of foreclosures, lower property 
tax collections and increased spending to 
combat urban blight. 
In July 2014, U.S. District Judge William 
Dimitrouleas in Fort Lauderdale, Florida 
dismissed Miami's lawsuits. He said the city 
lacked standing to sue, and that the alleged 
harm was too remote from the banks' 
conduct. 
But the appeals court said that standard was 
too stringent and that banks could have 
reasonably foreseen the "attendant harm" 
from their alleged discriminatory lending. 
The 11th Circuit did not rule on the merits. 
Wells Fargo is the largest U.S. mortgage 
lender and includes the former Wachovia, 
while Bank of America includes the former 
Countrywide Financial. 
Tom Goyda, a Wells Fargo spokesman, said 
the San Francisco-based bank is disappointed 
in the outcome and "prepared to present 
strong arguments in support of our long 
history of fair and responsible lending in 
Miami and across the country." 
Bank of America spokesman Rick Simon 
said the Charlotte, North Carolina-based 
217 
 
bank is considering its options. "Our record 
demonstrates a firm commitment and strong 
record for fair and responsible lending and 
community revitalization," he said. 
Mark Rodgers, a spokesman for New York-
based Citigroup, declined to comment. 
The Miami city attorney's office had no 
immediate comment. 
In July, federal judges in Chicago and Los 
Angeles dismissed lawsuit accusing Wells 
Fargo of predatory lending in those cities. 
Los Angeles' similar lawsuit against Bank of 

















The cases in the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals are Miami v. Bank of America Corp 
et al, No. 14-14543; Miami v. Wells Fargo & 
Co, et al, No. 14-14544; and Miami v. 
Citigroup Inc et al, No. 14-14706. (Reporting 
by Jonathan Stempel in New York; Editing 




Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools 
15-497 
Ruling Below: Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 788 F.3d 622 (6th Cir. 2015) 
E.F., daughter of Stacy and Brent Fry, was born with spastic quadriplegic cerebral palsy, and was 
prescribed a service dog. Her schools refused to allow her to bring her service dog into the 
school. Parents sued on behalf of their daughter on the grounds that this violated Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which was 
granted by the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs appealed. 
The Court of Appeals held that the claim required the plaintiffs to exhaust the procedures found 
in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act before they could fil suit, though one judge 
dissented.  
Question Presented: Whether the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986 commands 
exhaustion in a suit, brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation 
Act, that seeks damages – a remedy that is not available under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act. 
 
Stacy FRY and Brent Fry, as next friends of minor E.F., Plaintiffs–Appellants, 
v. 
NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS; Pamela Barnes; Jackson County Intermediate 
School District, Defendants–Appellees. 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit 
Decided on June 12, 2015 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
ROGERS, Circuit Judge. 
 
The administrative exhaustion requirements 
of the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act (IDEA) must, under that act, be met even 
with respect to some claims under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and 
the Rehabilitation Act. The question on this 
appeal is whether the ADA and 
Rehabilitation Act claims in this case are 
such claims requiring IDEA exhaustion. 
 
The Frys' daughter, E.F., suffers from 
cerebral palsy and was prescribed a service 
dog to assist her with everyday tasks. Her 
school, which provided her with a human 
aide as part of her Individualized Education 
Program (IEP) under the IDEA, refused to 
permit her to bring her service dog to school. 
The Frys sued the school, its principal, and 
the school district, alleging violations of the 
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and state 
disability law. The district court granted the 
defendants' motion to dismiss under 
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Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) on the grounds that 
because the Frys' claims necessarily 
implicated E.F.'s IEP, the IDEA's exhaustion 
provision required the Frys to exhaust IDEA 
administrative procedures prior to bringing 
suit under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. 
The Frys appeal, arguing that the IDEA 
exhaustion provision does not apply because 
they do not seek relief provided by IDEA 
procedures. But because the specific injuries 
the Frys allege are essentially educational, 
they are exactly the sort of injuries the IDEA 
aims to prevent, and therefore the IDEA's 
exhaustion requirement applies to the Frys' 
claims. 
 
Because this is an appeal from a grant of a 
motion to dismiss based on the pleadings, we 
take as true the facts alleged in the Frys' 
complaint. 
 
E.F., the daughter of Stacy and Brent Fry, 
was born with spastic quadriplegic cerebral 
palsy, which significantly impairs her motor 
skills and mobility. In 2008, E.F. was 
prescribed a service dog. Over the course of 
the next year, E.F. obtained and trained with 
a specially trained service dog, a hybrid 
goldendoodle named Wonder. Wonder 
assists E.F. by increasing her mobility and 
assisting with physical tasks such as using the 
toilet and retrieving dropped items. At the 
time this dispute arose, E.F. could not handle 
Wonder on her own, but at some point in the 
future she would be able to. In October 2009, 
when Wonder's training was complete, her 
school, Ezra Eby Elementary School, refused 
permission for Wonder to accompany E.F. at 
school. There was already an IEP in place for 
E.F. for the 2009–2010 school year that 
included a human aide providing one-on-one 
support. In a specially convened IEP meeting 
in January 2010, school administrators 
confirmed the decision to prohibit Wonder, 
reasoning in part that Wonder would not be 
able to provide any support the human aide 
could not provide. In April 2010, the school 
agreed to a trial period, to last until the end of 
the school year, during which E.F. could 
bring Wonder to school. During this trial 
period, however, Wonder was not at all times 
permitted to be with E.F. or to perform some 
functions for which he had been trained. At 
the end of the trial period, the school 
informed the Frys that Wonder would not be 
permitted to attend school with E.F. in the 
coming school year. 
 
The Frys then began homeschooling E.F. and 
filed a complaint with the Office of Civil 
Rights at the Department of Education under 
the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 
Two years later, in May 2012, the Office of 
Civil Rights found that the school's refusal to 
permit Wonder to attend with E.F. was a 
violation of the ADA. At that time, without 
accepting the factual or legal conclusions of 
the Office of Civil Rights, the school agreed 
to permit E.F. to attend school with Wonder 
starting in fall 2012. However, the Frys 
decided to enroll E.F. in a school in a 
different district where they encountered no 
opposition to Wonder's attending school with 
E.F. 
 
The Frys filed suit on December 17, 2012, 
seeking damages for the school's refusal to 
accommodate Wonder between fall 2009 and 
spring 2012. The Frys alleged the following 
particular injuries: denial of equal access to 
school facilities, denial of the use of Wonder 
as a service dog, interference with E.F.'s 
ability to form a bond with Wonder, denial of 
the opportunity to interact with other students 
at Ezra Eby Elementary School, and 
psychological harm caused by the 
defendants' refusal to accommodate E.F. as a 
disabled person. The Frys sought relief under 
Title II of the ADA, § 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act (which prohibits 
discrimination based on disability in “any 
program or activity receiving Federal 
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financial assistance”), and the Michigan 
Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act. 
The district court declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law 
claim. 
 
On January 10, 2014, the district court 
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss 
pursuant to Rule 12(c), finding that the 
IDEA's exhaustion requirements applied to 
the Frys' claims and dismissing them without 
prejudice. The court noted that although the 
Frys did not specifically allege any flaw in 
E.F.'s IEP, if she were permitted to attend 
school with Wonder, that document would 
almost certainly have to be modified in order 
to articulate the policies and practices that 
would apply to the dog. Therefore, the Frys' 
request for permission for E.F. to attend 
school with Wonder “would be best dealt 
with through the administrative process,” and 
exhaustion was required. Because the Frys 
had not exhausted IDEA administrative 
remedies, the district court dismissed their 
suit without prejudice. The Frys timely 
appealed. 
 
The IDEA exhaustion requirement applies to 
the Frys' claims. Under that statute, plaintiffs 
must exhaust IDEA procedures if they seek 
“relief that is also available” under IDEA, 
even if they do not include IDEA claims in 
their complaint. This language requires 
exhaustion when the injuries alleged can be 
remedied through IDEA procedures, or when 
the injuries relate to the specific substantive 
protections of the IDEA. The core harms that 
the Frys allege arise from the school's refusal 
to permit E.F. to attend school with Wonder 
relate to the specific educational purpose of 
the IDEA. The Frys could have used IDEA 
procedures to remedy these harms. 
Therefore, the nature of the Frys' claims 
required them to exhaust IDEA procedures 
before filing suit under the ADA and the 
Rehabilitation Act. 
The IDEA's exhaustion requirement ensures 
that complex factual disputes over the 
education of disabled children are resolved, 
or at least analyzed, through specialized local 
administrative procedures. The IDEA 
outlines standards and procedures for 
accommodations and services provided to 
disabled children whose disabilities cause 
them to need “special education and related 
services.” One of its primary purposes is to 
“ensure that all children with disabilities have 
available to them a free appropriate public 
education that emphasizes special education 
and related services designed to meet their 
unique needs and prepare them for further 
education, employment, and independent 
living.” To this end, the IDEA requires that 
schools and school districts develop an IEP 
for each such child. The IEP outlines “the 
child's present levels of academic 
achievement and functional performance[,] 
... measurable annual ... academic and 
functional goals,” measurement criteria for 
meeting those goals, and the “special 
education and related services and 
supplementary aids and services ... and ... the 
program modifications or supports for school 
personnel that will be provided for the child” 
to make progress in achieving the goals.  
 
The IDEA's procedures for creating and 
amending a child's IEP encourage 
participation by those directly involved in the 
child's care in education, application of 
expert analysis, and swift dispute resolution. 
There must be an IEP in effect for each 
disabled child by the start of each school 
year. The IEP is created by an IEP team, 
which includes the child's parents, at least 
one of the child's regular education teachers, 
at least one of the child's special education 
teachers, and a representative of the “local 
education agency” who is qualified in special 
education, knowledgeable about the general 
curriculum, and knowledgeable about the 
local education agency's resources. Any party 
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can present a complaint “with respect to any 
matter relating to the identification, 
evaluation, or educational placement of the 
child, or the provision of a free appropriate 
public education to such child,” including 
disputes over the content of the child's IEP. 
Within 15 days of receiving notice of a child's 
parents' complaint, the local educational 
agency must hold a “preliminary meeting” 
with the parents and other members of the 
IEP team to give the local educational agency 
“the opportunity to resolve the complaint.” If 
the local educational agency has not resolved 
the dispute within 30 days of receiving the 
complaint, the timeline for a “due process 
hearing” begins. This process must 
conclude—with the local or state educational 
agency issuing a written decision to the 
parties—within 45 days. If the local agency 
conducted the hearing, the decision can be 
appealed to the state educational agency, 
which conducts an impartial review and 
issues a decision within 30 days. These 
deadlines are of course not entirely set in 
stone, but in the abstract a dispute about an 
IEP should go through a resolution meeting, 
a local agency determination, and a state 
agency determination within 105 days of the 
initial complaint. Only at this point may 
either party take the dispute to court, and the 
court then receives “the records of the 
administrative proceedings.” The statute and 
implementing regulations ensure that the 
parties have a chance to resolve the dispute 
without going to court and that local and state 
educational agencies have a chance to 
analyze and study it. 
 
Requiring exhaustion of administrative 
procedures prior to filing suit under the IDEA 
has clear policy justifications: “States are 
given the power to place themselves in 
compliance with the law, and the incentive to 
develop a regular system for fairly resolving 
conflicts under the Act. Federal courts—
generalists with no expertise in the 
educational needs of handicapped students—
are given the benefit of expert factfinding by 
a state agency devoted to this very purpose.” 
The IDEA calls for highly fact-intensive 
analysis of a child's disability and her 
school's ability to accommodate her. The 
procedures outlined above ensure that the 
child's parents and educators, as well as local 
experts, are first in line to conduct this 
analysis. 
 
The IDEA's substantive protections overlap 
significantly with other federal legislation 
and constitutional protections, and so this 
policy justification would be threatened if 
parties could evade IDEA procedures by 
bringing suit contesting educational 
accommodations under other causes of 
action. The IDEA contemplates and 
explicitly precludes this possibility: 
 
[B]efore the filing of a civil action 
under [the ADA, the Rehabilitation 
Act, or other Federal laws protecting 
the rights of children with disabilities] 
seeking relief that is also available 
under this subchapter, the procedures 
under subsections (f) and (g) shall be 
exhausted to the same extent as would 
be required had the action been 
brought under this subchapter. 
 
The exhaustion requirement was intended “to 
prevent courts from acting as ersatz school 
administrators and making what should be 
expert determinations about the best way to 
educate disabled students.” Accordingly, it 
makes sense to require IDEA exhaustion in 
order to preserve the primacy the IDEA gives 
to the expertise of state and local agencies. 
 
We have held that exhaustion is not required 
when the injuries alleged by the plaintiffs do 
not “relate to the provision of a FAPE [free 
appropriate public education]” as defined by 
the IDEA, and when they cannot “be 
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remedied through the administrative process” 
created by that statute. When they do relate to 
the provision of the child's education and can 
be remedied through IDEA procedures, 
waiving the exhaustion requirement would 
prevent state and local educational agencies 
from addressing problems they specialize in 
addressing and require courts to evaluate 
claims about educational harms that may be 
difficult for them to analyze without the 
benefit of an administrative record. Under 
S.E. and F.H., exhaustion is required at a 
minimum when the claim explicitly seeks 
redress for a harm that IDEA procedures are 
designed to and are able to prevent—a harm 
with educational consequences that is caused 
by a policy or action that might be addressed 
in an IEP. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit 
required exhaustion when “[b]oth the genesis 
and the manifestations of the problem [were] 
educational.” In such a situation, the 
participants in IDEA procedures will answer 
the same questions a court would ask, and 
they have a chance of solving the child's and 
the child's parents' problem before the parents 
and their child become plaintiffs. 
 
The exhaustion requirement applies to the 
Frys' suit because the suit turns on the same 
questions that would have determined the 
outcome of IDEA procedures, had they been 
used to resolve the dispute. The Frys allege in 
effect that E.F.'s school's decision regarding 
whether her service animal would be 
permitted at school denied her a free 
appropriate public education. In particular, 
they allege explicitly that the school hindered 
E.F. from learning how to work 
independently with Wonder, and implicitly 
that Wonder's absence hurt her sense of 
independence and social confidence at 
school. The suit depends on factual questions 
that the IDEA requires IEP team members 
and other participants in IDEA procedures to 
consider. This is thus the sort of dispute 
Congress, in enacting the IDEA, decided was 
best addressed at the first instance by local 
experts, educators, and parents. 
 
In the context of the accommodations the 
school already provided to E.F., the 
additional value of allowing Wonder to 
attend with E.F. was educational—the sort of 
interest the IDEA protects. E.F.'s IEP already 
included a human aide who, it appears, 
assisted E.F. with the tasks Wonder could 
perform. Thus the Frys' claim is not that the 
school failed to accommodate E.F.'s 
disability at all, but that the accommodation 
provided was not sufficient. Whether this 
claim amounts to alleging a denial of a free 
appropriate public education, or whether it 
could be resolved through IDEA procedures, 
depends on why the existing accommodation 
was not sufficient relative to what Wonder 
could provide. 
 
If the human aide was not a sufficient 
accommodation, it was because he or she did 
not help E.F. learn to function independently 
as effectively as Wonder would have and 
perhaps because he or she was not as 
conducive to E.F.'s participating confidently 
in school activities as Wonder would have 
been. The complaint does not allege that the 
human aide was less effective than Wonder 
would have been in providing immediate 
physical assistance; thus the Frys do not 
appear to suggest that E.F. was directly 
denied physical access to public school 
facilities. Instead, having Wonder at school 
was important for E.F. to “form a bond” with 
the dog, a bond that would make Wonder a 
more effective service animal “outside of 
school.” The Frys characterize Wonder's 
independent value to E.F. as assistance with 
specific physical tasks, enabling her “to 
develop independence and confidence,” and 
helping her “to bridge social barriers.” Thus 
if the human aide was not a sufficient 
accommodation relative to Wonder, that was 
because he or she did not increase E.F.'s 
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ability to perform physical tasks and function 
confidently and independently outside of 
school. One might also infer, though the Frys 
do not allege it directly, that relying on only 
a human aide without the additional presence 
of a service dog would inhibit E.F.'s sense of 
confidence and independence, as well as her 
ability to overcome social barriers, in school. 
The other harms that the Frys specifically 
identify—denial of access to school facilities, 
denial of the use of Wonder as a service dog 
at school, harms caused by having to leave 
the school, and emotional distress caused by 
the school's refusal to accommodate her—all 
depend on the assumption that the school's 
refusal to permit Wonder's attendance 
harmed E.F. in the ways identified above. For 
example, E.F. was denied access to school 
facilities in the sense that school facilities did 
not provide her with an accommodation (i.e., 
permission to use Wonder) she reasonably 
needed, but she needed Wonder in school 
only (it appears on the face of the complaint) 
to form a stronger bond with the dog and, 
perhaps, to feel more confident and 
independent. In sum, each of these secondary 
injuries exists only to the extent that 
Wonder's absence is harmful, or else (in the 
case of injuries resulting from switching 
schools, for instance) would be entirely 
avoidable if Wonder's absence were not 
harmful. 
 
The primary harms of not permitting Wonder 
to attend school with E.F.—inhibiting the 
development of E.F.'s bond with the dog and, 
perhaps, hurting her confidence and social 
experience at school—fall under the scope of 
factors considered under IDEA procedures. 
Developing a bond with Wonder that allows 
E.F. to function more independently outside 
the classroom is an educational goal, just as 
learning to read braille or learning to operate 
an automated wheelchair would be. The goal 
falls squarely under the IDEA's purpose of 
“ensur[ing] that children with disabilities 
have available to them a free appropriate 
public education that emphasizes special 
education and related services designed to 
meet their unique needs and prepare them for 
further education, employment, and 
independent living.” Thus developing a 
working relationship with a service dog 
should have been one of the “educational 
needs that result from the child's disability” 
used to set goals in E.F.'s IEP. “Educational 
needs” is not limited to learning within a 
standard curriculum; the statute instructs the 
IEP team to take into account E.F.'s 
“academic, developmental, and functional 
needs,” which means that the IEP should 
include what a student actually needs to learn 
in order to function effectively. “A request 
for a service dog to be permitted to escort a 
disabled student at school as an ‘independent 
life tool’ is hence not entirely beyond the 
bounds of the IDEA's educational scheme.” 
The Frys' stated argument for why E.F. 
needed Wonder at school would have 
provided justification under the IDEA for 
allowing Wonder to accompany E.F. 
 
To the extent that the Frys also allege that 
Wonder would have provided specific 
psychological and social assistance to E.F. at 
school, the value of this assistance is also 
crucially linked to E.F.'s education. 
Accommodations that help make a student 
feel more comfortable and confident at 
school should be included in an IEP, which 
lists “the program modifications or supports 
for school personnel that will be provided for 
the child ... to be educated and participate 
with other children with disabilities and 
nondisabled children in [educational 
activities].” Thus an IEP should take into 
account any potential accommodations that 
will make a disabled child feel more 
comfortable in the school environment, since 
such accommodations will help the child 
participate actively in school activities. The 
IDEA is designed to address precisely the 
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sorts of harms the Frys allege in their 
complaint; assuming their claims are correct, 
they should have been able to obtain relief 
under IDEA procedures, if followed 
properly. 
 
In fact, the school did use IDEA procedures 
to attempt to resolve its dispute, and the 
injuries alleged by the Frys here could have 
been raised then. In a January 2010 IEP team 
meeting requested by the school, E.F.'s IEP 
team considered, among other questions, 
“[w]hat disability-related educational need ... 
the service animal [is] intended to address” 
and whether “the service animal [will] 
enhance or hinder [E.F.'s] ability to progress 
in the general curriculum[.]” The IEP team 
reached conclusions that pertain directly to 
the Frys' complaint: “[E.F.] was being 
successful in [the] school environment 
without the service animal, ... all of her needs 
were being met by the program and services 
in place, and ... adding the service animal 
would not be beneficial to [E.F.].” These 
statements either directly contradict the 
injuries alleged in the Frys' complaint or 
reflect an excessively narrow conception of 
educational success contradicted by the text 
of the IDEA. Either way, the Frys could have 
relied on the injuries alleged in the complaint 
here (or on the likelihood of those injuries 
arising in the future) to challenge the IEP 
team's conclusion under IDEA procedures. 
 
Had the Frys pursued IDEA procedures at 
this point, they would have achieved one of 
two outcomes. Either they would have 
prevailed and effectively resolved their 
dispute without litigation, making it possible 
for E.F. to attend school with Wonder, or else 
they would have failed but in the process 
generated an administrative record that 
would have aided the district court in 
evaluating their complaint. The IDEA's 
purposes of giving state educational agencies 
the opportunity to ensure compliance with 
federal law and ensuring that local experts are 
able to analyze disputes before litigation 
begins are well served by requiring 
exhaustion here. 
 
First, IDEA procedures would in fact have 
been capable of resolving the Frys' dispute. 
E.F.'s IEP already provided for a human aide 
to accompany her while at school; it could 
just as well have provided for her service 
animal. Further, as the Second Circuit in 
Cave has noted in similar circumstances, 
measures and policies designed to minimize 
the disruption caused by a service animal at 
school (a concern raised by school officials in 
refusing to permit Wonder to accompany 
E.F.) would also best be addressed through 
changes to an IEP. The Frys' complaint 
alleges a basis under the IDEA for E.F. to 
attend school with Wonder, and IDEA 
procedures would have allowed the Frys and 
school officials to work out exactly how the 
school should adapt to Wonder's presence. 
 
Second, the record IDEA procedures would 
have created in this dispute would have been 
directly relevant to analysis of the Frys' 
complaint under the ADA and the 
Rehabilitation Act. In order to prevail in their 
ADA claim, the Frys would have to show that 
permitting Wonder at school is “necessary to 
avoid discrimination on the basis of 
disability.” Under the allegations in their 
complaint, this can be the case only because 
of Wonder's contribution to and role in E.F.'s 
education—an issue that would be 
extensively analyzed in IDEA procedures. 
The Frys would have to make a similar 
showing under the Rehabilitation Act. Thus 
the IDEA exhaustion requirement's purpose 
of allowing courts to benefit from the 
development of an administrative record also 
suggests that exhaustion should be required. 
 
Although the Frys seek money damages, a 
remedy unavailable under the IDEA, rather 
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than an injunction, this does not in itself 
excuse the exhaustion requirement. 
Otherwise, plaintiffs could evade the 
exhaustion requirement simply by 
“appending a claim for damages.”  
 
It is true that IDEA procedures, which could 
at best require Ezra Eby Elementary to permit 
Wonder to accompany E.F. at school, would 
not at present be effective in resolving the 
Frys' dispute. First, E.F. no longer attends 
Ezra Eby Elementary, and her current school 
and school district permit Wonder to 
accompany her. Second, before the Frys 
decided to transfer E.F., the defendants 
settled the Frys' ADA complaint before the 
Department of Education's Office of Civil 
Rights and agreed to permit Wonder to 
accompany E.F. at school; IDEA procedures 
could not have produced a substantially 
better outcome. 
 
On appeal, the Frys do not argue that, under 
Covington, the above circumstances render 
exhaustion of IDEA procedures futile. 
Indeed, their argument does not rely on the 
procedural posture of their dispute at all. We 
therefore cannot decide whether the 
exhaustion requirement should be excused as 
futile. However, it is far from clear that the 
Frys' circumstances satisfy the requirements 
for futility under Covington. In the “unique 
circumstances” of that case, we distinguished 
precedent that required exhaustion when 
relief under IDEA was unavailable due to the 
plaintiff parents' “unilateral act” of removing 
their child from the defendant school. That is, 
plaintiffs cannot evade the exhaustion 
requirement by singlehandedly rendering the 
dispute moot for purposes of IDEA relief. 
While that is not exactly the case here, the 
Frys' failed to use IDEA procedures at any 
point during the almost two-and-a-half year 
period in which the school refused 
permission for Wonder to accompany E.F. 
The plaintiff in Covington, in contrast, 
participated, albeit imperfectly, in the IDEA's 
appellate procedures prior to her son's 
graduating from the school where the dispute 
arose. The Frys may thus bear some 
responsibility for the present inapplicability 
of IDEA procedures, and the futility doctrine 
may be inapplicable. 
 
In arguing that the exhaustion requirement 
does not apply to their claim, the Frys rely 
chiefly on a federal district court decision in 
California in which the court refused to 
require exhaustion for a wheelchair-bound 
student's request for a service dog at school. 
But applying that case's logic to this 
complaint would allow any ADA or 
Rehabilitation Act lawsuit to avoid the IDEA 
exhaustion requirement by not explicitly 
alleging a denial of a FAPE. The decision in 
Sullivan viewed a Rehabilitation Act claim 
as, in effect, asking questions distinct from 
those considered by IDEA procedures: 
 
“[O]nce plaintiff has made a 
threshold showing that her decision to 
use the service dog is reasonably 
related to her disability, the sole issue 
to be decided under section 504 [of 
the Rehabilitation Act] is whether 
defendants are capable of 
accommodating plaintiff's choice to 
use a service dog. The issue of 
whether the service dog enhances 
plaintiff's educational opportunities, 
which is central to the EHA [the 
IDEA's predecessor] inquiry, is 
completely irrelevant under section 
504.” 
 
This logic does not hold, because, as 
explained above, having Wonder at school, in 
addition to a human aide, is “reasonably 
related” to E.F.'s disability only because 
Wonder “enhances [E.F.]'s educational 
opportunities.” The analysis that would be 
necessary under the IDEA thus must be 
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incorporated into the ADA and 
Rehabilitation Act analysis for the Frys to 
prevail under the latter statutes. The Frys do 
not in so many words state that Wonder 
enhances E.F.'s educational opportunities, 
but if this is enough to avoid the exhaustion 
requirement, then any carefully pleaded 
claim under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act 
could evade the exhaustion requirement.1 
But the text of the IDEA exhaustion 
requirement clearly anticipates that the 
requirement will apply to some ADA and 
Rehabilitation Act claims. Instead, at 
minimum, the exhaustion requirement must 
apply when the cause of action “arise[s] as a 
result of a denial of a [FAPE]”—that is, when 
the legal injury alleged is in essence a 
violation of IDEA standards.  
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of 
the district court is AFFIRMED. 
 





The majority proposes to affirm the district 
court's order dismissing this civil rights 
action alleging violation of Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 
based on its conclusion that “the specific 
injuries the [plaintiffs] allege are essentially 
educational” and, therefore, subject to 
administrative exhaustion under an entirely 
separate statute, the Individuals with 
Disabilities Act (IDEA). Because I conclude 
to the contrary that the claim here is 
noneducational in nature and that the IDEA's 
exhaustion provision was improperly 
invoked by the district court, I respectfully 
dissent. Moreover, even if the 
accommodation sought could be considered 
“educational,” the fact that school policy 
would permit a “guide dog” on campus, but 
not a certified “service dog,” suggests why an 
attempt at exhaustion of administrative 
remedies would be futile in this case and 
should be excused. 
 
The disability discrimination at issue is a 
text-book example of the harms that Section 
504 and the ADA were designed to prevent, 
and the claims should not have been 
dismissed essentially because the victim of 
the discrimination was a school-aged child. 
Stacy and Brent Fry's daughter Ehlena, five 
years old when this dispute first arose in 
2009, suffers from a severe form of cerebral 
palsy that is sufficiently disabling to qualify 
her under the IDEA for a “free appropriate 
public education” (FAPE) based on an 
individualized educational program (IEP)—
one specifically “designed to meet [her] 
unique needs.” Parents dissatisfied with a 
child's IEP are guaranteed “[a]n opportunity 
... to present a complaint ... with respect to 
any matter relating to the identification, 
evaluation, or educational placement of the 
child, or the provision of a free appropriate 
public education to such child.” If the 
complaint cannot be resolved, the parents are 
entitled to a due-process hearing and, if 
necessary, an appeal to the state's educational 
agency. Failing that, suit against the school 
district may be filed in federal district court 
pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). 
 
In this case, the Frys did not attempt to 
exhaust their administrative remedies under 
the IDEA because they were not dissatisfied 
with Ehlena's educational program. Instead, 
their complaint stemmed from the school 
district's refusal to allow Ehlena's certified 
service dog, Wonder, to accompany her to 
school. Armed with a prescription from 
Ehlena's physician, the Frys had secured the 
dog at considerable expense through various 
community fund-raising efforts even before 
she started kindergarten, with the 
understanding that Ehlena would be able to 
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have the service dog accompany her to school 
in the fall of 2009. In addition, the family had 
undergone ten days of specialized training at 
a service-animal training facility in Ohio. The 
ultimate objective was to form the child and 
the dog into a “team of two,” with Wonder 
assisting Ehlena in myriad ways, including—
but not limited to—“retrieving dropped 
items, helping her balance when she uses her 
walker, opening and closing doors, turning 
on and off lights, helping her take off her 
coat, [and] helping her transfer to and from 
the toilet.” In short, the goal was to help 
Ehlena develop more independent motor 
skills, which is not the function of an 
academic program—put bluntly, basic 
mobility is not a subject taught in elementary 
school. After the Frys completed training, 
what remained was the task of getting Ehlena 
and Wonder to become closely attached to 
one another in order to make the dog a 
valuable resource for the child, especially 
during non-school hours. Based on the advice 
of experts, her parents maintained that for 
Ehlena to develop the confidence necessary 
to achieve independent mobility, she and 
Wonder needed to be together around the 
clock, including during school hours. 
 
School district officials contended that 
Ehlena already had an aide provided under 
her IEP and, therefore, did not need the 
additional assistance of a service animal. 
Indeed, they threatened to eliminate the 
human aide from the child's IEP if her parents 
insisted on having Wonder accompany 
Ehlena in school. Even more astounding, the 
school district refused to recognize Wonder 
as a service dog despite his official 
certification, possibly because school policy 
explicitly allowed “guide dogs”—but not 
“service dogs”—on school premises, giving 
lie to the claim that Wonder was 
objectionable because he might cause allergic 
reactions in staff members and students or 
become a distraction to others. 
When officials at Ehlena's school repeatedly 
refused to accommodate the dog's presence, 
the Frys filed suit as her next friends, alleging 
that the school district had violated the child's 
civil rights under Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act; and the Michigan Persons 
with Disabilities Civil Rights Act applies to 
public entities and their programs, 
prohibiting exclusion from participation by 
and discrimination against qualified 
individuals with a disability “by reason of 
such disability.” Moreover, ADA regulations 
require that a public entity “make reasonable 
modifications in policies, practices, or 
procedures when the modifications are 
necessary to avoid discrimination on the 
basis of disability, unless the public entity 
can demonstrate that making the 
modifications would fundamentally alter the 
nature of the service, program, or activity.” 
Similarly, the Rehabilitation Act prohibits 
discrimination against the disabled by 
recipients of federal funding and requires 
reasonable accommodations to permit access 
to such recipient facilities and programs by 
disabled persons. 
 
Depending upon a disabled child's 
circumstances, the two anti-discrimination 
laws and the IDEA could function as 
complements, but their focus and the 
obligations that they impose are independent 
of one another. The ADA and the 
Rehabilitation Act guard Ehlena's civil rights, 
ensuring that she, like her fellow citizens, has 
equal access to public facilities and publicly-
funded programs. By contrast, the IDEA 
guarantees that her education will be 
appropriate for her individual situation. If, for 
example, the school district declined to 
permit Ehlena to come to school altogether, 
that action would violate both the ADA and 
the Rehabilitation Act, by denying her access 
to a public facility and its publicly-funded 
program, and it would also violate the IDEA, 
by depriving her of a “free appropriate public 
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education.” On the other hand, if the school 
lacked ramps providing access to the building 
by someone using a wheelchair or walker, 
rectification of such an ADA violation would 
not likely be accomplished by modification 
of an IEP. In short, the ADA's focus is on 
ensuring access; the IDEA's focus is on 
providing individualized education. The 
point missed by both the district court and the 
majority is that for Ehlena, Wonder functions 
as an access ramp—not just in terms of the 
school building but, more significantly, in all 
aspects of her life. 
 
This point was missed because the test 
applied below was impossibly broad. In 
granting the school district's motion to 
dismiss, the district court observed that “[it] 
fail[ed] to see how Wonder's presence would 
not—at least partially—implicate issues 
relating to E.F.'s IEP.” But, this conclusion 
was based on nothing more than speculation, 
because the Frys' complaint was dismissed on 
the pleadings before any discovery could 
occur. Moreover, in terms of a school-age 
child, virtually any aspect of growth and 
development could be said to “partially 
implicate” issues relating to education. If 
flimsy, however, the district court's 
“implication” analysis was at least a test.  
 
On appeal, the majority offers no useful 
yardstick at all. My colleagues appear to 
formulate something approaching a loose 
standard, observing that “having Wonder at 
school, in addition to a human aide, is 
‘reasonably related’ to E.F.'s disability only 
because Wonder ‘enhances [E.F.]’ s 
educational opportunities.' ” But the majority 
then quickly concedes that her parents “do 
not in so many words state that Wonder 
enhances E.F.'s educational opportunities.” 
 
Indeed, the Frys' complaint does not tie use 
of the service dog to Ehlena's academic 
program or seek to modify her IEP in any 
way. For this reason, the majority is also 
incorrect in asserting that “[t]he Frys allege 
in effect that E.F.'s school's decision 
regarding whether her service animal would 
be permitted at school denied her a free and 
appropriate public education.” The Frys did 
not allege the denial of a FAPE, only Ehlena's 
access to it. Moreover, given the total 
absence of discovery in this case, the 
contention that further accommodation 
through the service dog is unnecessary 
because Ehlena already has a “human aide” 
simply cannot be taken seriously. The aide 
provided under the IEP is not there to help 
Ehlena develop and maintain balance and 
mobility, but to ensure her ability to progress 
in her academic program. To equate that 
assistance with the function of the service 
dog, as the school district did and the 
majority appears to approve, is ludicrous, and 
it completely misconceives the purpose of 
providing an aide under an IEP. Such an aide, 
after all, would be equally available to assist 
a special-needs child with no mobility 
problems at all. 
 
If “implication” and “relatedness” are vague 
and unhelpful as standards for determining 
whether a Section 504 claim under the 
Rehabilitation Act or a Title II claim under 
the ADA must first be exhausted under the 
IDEA's administrative procedures, what test 
should apply? Although the majority quotes 
statutes at length and cites very little case 
law, it does invoke the Ninth Circuit's 
opinion in Payne v. Peninsula School 
District, overruled on other grounds by 
Albino v. Baca, for the proposition that “at 
minimum, the exhaustion requirement must 
apply when the cause of action ‘arise(s) as the 
result of the denial of a FAPE’—that is, when 
the legal injury alleged is in essence a 
violation of the IDEA standards.” This 
proposition is, obviously, true. But it is 
immaterial, because the Frys neither alleged 
that Ehlena was denied a FAPE nor asked for 
229 
 
a modification of her IEP. Moreover, there is 
no proof in the record that what the Frys seek 
to redress is the functional equivalent of a 
deprivation under the IDEA. 
 
Indeed, what is clear from the record—the 
complaint and attached exhibits—is that the 
request for a service dog would not require a 
modification of Ehlena's IEP, because that 
request could be honored simply by 
modifying the school policy allowing guide 
dogs to include service dogs. That wholly 
reasonable accommodation—accomplished 
by a few keystrokes of a computer—would 
have saved months of wrangling between 
Ehlena's parents and school district officials; 
it would have prevented her absence from 
public school during the two years she was 
home-schooled following the school's 
decision; it would have avoided the 
disruption of relocating the child and her 
service dog to another school district; and it 
would have mooted the question of 
exhaustion and eliminated the necessity of 
litigation that has ensued since this action 
was filed. 
 
On the other hand, if litigation was inevitable, 
then perhaps the majority in this case should 
look to the Ninth Circuit's en banc opinion in 
Payne for more guidance than merely a 
restatement of the exhaustion provision 
found in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l ): 
 
“[T]he exhaustion requirement in § 
1415(l ) is not a check-the-box kind 
of exercise. As our cases demonstrate, 
determining what has and what has 
not been exhausted under the IDEA's 
procedures may prove an inexact 
science. In other words, the 
exhaustion requirement appears more 
flexible than a rigid jurisdictional 
limitation—questions about whether 
administrative proceedings would be 
futile, or whether dismissal of a suit 
would be consistent with the “general 
purposes” of exhaustion, are better 
addressed through a fact-specific 
assessment of the affirmative defense 
than through an inquiry about 
whether the court has the power to 
decide the case at all.” 
 
In summary, the Ninth Circuit held, “[n]on-
IDEA claims that do not seek relief available 
under the IDEA are not subject to the 
exhaustion requirement, even if they allege 
injuries that could conceivably have been 
redressed by the IDEA.” In this vein, the 
court focused on Congress's intent as 
explicitly set out in the IDEA itself: “Nothing 
in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or 
limit the rights, procedures, and remedies 
available under the Constitution, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, title 
V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other 
Federal laws protecting the rights of children 
with disabilities....” This deliberate carve-out 
would have no meaning if any and every 
aspect of a child's development could be said 
to be “educational” and, therefore, related to 
a FAPE, requiring inclusion in an IEP, and 
imposing an extra impediment to the 
remediation of a disabled child's civil rights. 
As the Payne court noted, “ § 1415 makes it 
clear that Congress understood that parents 
and students affected by the IDEA would 
likely have issues with schools and school 
personnel that could be addressed—and 
perhaps could only be addressed—through a 
suit under § 1983 or other federal laws.”  
 
The majority here has told us that 
“[d]eveloping a bond with Wonder that 
allows E.F. to function more independently 
outside the classroom is an educational goal” 
but has failed to tell us how it reached this 
conclusion. The omission is not entirely 
surprising, given that the Payne court 
identified the Sixth Circuit as one of the 
“courts [that] have not articulated a 
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comprehensive standard for determining 
when exactly the exhaustion requirement 
applies.” In developing such a standard for 
itself, the Ninth Circuit abandoned an injury-
centered approach, in which IDEA's 
exhaustion requirement would apply to any 
case in which the injuries alleged could be 
redressed to any degree by the IDEA's 
administrative procedures, in favor of a 
relief-centered approach requiring 
exhaustion in three situations: (1) “when a 
plaintiff seeks an IDEA remedy or its 
functional equivalent”—for example, when 
“a disabled student files suit under the ADA 
and challenges the school district's failure to 
accommodate his special needs and seeks 
damages for the costs of a private school 
education;” (2) “where a plaintiff seeks 
prospective injunctive relief to alter an IEP or 
the educational placement of a disabled 
student;” and  (3) “where a plaintiff is seeking 
to enforce rights that arise as a result of a 
denial of a free appropriate public education, 
whether pled as an IDEA claim or any other 
claim that relies on the denial of a FAPE to 
provide the basis for the cause of action....” 
Because the Frys do not seek to “alter an IEP” 
or to rectify “the denial of a FAPE,” a court 
adopting the Payne approach would be left 
with this question: is their request for the 
service dog under the circumstances of this 
case “the functional equivalent of an IDEA 
remedy”? 
 
The answer to this question involves the very 
purpose of the IDEA's exhaustion 
requirement, which “is designed to allow for 
the exercise of discretion and educational 
expertise by state and local agencies, [to] 
afford full exploration of technical 
educational issues, [to] further development 
of a complete factual record, and [to] promote 
judicial efficiency by giving agencies the first 
opportunity to correct shortcomings in their 
educational programs for disabled children.” 
In short, the exhaustion provision in Section 
1415(l ) is intended to insure that education 
experts make the “expert determinations 
about the best way to educate disabled 
students.” 
 
Clearly, an “expert determination” about 
“technical educational issues” might well 
concern whether a handicapped student could 
be mainstreamed or would fare better in a 
special-education classroom. It might also 
concern whether speech therapy would help 
a child struggling with autism to 
communicate. And, it might concern whether 
an intellectually-challenged student could 
learn to read with the assistance of a reading 
specialist. But it would not concern whether 
a deaf child should be equipped with a 
cochlear implant or relegated to learning sign 
language; whether a blind child should be 
furnished with a guide dog or outfitted with a 
white cane; or whether a crippled child 
should be confined to a wheelchair or 
encouraged to use a walker assisted in 
balance and navigation by a service dog. The 
experts qualified to make the “technical 
decisions” for children in the latter group are 
obviously not trained educators but their 
physicians and physical therapists.  
 
In fact, it was Ehlena's pediatrician who 
originally assessed her need for a service dog 
and wrote a prescription that allowed the Frys 
to provide Ehlena with Wonder. The school 
district's failure to allow Wonder to 
accompany Ehlena in school was no different 
from denying her the use of a wheelchair, if 
one were needed to enable her to achieve 
mobility. 
 
Rather than ask a state agency to make that 
call, the Frys submitted their claim to federal 
authorities in July 2010, by filing a complaint 
with the United States Department of 
Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR), 
the federal agency responsible for enforcing 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and 
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Title II of the ADA. The complaint was based 
on the school district's interference with 
Ehlena's access to its publicly-funded school 
program by refusing to allow her “trained 
service animal” to accompany her in school. 
In a report dated May 3, 2012, the Director of 
the Office for Civil Rights indicated that 
current Title II regulations require that 
“public entities must modify policies, 
practices, or procedures to permit the use of a 
service animal by an individual with a 
disability.” Moreover, the regulations in 
effect at the time defined “service animals” to 
include “any guide dog or other animal 
individually trained to do work or perform 
tasks for the benefit of an individual with a 
disability, including, but not limited to, 
guiding individuals with impaired vision, 
alerting individuals with impaired hearing to 
intruders or sounds, providing minimal 
protection or rescue work, pulling a 
wheelchair, or fetching dropped items.” The 
report also notes that a “public entity is 
required to permit an individual with a 
disability to be accompanied by the 
individual's service animal in all areas of a 
public entity's facilities where members of 
the public, participants in services, programs, 
or activities; or invitees, as relevant, are 
allowed to go.” 
 
Addressing Ehlena's situation specifically, 
the OCR Director summarized a letter from 
Ehlena's physical therapists: 
 
“[T]he therapists explained how the 
service animal [Wonder] had 
accompanied the Student to therapy 
since November of 2009 and had 
been incorporated into therapy in a 
number of ways. For example, the 
service animal assisted the Student 
with directional control of her walker, 
with ambulation, and with stabilizing 
herself while transitioning into and 
out of her walker from the floor. The 
Student used the service animal as a 
bridge for transitioning from her 
walker to a standing or seated 
position at a table. She also 
consistently used the service animal 
safely to improve her sitting balance 
by having the service animal provide 
posterior support as needed. The 
letter also described how the service 
animal was directed behind or to the 
side of the Student when she was 
standing at a supportive surface for 
improved safety. Additionally, the 
Therapists explained that the Student 
used the service animal to safely pick 
up dropped items. The letter stated 
that, although the Student still needed 
adult stand-by assistance for added 
safety, her independence with 
transitioning was improving.” 
 
Nevertheless, the OCR Director noted, 
Ehlena's school district “assert[ed] that the 
Student does not need her service animal for 
school, because they will provide her a 
human aide,” but if they do, “it will violate 
the antidiscrimination provisions of Section 
504 and Title II.” The Director added: 
 
“[T]he decision to deny the Student 
the service animal in the school 
setting would have wider 
implications for the Student outside 
of the school day. Activities that the 
service animal performs for the 
Student during school, such as 
providing assistance with balance and 
support, retrieving dropped items, 
and taking off her coat, are the same 
types of activities for which the 
Student uses the service animal 
outside of the school.... Th[e] 
evidence suggests that refusing to 
allow the service animal to assist the 
Student at school, which she is 
required to attend for nine months a 
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year, would result in a more 
prolonged and complete separation 
that would likely cause the Student's 
working relationship with the service 
animal to deteriorate.” 
 
When the school district refused to accept the 
factual findings and the legal conclusions in 
the OCR report, the Frys filed this action in 
district court. 
 
It is difficult to fathom what could have been 
gained by requiring the Frys to undergo 
additional “exhaustion” before filing suit. 
The stupefying fact, as noted previously, is 
that the school district's policy would 
explicitly have permitted Ehlena to have a 
guide dog at school if she were blind, but was 
not interpreted to allow the use of a service 
dog as a reasonable accommodation for her 
mobility handicap—even in the face of 
federal regulations establishing that any 
distinction between a guide dog and a service 
dog is purely semantic. Moreover, the school 
district's recalcitrance suggests a possible 
reason for the Frys' decision to pass up the 
bureaucratic process involved in pursuing 
Section 1415(l ) exhaustion as futile, given 
their repeated efforts to reach a favorable 
accommodation with the school district 
officials and their lack of success, even with 
the OCR report in hand. Of course, we cannot 
know why the Frys decided to file suit rather 
than seek a due-process hearing, because the 
district court dismissed the action on the 
pleadings, thereby short-circuiting the case 
before the complaint was answered and 
discovery could occur. 
 
In my judgment, the district court's dismissal 
was inappropriately premature. When the 
court granted the school district's motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, the pleadings 
were closed, as required by Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(c), but discovery had not 
been undertaken. And yet, Sixth Circuit case 
law recognizes that “exhaustion is not 
required under the IDEA in certain 
circumstances ... [for example, where] it 
would be futile or inadequate to protect the 
plaintiff's rights.” Although “the burden of 
demonstrating futility or inadequacy rests on 
the party seeking to bypass the administrative 
procedures,” id., the necessity of making 
such a showing presumes that a plaintiff's 
civil-rights action setting out Section 504 and 
ADA claims will proceed at least to the 
summary judgment stage, as it did in 
Covington. It follows that the district court's 
order dismissing the Frys' complaint was 
inappropriate at best, arguably erroneous, and 
not worthy of affirmance. 
 
At the very least, this case should be 
remanded to the district court to permit the 
Frys to attempt a showing that Section 1415(l 
) exhaustion was inapplicable to their case or 
that it would have been “futile or 
inadequate.” From the majority's decision to 
affirm, I respectfully dissent. 
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“Supreme Court takes up case of girl's service dog” 
 
CBS News 
June 28, 2016 
 
The Supreme Court is taking up an appeal 
from an 11-year-old Michigan girl with 
cerebral palsy who wasn't allowed to bring 
her service dog to school. 
The justices said Tuesday they will consider 
whether Ehlena Fry's family can sue the 
school district for violations of federal 
disability laws. 
Fry's family obtained a goldendoodle to help 
her open doors and retrieve items. Her school 
district initially refused to allow Wonder at 
school. Officials relented a bit in 2010, but 
they placed many restrictions on Wonder. 
Ehlena and her dog later transferred to 
another school. 
Her family sued the school district for 
violations of federal disability laws. The case 
was dismissed after a judge said the Frys first 
had to seek an administrative hearing. An 
appeals court last year upheld that decision 2-
1. 
The American Civil Liberties Union, which 
is representing the family, says the case is 
important because school districts around the 
country have repeatedly denied children with 
disabilities their right to bring service dogs to 
school. These districts often claim the service 
animals are not necessary and that the schools 
can help the children through other means. 
The ACLU wants the justices to declare that 
children prevented from using service 
animals at school can proceed directly to 
court without having to go through 
administrative hearings that can be costly, 
time consuming and burdensome. 
The school argues that exhausting 
administrative remedies encourages parents 
and schools to work together to determine the 
best plan for each child and are a cheaper way 
to resolve educational disputes. 
The Obama administration has backed the 
Fry family, saying the appeals court's 
decision was wrong and "leads to unsound 
results." The government said at the time the 
lawsuit was filed, Ehlena had already moved 
to a new school district and there was no 
ongoing dispute to compromise. Requiring 
her to go through administrative proceedings 
"would waste time a resources without 
offering any chance of resolving their actual 
dispute," the Justice Department said in a 
brief to the court. 
The high court will hear the case, Fry v. 
Napoleon Community Schools, 15-497, 










October 24, 2015 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court is being asked to 
take an appeal from an 11-year-old Michigan 
girl with cerebral palsy who switched schools 
after her service dog wasn't welcomed in a 
district in Jackson County. 
It's a long shot; the Supreme Court rejects 
thousands of cases each year. But the 
American Civil Liberties Union believes it's 
ripe for review because federal appeals courts 
have given different interpretations to laws 
protecting the rights of children with 
disabilities. 
"To force a child to choose to between her 
independence and her education is not only 
illegal — it is heartless," said Michael 
Steinberg, legal director at the ACLU in 
Michigan. 
In 2009, with support from families in the 
Napoleon area, Ehlena Fry's family obtained 
a service dog to help her open doors, retrieve 
items and use the bathroom. She was 5 at the 
time and suffered from mobility problems 
due to cerebral palsy, which affects the brain. 
But the Napoleon district that fall refused to 
allow Wonder to accompany Ehlena at 
school, 75 miles southwest of Detroit. 
Officials relented somewhat by spring 2010, 
but many restrictions were placed on Wonder 
in the classroom. Ehlena was subsequently 
home-schooled. 
The U.S. Education Department in 2012 said 
the girl's rights had been violated. The school 
district agreed to let Ehlena return with 
Wonder, but her parents, fearing difficulties, 
instead sent her to the Manchester district, 
which had no problem with the dog. 
The Frys sued Napoleon, saying the district 
violated federal disabilities laws when it had 
refused to accommodate Wonder over a 2 ½-
year period. The case was dismissed on very 
technical grounds: A judge said the Frys first 
had to exhaust a series of administrative 
hearings. An appeals court agreed, 2-1. 
That's the issue at the Supreme Court. The 
ACLU wants the justices to declare that a 
quick, clear route to a courthouse is available. 
The petition was filed Oct. 15. 
"It's important to set a precedent so other 
children's lives are not disrupted while school 
officials drag their feet and refuse to provide 
them their right to a service dog or other 
accommodation," Ehlena's mother, Stacy 
Fry, said Friday. 
But an attorney for the Napoleon district, Tim 
Mullins, said the hearing process works well 




"I doubt very much the Supreme Court is 
going to say, 'Yeah, let's pick this up,'" 
Mullins said. 
Ehlena's independence has improved and she 
now attends school without Wonder.
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June 18, 2015 
 
Courts in different jurisdictions have 
disagreed whether requests for service 
animals at school are subject to IDEA 
administrative remedies or whether parents 
may proceed directly to court under the ADA 
or Section 504. The United States Circuit 
Court for the Sixth Circuit, which interprets 
federal law as it applies to Michigan school 
districts, recently came down on the side of 
exhaustion in Fry v Napoleon Community 
Schools, ___ F3d ___; 115 LRP 25804 (6th 
Cir, June 12, 2015). 
The facts will seem familiar to anyone who 
has encountered a service animal request. 
The student, a five year old with cerebral 
palsy, had an IEP that included a 1:1 human 
paraprofessional. The parents requested that, 
in addition, the student be permitted to bring 
her service animal, a trained dog named 
Wonder. The district convened an IEP to 
consider the issue and concluded the service 
animal was not necessary to provide the 
student with FAPE because the human 
paraprofessional could do everything the dog 
could do (and, presumably, then some). The 
parents did not initiate their administrative 
remedies under IDEA – i.e., request a due 
process hearing. Instead, they withdrew their 
daughter from the district in favor of home 
schooling and filed a complaint with the 
United States Department of Education’s 
Office for Civil Rights (OCR), which 
investigates alleged violations of ADA and 
Section 504. OCR concluded the district had, 
in fact, violated ADA by prohibiting the 
service animal. Later, the parents placed the 
student in another school district that agreed 
to permit Wonder to accompany the student. 
The parents then sued in federal district court 
alleging the first district had violated Section 
504 and ADA. The district moved to dismiss 
on the grounds the parents had failed to 
exhaust their administrative remedies under 
IDEA. The district court agreed and 
dismissed the parents’ complaint. The 
parents appealed. 
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision dismissing the parents’ complaint. 
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the specific 
injuries the parents alleged were “essentially 
educational” – how the student would learn 
and develop with or without the service 
animal – and, therefore, fell into an area of 
overlap between IDEA and Section 504 and 
ADA. The Sixth Circuit also noted that the 
provision of IDEA that requires exhaustion 
of administrative remedies applies not only to 
claims alleging IDEA violations, but also to 
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claims under other federal laws seeking relief 
that is also available under IDEA. Therefore, 
given the overlap, the parents were required 
to exhaust administrative remedies before 
seeking relief under Section 504 and ADA. 
It is worth noting that Fry does not answer the 
question of whether ADA or Section 504 
requires a school district to accommodate a 
parent’s request for a service animal. The 
answer to that question requires an 
application of the specific facts of the case to 
the ADA’s service animal requirements.  
Fry does, however, prevent parents from 
taking service animal requests directly to 
court (at least in the Sixth Circuit) instead of 
exhausting IDEA administrative remedies.
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Ivy v. Morath 
15-486 
Ruling Below: Ivy v. Williams, 781 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2015) 
Deaf individuals brought a class action suit against the Texas Education Agency (TEA) head, 
requesting that the TEA be required to bring their driver education program into compliance with 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act. The defendants filed a 
motion to dismiss. The District Court for the Western District of Texas denied the motion, but 
allowed for immediate appeal.  
The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims, but that the TEA 
was not required to ensure the driver education program complied with the ADA and 
Rehabilitation Act because the program was not directly a service, program, or activity under the 
TEA. One judge filed a separate opinion which dissented in part and concurred in part.  
Question Presented: Whether the Fifth Circuit erred in deciding that the relationship between 
public and private actors does not invoke dual obligations to accommodate disabilities in any 
context other than an express contractual relationship between a public entity and its private 
vendor. 
 
Donnika IVY; Bernardo Gonzalez; Tyler Davis, as next friend of Juana Doe, a minor; 
Erasmo Gonzalez; Arthur Prosper, IV, Plaintiffs–Appellees 
v. 
 Commissioner Michael WILLIAMS, in his official capacity as head of the Texas 
Education Agency, Defendant–Appellant. 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit 
Decided on March 24, 2015 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
EDITH BROWN CLEMENT, Circuit Judge: 
  
Plaintiffs-appellees Donnika Ivy (“Ivy”) and 
the other named plaintiffs (collectively, the 
“named plaintiffs”) are deaf individuals who 
brought a putative class action against 
defendant-appellant Michael Williams in his 
official capacity as head of the Texas 
Education Agency (the “TEA”). They 
request injunctive and declaratory relief 
requiring the TEA to bring driver education 
into compliance with the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Rehabilitation 
Act. The district court denied the TEA's 
motion to dismiss but certified its order for 
immediate appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 
We granted leave for the TEA to file an 
appeal, and we now REVERSE and 




Facts and Proceedings 
 
In Texas, individuals under the age of 25 
cannot obtain driver's licenses unless they 
submit a driver education certificate to the 
Department of Public Safety (“DPS”). Driver 
education certificates, in turn, are only 
available from private driver education 
schools licensed by the TEA. The named 
plaintiffs are all deaf individuals who 
contacted a variety of TEA-licensed private 
driver education schools, all of which 
informed the named plaintiffs that the 
schools would not accommodate them.3 
Because they cannot obtain driver education 
certificates, the named plaintiffs cannot 
obtain driver's licenses. 
 
A Deafness Resource Specialist with the 
Texas Department of Assistive and 
Rehabilitative Services informed the TEA of 
the inability of deaf individuals like the 
named plaintiffs to receive driver education 
certificates. But the TEA declined to 
intervene, stating that it was not required to 
enforce the ADA and that it would not act 
against the private driver education schools 
unless the United States Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”) found that the schools had 
violated the ADA. The Deafness Resource 
Specialist filed a complaint against the TEA 
with the DOJ, which the DOJ apparently 
dismissed. 
  
Ivy filed a lawsuit in federal district court 
against the TEA and a private driver 
education school, requesting injunctive and 
declaratory relief against both parties under 
the ADA. She later dismissed the private 
driver education school from the lawsuit. 
After some additional procedural steps that 
are not relevant here, the lawsuit became a 
putative class action with multiple named 
plaintiffs and the TEA as the sole remaining 
defendant. The live pleading, the Fourth 
Amended Complaint, requests injunctive and 
declaratory relief requiring the TEA to bring 
driver education into compliance with the 
ADA. The TEA filed a motion to dismiss for 
want of jurisdiction and for failure to state a 
claim. The district court denied these 
motions, certified its order for interlocutory 
appeal, and stayed the case. We granted the 
TEA leave to file an interlocutory appeal. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
We review de novo the denial of a motion to 
dismiss for want of jurisdiction and for 




We first consider the TEA's argument that the 
named plaintiffs lack standing to bring their 
claims. Finding that they have standing, we 
next consider whether they adequately state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted. We 





There are three requirements for standing: (1) 
the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in 
fact,” (2) there must be “a causal connection 
between the injury and the conduct 
complained of—the injury has to be fairly 
traceable to the challenged action of the 
defendant, and not the result of the 
independent action of some third party before 
the court,” and (3) “it must be likely, as 
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury 
will be redressed by a favorable decision.”  
 
Here, the injury alleged is quite obvious—the 
named plaintiffs' inability to receive driver 
education certificates, which in turn prevents 
them from receiving driver's licenses. The 
TEA challenges the named plaintiffs' 
standing under the second and third prongs. 
The TEA argues that there is no causal 
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connection between the named plaintiffs' 
injury and the TEA's conduct because it is the 
driver education schools, not the TEA, that 
refuse to accommodate the named plaintiffs. 
This contention is meritless. While driver 
education schools' actions are one cause of 
the injury, it is equally clear that the named 
plaintiffs' alleged injuries are also “fairly 
traceable” to the TEA's failure to inform 
private driver education schools of their 
ADA obligations and its failure to deny 
licenses to driver education schools that 
violate the ADA. 
 
The TEA next argues that a court order could 
not redress the plaintiffs' alleged injuries. It 
advances three main arguments in support of 
this contention. First, it argues that it does not 
have the statutory authority under Texas law 
to ensure private driver education schools' 
compliance with the ADA. We disagree; 
multiple provisions of Texas law empower 
the TEA to perform actions that would likely 
redress the named plaintiffs' injuries. For 
example, the TEA can issue a license to a 
driver education school only if the school 
“complies with all county, municipal, state, 
and federal regulations, including fire, 
building, and sanitation codes and assumed 
name registration.” Thus, the TEA has the 
power to withhold licenses from driver 
education schools that fail to comply with the 
DOJ's ADA regulations. Further, Texas law 
provides that the TEA “has jurisdiction over 
and control of” driver education schools and 
is allowed to “adopt and enforce rules 
necessary to administer” the chapter on 
driver education. These provisions give the 
TEA the power to enact regulations relating 
to ADA compliance in driver education 
schools. 
 
Second, the TEA argues that a federal court 
cannot order it to ensure that driver education 
schools comply with the ADA because the 
court would effectively be commandeering 
the state into implementing a federal 
program. This argument misses the mark. 
While the federal government cannot require 
states to implement a federal program, the 
federal government can require the states to 
comply with federal law. The named 
plaintiffs are arguing that driver education 
schools are a “service, program, or activity” 
of the TEA. If they are correct, requiring the 
TEA to comply with the ADA in providing 
driver education would only require the state 
itself to comply with federal law, so the anti-
commandeering doctrine would not be 
implicated. 
 
Third, the TEA argues that withholding or 
revoking licenses from driver education 
schools would only shut down schools, not 
improve their compliance with the ADA. 
Similarly, the TEA argues that any potential 
fines would not necessarily change the 
schools' behavior. But it seems highly 
unlikely that all driver education schools 
would choose to shut their doors or accept 
fines rather than comply with the ADA. 
Instead, it is likely that the TEA's action 
would help redress the named plaintiffs' 
injuries. Thus, the redressability requirement 
for standing is satisfied. 
 
B. Failure to State a Claim 
 
The named plaintiffs' lawsuit fails on the 
merits, however. They sued under both the 
Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA. It 
is uncontested that the TEA receives federal 
funding, which is a prerequisite for 
Rehabilitation Act coverage. Besides this 
special prerequisite for the Rehabilitation 
Act, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act “are 
judged under the same legal standards, and 
the same remedies are available under both 
Acts.” Further, “[t]he parties have not 
pointed to any reason why Title II and [the 
Rehabilitation Act] should be interpreted 
differently.” Thus, “[a]lthough we focus 
241 
 
primarily on Title II, our analysis is informed 
by the Rehabilitation Act, and our holding 
applies to both statutes.”  
 
Title II of the ADA provides that “no 
qualified individual with a disability shall, by 
reason of such disability, be excluded from 
participation in or be denied the benefits of 
the services, programs, or activities of a 
public entity, or be subjected to 
discrimination by any such entity.” It is 
uncontested that the TEA is a public entity 
and that the named plaintiffs are qualified 
individuals with disabilities. The key 
question is whether the named plaintiffs have 
been “excluded from participation in or ... 
denied the benefits of the services, programs, 
or activities of [the TEA].” To answer that 
question, we must decide whether driver 
education is a service, program, or activity of 
the TEA. We hold that it is not, although this 
is a close question for which the statutes, 
regulations, and case law provide little 
concrete guidance. 
 
Starting with the plain text of Title II of the 
ADA, the phrase “services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity” is undefined. The 
Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase 
with reference to what “services, programs, 
or activities” are provided by the public 
entity. Here, the TEA itself does not teach 
driver education, contract with driver 
education schools, or issue driver education 
certificates to individual students. Instead, 
the TEA licenses and regulates private driver 
education schools, which in turn teach driver 
education and issue certificates. Thus, the 
TEA's program provides the licensure and 
regulation of driving education schools, not 
driver education itself. Title II of the ADA 
therefore suggests that driver education is not 
a program, service, or activity of the TEA. 
 
The Rehabilitation Act does define “program 
or activity,” defining it as “all the operations 
of” a public entity. In the context of 
interpreting this definition, we have 
explained that “Webster's Dictionary broadly 
defines ‘operations' as ‘the whole process of 
planning for and operating a business or other 
organized unit,’ and defines ‘operation’ as ‘a 
doing or performing esp[ecially] of action.” 
Here, as explained above, the TEA does not 
operate or perform driver education because 
it does not teach driver education or contract 
with the schools that do so. Thus, driver 
education seems to fall outside of the ambit 
of the Rehabilitation Act's definition of 
“program or activity.” 
 
Turning to the regulations, the ADA tasks the 
Attorney General with promulgating 
regulations that implement Title II. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12134(a). Unfortunately, these regulations 
do not further define what it means to be a 
service, program, or activity of a public 
entity. 
 
The most relevant regulation is 28 C.F.R. § 
35.130(b)(1)(v). Section 35.130(b)(1) 
provides that a public entity cannot 
discriminate against qualified individuals 
with disabilities “in providing any aid, 
benefit, or service,” whether the state acts 
“directly or through contractual, licensing, or 
other arrangements.” Subsection (v), which is 
not cited by the parties, provides that a state 
may not “[a]id or perpetuate discrimination 
against a qualified individual with a disability 
by providing significant assistance to an 
agency, organization, or person that 
discriminates on the basis of disability in 
providing any aid, benefit, or service to 
beneficiaries of the public entity's program.” 
 
But the regulations simply beg the ultimate 
question here. Section 35.130(b)(1) does not 
allow a state to discriminate “in providing 
any aid, benefit, or service,” but it does not 
define what it means for the state to 
“provid[e]” an “aid, benefit, or service.” As 
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detailed above, the TEA does not provide 
driver education. Similarly, section 
35.130(b)(1)(v) prohibits a state from aiding 
entities that discriminate against 
“beneficiaries of the public entity's program,” 
but it does not define what it means for a 
program to be the “public entity's.” It does 
not seem that a program of driver education 
belongs to the TEA. 
 
Another regulation provides that “[t]he 
programs or activities of entities that are 
licensed or certified by a public entity are not, 
themselves, covered.” But we agree with the 
named plaintiffs that this statement does not 
automatically immunize licensed activities 
from the ADA's gamut, given that the 
regulations also provide that a public entity 
cannot discriminate “directly or through 
contractual, licensing, or other 
arrangements.” 
 
Looking further to the interpretative guidance 
provided by the DOJ, the DOJ has 
specifically stated that a public entity “is not 
accountable for discrimination in the 
employment or other practices of [a company 
licensed by the public entity], if those 
practices are not the result of requirements or 
policies established by the [public entity].” 
Here, any failure of the driver education 
schools to comply with the ADA or 
Rehabilitation Act cannot be said to be “the 
result of requirements or policies established 
by the” TEA. Instead, the named plaintiffs' 
claim is at most that the TEA's failure to 
establish requirements or policies has 
allowed private driver education schools to 
be inaccessible. Thus, the DOJ's 
interpretative guidance indicates that the 
TEA is not accountable for the driver 
education schools' inaccessibility because the 
TEA's requirements and policies have not 
caused it. 
 
Finally, as to case law, the named plaintiffs 
cite two lottery cases as their primary 
authority for finding that driver education is 
a program of the TEA. In those state supreme 
court cases, each court held that the state 
lottery was a program of the state lottery 
commission, so the ADA required the 
commission to make the lottery program 
accessible. Thus, even though the 
inaccessible lottery agents were private 
parties, the commission could be held liable 
under the ADA because it ran a lottery 
program that was inaccessible as a whole. 
 
But there are two important differences 
between these lottery cases and this case. 
First, there, it was clear that the lottery 
commissions were running lotteries, not just 
licensing lottery agents. After all, the lottery 
commissions themselves conducted the 
lotteries; the agents that sold the tickets were 
just one component of that entire program. 
Here, in contrast, the TEA just as clearly does 
not provide any portion of driver education; 
it merely licenses driver education schools. 
Second, in the lottery cases, the lottery 
commissions contracted with the lottery 
providers, which were paid commissions for 
acting as agents for the state. Here, there is no 
such agency or contractual relationship. 
These cases are therefore unpersuasive. 
 
The only other cases that have held a public 
entity liable for a private actor's 
inaccessibility involved similar situations 
where the private actors had a contractual or 
agency relationship with the public entity. In 
the absence of such a contractual or agency 
relationship, courts have routinely held that a 
public entity is not liable for a licensed 
private actor's behavior.  
 
The importance of a contractual or agency 
relationship is also demonstrated by the 
DOJ's interpretative guidance, which 
provides three examples of a private actor's 
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activities being covered by Title II because of 
the “close relationship” between the private 
actor and a public entity. All three examples 
involve some form of contractual or agency 
relationship: a restaurant with a “concession 
agreement with a State department of parks”; 
a “joint venture” between a city and a private 
corporation; and a nonprofit organization that 
runs group homes “under contract with a 
State agency.” Thus, we conclude that the 
lack of a contractual or agency relationship 
between driver education schools and the 
TEA cuts strongly against holding that driver 
education is a program of the TEA. 
 
The named plaintiffs essentially argue that 
the TEA's pervasive regulation and 
supervision of driver education schools 
transforms these schools into agents of the 
state. But we hold that the mere fact that the 
driver education schools are heavily 
regulated and supervised by the TEA does 
not make these schools a “service, program, 
or activity” of the TEA. Otherwise, states and 
localities would be required to ensure the 
ADA compliance of every heavily-regulated 
industry, a result that would raise substantial 
policy, economic, and federalism concerns. 
Nothing in the ADA or its regulations 
mandates or even implies this extreme result. 
Thus, we join the Second Circuit in holding 
that public entities are not responsible for 
ensuring the ADA compliance of even 
heavily-regulated industries. Beyond heavy 
regulation, the named plaintiffs allege only 
that the TEA provides sample course 
materials to driver education schools and 
sells blank driver education certificates to 
them. The provision of such sample course 
materials and blank certificates is simply not 
enough to turn the schools into proxies for the 
TEA. 
 
Admittedly, this case is further complicated 
by the fact that the benefit provided by driver 
education schools—a driver education 
certificate—is necessary for obtaining an 
important governmental benefit—a driver's 
license. Given the broad remedial purposes of 
the ADA, it would be extremely troubling if 
deaf young adults were effectively deprived 
of driver's licenses simply because they could 
not obtain the private education that the State 
of Texas has mandated as a prerequisite for 
this important government benefit. But this 
concern does not transform driver education 
into a TEA program or service. Instead, it is 
partly resolved by the fact that the ADA 
regulations offer a potential avenue for relief 
against the DPS. That is, the DPS may well 
be required to give exemptions to certain deaf 
individuals who cannot obtain driver 
education certificates, given that using these 
certificates as an eligibility criteria allegedly 
“screen[s] out or tend[s] to screen out” deaf 
people and may not be “necessary for the 
provision of the” driver's license program. 
But the named plaintiffs have not sued the 
DPS, so we need not decide this issue. 
 
We conclude that the TEA does not provide 
the program, service, or activity of driver 
education. Thus, it is not required to ensure 




For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the 
district court's order denying the TEA's 
motion to dismiss and RENDER judgment 
that the case is dismissed with prejudice for 





WIENER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part 
and dissenting in part: 
 
I concur in the panel majority's holding that 
the named plaintiffs have standing to bring 
their ADA claims. I respectfully dissent on 
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the merits, however, in the firm conviction 
that TEA's involvement in driver education in 
Texas does constitute a service, program, or 
activity under Title II of the ADA, which in 
turn requires TEA to ensure that its licensee 
driving schools accommodate the deaf. 
Convinced that the named plaintiffs have 
stated a claim for which relief may be 
granted, I would affirm the district court's 
judgment denying TEA's motion to dismiss 
and permitting the case to proceed on the 
merits. 
 
1. Service, Program, or Activity 
 
This case turns entirely on whether Texas, 
through TEA, conducts a service, program, or 
activity by licensing the driving schools that 
train all drivers between 17 and 25 years of 
age who seek driver's licenses. As the 
majority opinion acknowledges, neither the 
statutes and regulations nor the case law 
provide a precise definition of “services, 
programs, or activities.” We differ, however, 
because the guidance to be derived from 
these sources inexorably leads me to the 
conclusion that the phrase is sufficiently 
broad and flexible to apply to TEA's licensing 
in this case. The indisputable truism that 
virtually every adult, including those 
between 17 and 25 years old, must have the 
opportunity to be licensed to drive a car (or, 
in Texas, a truck), given driving's unique and 
indispensable importance in their daily lives, 
confirms to me beyond cavil that TEA does 
in fact engage in the public “program” of 
driver education. That in turn warrants our 
mandating that TEA ensure that every 
driving school accommodates deaf students. 
 
2. Contract; Agency; Licensing 
 
The majority opinion rests its holding on its 
perceived distinction between contractual 
and agency relationships, on the one hand, 
and licensing relationships on the other. This 
to me is a classic distinction without a 
difference. First and foremost, no such 
dichotomy appears in the text of Title II. As 
for the implementing regulations, if the term 
“services, programs, or activities” hinged on 
the technical legal formalities of agency or 
contract and distinguished them based on the 
formalities of licensing, such a clear rule 
would surely be set out in the text, not 
relegated to subtext. The fact that 28 C.F.R. 
§ 35.130 is couched in the language of 
standards, not rules, suggests that DOJ 
interprets Title II to encompass a greater set 
of public/private interactions than the 
majority opinion recognizes. Indeed, the 
regulations explicitly forbid public entities 
from engaging in discrimination through 
“contractual, licensing, or other 
arrangements.” Not only does 28 C.F.R. § 
35.130(b)(1) specifically include licensing 
regimes, but the breadth of the additional, 
catch-all phrase, “other arrangements,” cuts 
against the majority's narrow construction 
that only contractual or agency relationships 
qualify as programs and that licensing does 
not. To me, it's not a matter of undefined 
labels but of the substance of each particular 
public/private relationship. 
 
I also read DOJ's Technical Assistance 
Manual as supportive of a more expansive 
view of “services, programs, or activities.” 
Surely, if the rule to be gleaned from the four 
examples in section II–1.3000 were that only 
contractual or agency relationships between 
public and private entities could invoke dual 
Title II and Title III obligations, but that 
licensing could not, the manual would have 
stated so plainly. Instead, the manual makes 
only the general point that, “[i]n many 
situations, however, public entities have a 
close relationship to private entities that are 
covered by title III, with the result that certain 
activities may be at least indirectly affected 
by both titles.” “Close relationship” is not 
synonymous with or restricted to “contractual 
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or agency relationship,” and I am reluctant to 
so narrow DOJ's language. Rather, I see the 
four illustrations that follow not as 
delineating the outer limits of what 
constitutes a “close relationship,” but as 
presenting four non-exclusive, typical 
examples of public-private interactions-non-
exclusive examples that occur often in the 
real world and thus are useful to include as 
illustrations. The driver education system at 
issue here, however, is sui generis—atypical 
if not unique—so it is unsurprising that the 
manual presents no close analogy. What the 
manual does do, however, is instruct us to 
focus on the closeness of the particular 
relationship—here, the one between TEA 
and private driving schools—not on the 
legalistic labeling of the relationship as 
licensing. 
 
Finally, the panel majority's perceived 
distinction between contractual and agency 
relationships and licensing relationships is 
nowhere apparent in the limited case law on 
this issue. It may well be that a contractual or 
agency relationship is a sufficient condition 
to finding that a public entity's program 
encompasses a private entity's activities, but 
it is neither the only one nor a necessary one.5 
The critical issue is not whether a contract 
exists, but (1) whether a private party 
services the beneficiaries of the public 
entity's program, and (2) how extensively the 
public entity is involved in the functions and 
operations of the private entity. If the private 
entity does so serve, and the public and 
private entities are closely intertwined, then 
under those particular circumstances, the 
private entity's activities might be fairly 
considered an integral and inseparable part of 
the public entity's program. 
 
3. TEA and Driving Schools Are Inextricably 
Intertwined 
 
The crux of the plaintiffs' case (and mine!) is 
that, even though the driving schools perform 
the actual day-to-day instruction, instruction 
is but one component of the broader program 
of driver education that is continually 
overseen and regulated in discrete detail by 
TEA. When Chapter 1001 of the Texas 
Education Code is considered as a whole, it 
reveals that TEA superintends a wide-
ranging driver training program in support of 
Texas's overarching policy goal of ensuring 
safe roads for all. Chapter 1001 does not 
merely establish TEA's authority over driver 
education—and consequently, its role as 
gatekeeper to the uniquely pervasive and 
indispensable state function of licensing its 
drivers-but also the agency's role in ensuring 
driving safety. The named plaintiffs do not 
discuss driving safety schools, but it is 
notable that Chapter 1001 gives TEA 
oversight of both driver education and 
driving safety, under the general umbrella of 
driver training. 
 
TEA plays a significant hands-on role in 
licensing drivers, but its role in driving safety 
is anything but remote or marginal. For 
example, Texans who receive specified 
minor traffic tickets may have those tickets 
dismissed if the drivers complete a driving 
safety course certified and licensed by TEA.8 
The way that the state interfaces driver 
training and the receipt of state benefits 
indicates that its intimate participation at all 
levels of the private driving school industry 
is more than merely regulatory. Through 
TEA, the state employs and manages this 
industry to achieve its own public ends. 
Again, the fact that the state's active 
involvement in this industry is labeled 
licensing does not diminish, much less block, 
its qualifying as a program of the state for the 
purposes of the ADA. 
 




The powers granted to TEA in Chapter 1001 
further support the view that private driving 
instruction forms one component of an 
overall state program. This is because TEA 
exerts more rigorous oversight of providers 
of driver education than would be expected in 
most run-of-the-mill licensing regimes. 
Every driving school's curriculum must be 
approved by TEA, and the agency 
“designate[s]” the textbooks that may be 
used. Furthermore, TEA's enforcement 
powers over driver education schools are 
broad and varied—its power to order a peer 
review, for example, suggests a greater 
degree of involvement in the driving schools' 
operations than is typical of a plain vanilla 
licensing arrangement. The requirement that 
driving school owners and staff be of “good 
reputation and character” signals a 
heightened level of concern for the reliability 
of these schools' services—a concern that is 
consistent with TEA as a public provider of a 
social services program. Similarly, the fact 
that each driver education school must post a 
significant bond, payable to TEA for its 
direct use in paying refunds to students, 
portrays a higher and more intimate level of 
agency involvement in these licensees' 
activities than would be expected if TEA 
were purely a hands-off licensing entity.13 
And TEA has the right to inspect every 
school physically at least once a year as a 
condition of license renewal—more 
frequently if the school has a history of 
regulatory violations. 
 
Beyond TEA's intertwined involvement with 
driver education schools, however, is the fact 
that through TEA the state also employs 
driver training to teach civic responsibility, 
including lessons having nothing to do with 
the mechanics of driving. Chapter 1001 
requires TEA to ensure that information 
about litter prevention and organ donation is 
included in all driving courses certified by the 
agency. That the Texas Legislature has 
chosen to promote these important civic and 
community values through the vehicle of 
driver training is another indication that the 
private driving school industry participates in 
a public program of TEA. 
 
All of this makes abundantly clear that driver 
education is not merely a passively licensed, 
private, for-profit industry, but constitutes a 
means by which TEA substantively and 
substantially effectuates the policy goals that 
the state has charged it with implementing 
and maintaining. The fact that driver 
education forms part of the academic 
curriculum in some public schools only 
reinforces the conclusion that this entire 
infrastructure is truly a “program” of the state 
of Texas. 
 
As the panel majority acknowledges, 28 
C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(v) is the regulation that 
is most relevant to this case. It contemplates 
precisely the instant situation: A public entity 
may well discriminate indirectly by 
furnishing significant assistance to a private 
entity that discriminates directly by failing to 
provide the public entity's program to 
disabled beneficiaries. The regulation, in 
other words, covers a public entity that farms 
out the practical implementation of its 
program to private entities while retaining 
and exercising considerable oversight, 
regulation, and other substantive 
involvement. In this case, the driving school 
students are the direct beneficiaries of TEA's 
program, and TEA furnishes operating 
licenses and course completion certificates to 
private schools that in turn discriminate on 
the basis of disability. In my view, the 
plaintiffs have stated a viable cause of action: 
The State of Texas cannot legislatively 
mandate driver education, then evade ADA 
responsibility via a “flea-flicker” lateral from 
TEA to private licensees. 
 
5. “Parade of Horribles” Is Inapt 
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TEA claims that affirming the district court 
in this case could lead to requiring the state to 
police ADA compliance by all heavily 
regulated, licensed industries, such as 
massage parlors and tattoo artists—a typical 
“parade of horribles” frequently advanced by 
desperate public defendants. That may well 
be, but the one and only issue before us today 
is the discrete driver education scheme 
mandated by the Texas legislature and 
created and administered by TEA. It is 
sufficiently distinct and distinguishable from 
all others that affirming the district court 
surely will not open those floodgates. There 
exist obviously meaningful differences 
between this particular public/private 
operation and virtually every other private 
operation that Texas licenses. TEA's role is 
not just about consumer protection, as is the 
focus of the several occupational codes cited 
by the state. I repeat here for emphasis that, 
in this day and age, the driving of private and 
personal vehicles is a uniquely important, 
pervasive, and indispensable entitlement, and 
driving responsibly is a civic duty that the 
state seeks to promote with this unique 
regulatory scheme that it entrusts to TEA. 
Nothing about this is changed by the fact that 
state-licensed driver education schools 
happen to be private enterprises. 
 
To illustrate this distinction between driver 
education and essentially all other heavily 
regulated businesses and industries, consider 
a hypothetical world in which every driver 
education school in Texas shuts down, so that 
no person under the age of 25 could obtain a 
driver's license via private instruction. Texas 
would undoubtedly fill the void itself—
perhaps by adding courses at community 
colleges and expanding the driver education 
programs that currently exist in its public 
schools. But if, by contrast, each and every 
massage therapist or tattoo artist school in 
Texas were to close, the state surely would 
not respond by entering the business of 
training massage therapists or tattoo artists. 
Unlike driver education schools, those 
industries do not serve as private mechanisms 
for achieving public ends and public policy. 
Viewing the case law from this perspective, 
the distinction becomes even more apparent. 
Liquor stores, buses to gambling and ski 
resorts, and taxi cabs are not services of the 
state. Like Kansas, Colorado, and New York, 
Texas might well regulate these industries, 
but it is not likely to replicate them. Again, 
the feature that sets driver education apart 
from all the rest is the pervasiveness of 
driving private vehicles in a state like Texas. 
States regulate other industries to prevent 
unlicensed operators from doing harm. In 
contrast, driver education alone is a positive 
good and an end unto itself. Texas has chosen 
to educate drivers via private driving schools, 
and it regulates this private industry not 
simply to protect consumers from unlicensed 
operators, but first and foremost to ensure 
that important training goals for this large 
segment of the state's adult population are 
met to the state's satisfaction. Texas has an 
inherent interest in driver education that it 
does not have in any of the other licensed 
endeavors, accounting for its extensive 
involvement through TEA. 
 
Finally, I acknowledge the concern that 
requiring TEA to take a more active role in 
promoting handicap accessibility in driver 
education would unduly expand its role. 
True, it may well impose an unanticipated 
ADA burden on the agency. Yet Congress 
made the conscious calculation to impose this 
burden on public entities. In light of this 
nation's unseemly history of systematically 
excluding persons with disabilities from 
public life and public activities, Congress 
intentionally wrote the ADA “to provide a 
clear and comprehensive national mandate 
for the elimination of discrimination.” It 
might not be convenient for TEA to require 
ADA compliance by its licensed driver 
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education schools, but the ADA's sweeping 
purpose is clear. And, after all, TEA may rely 
on the ADA's safety valve of reasonableness. 
Although TEA is obligated to make 
“reasonable modifications in policies, 
practices, or procedures,” if it finds that such 
modifications are too strenuous, it may 
“demonstrate that making the modifications 
would fundamentally alter the nature of the 
service, program, or activity,” and be excused 
from compliance. A public entity's 
obligations under Title II are broad, but they 
are not unlimited. 
 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully 
dissent from the panel majority's reversal of 








June 30, 2016 
 
A group of deaf Texans fighting what they 
claim is discriminatory treatment is hoping 
the U.S. Supreme Court will step in and force 
the state to provide sign-language interpreters 
at classes young drivers must take to get 
licenses.  
The high court on Tuesday agreed to hear the 
case, Ivy v. Morath, involving a group of deaf 
Texans who sued the state in 2011. The state 
requires first-time driver's license applicants 
under age 25 to take classes that are typically 
conducted by private companies. The suit 
argues that since Texas requires the classes, 
it should make sure there are interpreters for 
deaf students. 
The private companies were regulated and 
licensed by the Texas Education Agency 
when the suit was filed, but the duties have 
since been transferred to the Texas 
Department of Licensing and Regulation. 
The state argues that since the TEA did not 
directly contract with the companies, the state 
isn't liable for their compliance with federal 
laws on access for the disabled. 
Disability advocates hope the nation's high 
court will use the case to define when a state 
agency is responsible for discrimination 
against people with disabilities when that 
agency farms out public programs to private 
vendors. 
The case shines a spotlight on issues that 
people with disabilities frequently face, said 
Wayne Krause Yang, legal director of the 
Texas Civil Rights Project, which is 
representing the five deaf plaintiffs. 
“This has the potential to be a landmark 
decision for deaf rights, and indeed for all 
disability rights,” he said. “Folks with 
disabilities and the deaf community are often 
left in the shadows. The time has come for the 
Supreme Court to recognize loudly and 
clearly civil rights for folks with disabilities.” 
The TEA referred all questions to the state 
attorney general’s office, which said it could 
not comment on ongoing litigation. 
The plaintiffs, who hail from Austin, Dallas, 
Plano, Midland and Arlington, say their 
requests for sign-language interpreters from 
several Texas driver education schools were 
denied. They also asked the TEA to provide 
accommodations, but those efforts were 
unsuccessful. They argue that the Americans 
with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation 
Act requires Texas to ensure that a mandatory 
state program, such as driver education 
courses, is accessible to the disabled. 
Title II of the ADA, which applies to public 
entities, mandates that “no qualified 
individual with a disability shall, by reason of 
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such disability, be excluded from 
participation in or be denied the benefits of 
the services, programs, or activities of a 
public entity.” Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act includes similar language, 
prohibiting discrimination of the disabled in 
any “program or activity” receiving federal 
funding. 
But the phrase “services, programs, or 
activities” is not precisely defined, and its 
meaning cuts to the heart of the deaf students' 
case. 
U.S. District Judge Lee Yeakel ruled in favor 
of the plaintiffs in 2013, but the U.S. 5th 
Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, 
dismissed the case in 2015, saying that driver 
education is not a service, program, or 
activity of the TEA. 
“We hold that the mere fact that the driver 
education schools are heavily regulated and 
supervised by the TEA does not make these 
schools a ‘service, program, or activity’ of 
the TEA,” the court’s opinion said. 
“Otherwise, states and localities would be 
required to ensure the ADA compliance of 
every heavily regulated industry, a result that 
would raise substantial policy, economic, and 
federalism concerns.” 
The plaintiffs appealed, arguing to the 
Supreme Court that the circuit’s ruling 
overlooked how intertwined the TEA and 
private driver education schools were. The 
TEA — and the licensing and regulation 
department after it — evaluate and license the 
schools, approve the course materials, certify 
the instructors and provide the school with 
unique course completion certificates for 
each student. 
“The schools could not exist if not for the 
TEA,” Krause Yang said, “and there would 
be no driver training that the TEA is 
responsible for doing if the driving schools 
didn’t provide the classes. They work as a 
team.” 
Rather than suing each individual driving 
school, Krause Yang said the plaintiffs want 
to hold the state accountable for ensuring 
private entities it works with provide 
disability accommodations. 
Lucy Wood, clinical professor of law at UT-
Austin, said she believes this case could 
clarify what constitutes a “program, service, 
or activity” once and for all, eliminating 
potential loopholes in the ADA. 
"This case is important because it, hopefully, 
will eliminate state's' ability to avoid Title II 
responsibility through various arrangements 










June 28, 2016 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Tuesday agreed 
to review a lawsuit brought by a group of deaf 
Texas residents who allege the state's driver 
education requirements prevent them from 
receiving licenses, in violation of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act.  
The high court on Tuesday granted certiorari 
in the case that the Fifth Circuit had 
dismissed with prejudice in March 2015 after 
finding that the class of deaf students — 
requesting that the TEA bring its driver 
education course in compliance with the 
ADA — had failed to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. The Texas 
Education Agency, the Fifth Circuit held, did 
not provide the driving instruction but only 
licensed the private schools that did, meaning 
it isn't required to ensure ADA compliance. 
In July 2015 the Fifth Circuit denied named 
plaintiff Donnika Ivy's petition for an en banc 
rehearing of the case, and in October she filed 
her petition with the nation's high court. 
The Fifth Circuit wrote in March 2015 that it 
would be “extremely troubling” if deaf 
residents were deprived of driver's licenses 
because the private education Texas has 
mandated as a prerequisite for the license is 
unavailable to them. 
“But this concern does not transform driver 
education into a TEA program or service,” 
the court wrote. 
The court noted that there's a possible avenue 
for relief via the ADA as it relates to the 
state's Department of Public Safety, as it may 
be required to give exemptions to deaf 
individuals in this situation. 
“But the named plaintiffs have not sued the 
DPS, so we need not decide this issue,” the 
opinion reads. “We conclude that the TEA 
does not provide the program, service, or 
activity of driver education. Thus, it is not 
required to ensure that driver education 
complies with the ADA.” 
The class of plaintiffs comprises deaf Texas 
residents between the ages of 16 and 25 who 
alleged they couldn't obtain a driver's license 
in the state. According to court documents, 
the plaintiffs contacted a number of driver-
education schools and were refused 
accommodations, like an American Sign 
Language interpreter, that would have 
allowed them to complete the course. 
Additionally, before filing suit, Ivy and 
others contacted Heather Bise, a deaf-
resource specialist, who also reached out to 
the TEA on their behalf without luck. 
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In its brief asking the Fifth Circuit to toss the 
case filed in May 2014, the state had argued 
that if the district court's interpretation of the 
ADA was allowed to stand, the TEA would 
be required to use its limited resources to 
police ADA compliance in private 
businesses. 
“And all kinds of other private businesses 
licensed by state agencies might also be 
subject to previously unanticipated oversight 
by those agencies, which presumably also 
would be charged with adopting and 
enforcing their own regulations to ensure 
compliance with the ADA (and presumably 
other federal laws),” the brief reads. 
In a reply brief from the class of hearing 
impaired individuals, they attacked the TEA's 
argument that the lower court's decision 
could lead to the TEA policing other entities, 
like barber shops and massage therapy 
schools. 
“But not one of the statutes for the licensure 
of the businesses the TEA cites in its brief 
expressly conditions the receipt of a license 
on compliance with state and federal law,” 
the brief reads. “Unlike driver education, the 
state does not mandate that the state citizens 
patronize these businesses, and its 








The parties did not immediately respond 
Tuesday to requests for comment. 
The state is represented by Richard B. Farrer, 
Jonathan F. Mitchell and Daniel T. Hodge of 
the Texas Attorney General's Office. 
The plainiffs are represented by Joe T. 
Sanders I and Olga Kobzar of Scott, 
Douglass & McConnico and James C. 
Harrington and Joseph P. Berra of the Texas 
Civil Rights Project. 
The case is Donnika Ivy et al. v. Mike Morath, 
in his official capacity as head of the Texas 
Education Agency, case number 15-486, in 
the U.S. Supreme Court.
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G.G. v. Gloucester 
15-8049 
Ruling Below: G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016) 
G.G. brought action against the Gloucester County School Board under the Equal Protection 
Clause and Title IX. The plaintiff specifically challenged the school board’s policy of requiring 
students to use the school’s sex-segregated bathrooms in accordance with their birth sex, not 
their gender identity. The plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction to be allowed to use the 
boys’ restroom. The school board filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the Title IX claim and denied the 
preliminary injunction. The student appealed. The Court of Appeals held that the Department of 
Education’s instruction to treat student’s according to their gender identity was entitled to 
deference. The school board applied for a grant of certiorari from the Supreme Court. 
Question Presented: Whether, under Title IX, schools must treat students consistent with their 
gender identity with regards to sex-segregated bathrooms. 
 
G.G., by his next friend and mother, Deirdre GRIMM, Plaintiff–Appellant, 
v. 
GLOUCESTER COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Defendant–Appellee. 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit 
Decided on April 19, 2016 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
 
FLOYD, Circuit Judge: 
 
G.G., a transgender boy, seeks to use the 
boys' restrooms at his high school. After G.G. 
began to use the boys' restrooms with the 
approval of the school administration, the 
local school board passed a policy banning 
G.G. from the boys' restroom. G.G. alleges 
that the school board impermissibly 
discriminated against him in violation of 
Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Constitution. The district court dismissed 
G.G.'s Title IX claim and denied his request 




followed. Because we conclude the district 
court did not accord appropriate deference to 
the relevant Department of Education 
regulations, we reverse its dismissal of G.G.'s 
Title IX claim. Because we conclude that the 
district court used the wrong evidentiary 
standard in assessing G.G.'s motion for a 
preliminary injunction, we vacate its denial 
and remand for consideration under the 
correct standard. We therefore reverse in 
part, vacate in part, and remand the case for 
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At the heart of this appeal is whether Title IX 
requires schools to provide transgender 
students access to restrooms congruent with 
their gender identity. Title IX provides: “[n]o 
person ... shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any education program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance.” The 
Department of Education's (the Department) 
regulations implementing Title IX permit the 
provision of “separate toilet, locker room, 
and shower facilities on the basis of sex, but 
such facilities provided for students of one 
sex shall be comparable to such facilities for 
students of the other sex.” In an opinion letter 
dated January 7, 2015, the Department's 
Office for Civil Rights (OCR) interpreted 
how this regulation should apply to 
transgender individuals: “When a school 
elects to separate or treat students differently 
on the basis of sex ... a school generally must 
treat transgender students consistent with 
their gender identity.” Because this case 
comes to us after dismissal pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the 





G.G. is a transgender boy now in his junior 
year at Gloucester High School. G.G.'s birth-
assigned sex, or so-called “biological sex,” is 
female, but G.G.'s gender identity is male. 
G.G. has been diagnosed with gender 
dysphoria, a medical condition characterized 
by clinically significant distress caused by an 
incongruence between a person's gender 
identity and the person's birth-assigned sex. 
Since the end of his freshman year, G.G. has 
undergone hormone therapy and has legally 
changed his name to G., a traditionally male 
name. G.G. lives all aspects of his life as a 
boy. G.G. has not, however, had sex 
reassignment surgery. 
 
Before beginning his sophomore year, G.G. 
and his mother told school officials that G.G. 
was a transgender boy. The officials were 
supportive and took steps to ensure that he 
would be treated as a boy by teachers and 
staff. Later, at G.G.'s request, school officials 
allowed G.G. to use the boys' restroom. G.G. 
used this restroom without incident for about 
seven weeks. G.G.'s use of the boys' 
restroom, however, excited the interest of 
others in the community, some of whom 
contacted the Gloucester County School 
Board (the Board) seeking to bar G.G. from 
continuing to use the boys' restroom. 
 
Board Member Carla B. Hook (Hook) added 
an item to the agenda for the November 11, 
2014 board meeting titled “Discussion of Use 
of Restrooms/Locker Room Facilities.” Hook 
proposed the following resolution 
(hereinafter the “transgender restroom 
policy” or “the policy”): 
 
Whereas the GCPS [i.e., Gloucester 
County Public Schools] recognizes 
that some students question their 
gender identities, and 
 
Whereas the GCPS encourages such 
students to seek support, advice, and 
guidance from parents, professionals 
and other trusted adults, and 
 
Whereas the GCPS seeks to provide a 
safe learning environment for all 
students and to protect the privacy of 
all students, therefore 
It shall be the practice of the GCPS to 
provide male and female restroom 
and locker room facilities in its 
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schools, and the use of said facilities 
shall be limited to the corresponding 
biological genders, and students with 
gender identity issues shall be 
provided an alternative appropriate 
private facility. 
 
At the November 11, 2014 meeting twenty-
seven people spoke during the Citizens' 
Comment Period, a majority of whom 
supported Hook's proposed resolution. Many 
of the speakers displayed hostility to G.G., 
including by referring pointedly to him as a 
“young lady.” Others claimed that permitting 
G.G. to use the boys' restroom would violate 
the privacy of other students and would lead 
to sexual assault in restrooms. One 
commenter suggested that if the proposed 
policy were not adopted, non-transgender 
boys would come to school wearing dresses 
in order to gain access to the girls' restrooms. 
G.G. and his parents spoke against the 
proposed policy. Ultimately, the Board 
postponed a vote on the policy until its next 
meeting on December 9, 2014. 
 
At the December 9 meeting, approximately 
thirty-seven people spoke during the 
Citizens' Comment Period. Again, most of 
those who spoke were in favor of the 
proposed resolution. Some speakers 
threatened to vote the Board members out of 
office if the Board members voted against the 
proposed policy. Speakers again referred to 
G.G. as a “girl” or “young lady.” One speaker 
called G.G. a “freak” and compared him to a 
person who thinks he is a “dog” and wants to 
urinate on fire hydrants. Following this 
second comment period, the Board voted 6–
1 to adopt the proposed policy, thereby 
barring G.G. from using the boys' restroom at 
school. 
 
G.G. alleges that he cannot use the girls' 
restroom because women and girls in those 
facilities “react[ ] negatively because they 
perceive[ ] G.G. to be a boy.” Further, using 
the girls' restroom would “cause severe 
psychological distress” to G.G. and would be 
incompatible with his treatment for gender 
dysphoria. As a corollary to the policy, the 
Board announced a series of updates to the 
school's restrooms to improve general 
privacy for all students, including adding or 
expanding partitions between urinals in male 
restrooms, adding privacy strips to the doors 
of stalls in all restrooms, and constructing 
single-stall unisex restrooms available to all 
students. G.G. alleges that he cannot use 
these new unisex restrooms because they 
“make him feel even more stigmatized .... 
Being required to use the separate restrooms 
sets him apart from his peers, and serves as a 
daily reminder that the school views him as 
‘different.’ ” G.G. further alleges that, 
because of this stigma and exclusion, his 
social transition is undermined and he 
experiences “severe and persistent emotional 
and social harms.” G.G. avoids using the 
restroom while at school and has, as a result 





G.G. sued the Board on June 11, 2015. G.G. 
seeks an injunction allowing him to use the 
boys' restroom and brings underlying claims 
that the Board impermissibly discriminated 
against him in violation of Title IX of the 
Education Amendments Act of 1972 and the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. 
On July 27, 2015, the district court held a 
hearing on G.G.'s motion for a preliminary 
injunction and on the Board's motion to 
dismiss G.G.'s lawsuit. At the hearing, the 
district court orally dismissed G.G.'s Title IX 
claim and denied his request for a preliminary 
injunction, but withheld ruling on the motion 
to dismiss G.G.'s equal protection claim. The 
district court followed its ruling from the 
bench with a written order dated September 
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4, 2015 denying the injunction and a second 
written order dated September 17, 2015 
dismissing G.G.'s Title IX claim and 
expanding on its rationale for denying the 
injunction. 
 
In its September 17, 2015 order, the district 
court reasoned that Title IX prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of sex and not on 
the basis of other concepts such as gender, 
gender identity, or sexual orientation. The 
district court observed that the regulations 
implementing Title IX specifically allow 
schools to provide separate restrooms on the 
basis of sex. The district court concluded that 
G.G.'s sex was female and that requiring him 
to use the female restroom facilities did not 
impermissibly discriminate against him on 
the basis of sex in violation of Title IX. With 
respect to G.G.'s request for an injunction, the 
district court found that G.G. had not made 
the required showing that the balance of 
equities was in his favor. The district court 
found that requiring G.G. to use the unisex 
restrooms during the pendency of this lawsuit 
was not unduly burdensome and would result 
in less hardship than requiring other students 
made uncomfortable by G.G.'s presence in 
the boys' restroom to themselves use the 
unisex restrooms. 
 
This appeal followed. G.G. asks us to reverse 
the district court's dismissal of his Title IX 
claim, grant the injunction he seeks, and, 
because of comments made by the district 
judge during the motion hearing, to assign the 
case to a different district judge on remand. 
The Board, on the other hand, asks us to 
affirm the district court's rulings and also asks 
us to dismiss G.G.'s equal protection claim—
on which the district court has yet to rule—as 
without merit. The United States, as it did 
below, has filed an amicus brief supporting 
G.G.'s Title IX claim in order to defend the 
government's interpretation of Title IX as 
requiring schools to provide transgender 
students access to restrooms congruent with 




We turn first to the district court's dismissal 
of G.G.'s Title IX claim. We review de novo 
the district court's grant of a motion to 
dismiss. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a 
complaint must contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.”  
 
As noted earlier, Title IX provides: “[n]o 
person ... shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any education program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance.” To 
allege a violation of Title IX, G.G. must 
allege (1) that he was excluded from 
participation in an education program 
because of his sex; (2) that the educational 
institution was receiving federal financial 
assistance at the time of his exclusion; and (3) 
that the improper discrimination caused G.G. 
harm. We look to case law interpreting Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for 
guidance in evaluating a claim brought under 
Title IX. 
 
Not all distinctions on the basis of sex are 
impermissible under Title IX. For example, 
Title IX permits the provision of separate 
living facilities on the basis of sex: “nothing 
contained [in Title IX] shall be construed to 
prohibit any educational institution receiving 
funds under this Act, from maintaining 
separate living facilities for the different 
sexes.” The Department's regulations 
implementing Title IX permit the provision 
of “separate toilet, locker room, and shower 
facilities on the basis of sex, but such 
facilities provided for students of one sex 
shall be comparable to such facilities 
provided for students of the other sex.” The 
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Department recently delineated how this 
regulation should be applied to transgender 
individuals. In an opinion letter dated January 
7, 2015, the Department's Office for Civil 
Rights (OCR) wrote: “When a school elects 
to separate or treat students differently on the 
basis of sex ... a school generally must treat 





G.G., and the United States as amicus curiae, 
ask us to give the Department's interpretation 
of its own regulation controlling weight 
pursuant to Auer v. Robbins. Auer requires 
that an agency's interpretation of its own 
ambiguous regulation be given controlling 
weight unless the interpretation is plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation 
or statute. Agency interpretations need not be 
well-settled or long-standing to be entitled to 
deference. They must, however, “reflect the 
agency's fair and considered judgment on the 
matter in question.” An interpretation may 
not be the result of the agency's fair and 
considered judgment, and will not be 
accorded Auer deference, when the 
interpretation conflicts with a prior 
interpretation, when it appears that the 
interpretation is no more than a convenient 
litigating position, or when the interpretation 
is a post hoc rationalization.  
 
The district court declined to afford 
deference to the Department's interpretation 
of 34 C.F.R. § 106.33. The district court 
found the regulation to be unambiguous 
because “[i]t clearly allows the School Board 
to limit bathroom access ‘on the basis of sex,’ 
including birth or biological sex.” The district 
court also found, alternatively, that the 
interpretation advanced by the Department 
was clearly erroneous and inconsistent with 
the regulation. The district court reasoned 
that, because “on the basis of sex” means, at 
most, on the basis of sex and gender together, 
it cannot mean on the basis of gender alone. 
 
The United States contends that the 
regulation clarifies statutory ambiguity by 
making clear that schools may provide 
separate restrooms for boys and girls 
“without running afoul of Title IX.” 
However, the Department also considers § 
106.33 itself to be ambiguous as to 
transgender students because “the regulation 
is silent on what the phrases ‘students of one 
sex’ and ‘students of the other sex’ mean in 
the context of transgender students.” The 
United States contends that the interpretation 
contained in OCR's January 7, 2015 letter 
resolves the ambiguity in § 106.33 as that 




We will not accord an agency's interpretation 
of an unambiguous regulation Auer 
deference. Thus, our analysis begins with a 
determination of whether 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 
contains an ambiguity. Section 106.33 
permits schools to provide “separate toilet, 
locker room, and shower facilities on the 
basis of sex, but such facilities provided for 
students of one sex shall be comparable to 
such facilities provided for students of the 
other sex.”  
 
“[D]etermining whether a regulation or 
statute is ambiguous presents a legal 
question, which we determine de novo.” We 
determine ambiguity by analyzing the 
language under the three-part framework set 
forth in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. The 
plainness or ambiguity of language is 
determined by reference to (1) the language 
itself, (2) the specific context in which that 
language is used, and (3) the broader context 




First, we have little difficulty concluding that 
the language itself—“of one sex” and “of the 
other sex”—refers to male and female 
students. Second, in the specific context of § 
106.33, the plain meaning of the regulatory 
language is best stated by the United States: 
“the mere act of providing separate restroom 
facilities for males and females does not 
violate Title IX ....” the language “of one sex” 
and “of the other sex” appears repeatedly in 
the broader context of 34 C.F.R. § 106 
Subpart D, titled “Discrimination on the 
Basis of Sex in Education Programs or 
Activities Prohibited.” This repeated 
formulation indicates two sexes (“one sex” 
and “the other sex”), and the only reasonable 
reading of the language used throughout the 
relevant regulatory section is that it 
references male and female. Read plainly 
then, § 106.33 permits schools to provide 
separate toilet, locker room, and shower 
facilities for its male and female students. By 
implication, the regulation also permits 
schools to exclude males from the female 
facilities and vice-versa. 
 
Our inquiry is not ended, however, by this 
straightforward conclusion. Although the 
regulation may refer unambiguously to males 
and females, it is silent as to how a school 
should determine whether a transgender 
individual is a male or female for the purpose 
of access to sex-segregated restrooms. We 
conclude that the regulation is susceptible to 
more than one plausible reading because it 
permits both the Board's reading—
determining maleness or femaleness with 
reference exclusively to genitalia—and the 
Department's interpretation—determining 
maleness or femaleness with reference to 
gender identity. It is not clear to us how the 
regulation would apply in a number of 
situations—even under the Board's own 
“biological gender” formulation. For 
example, which restroom would a 
transgender individual who had undergone 
sex- reassignment surgery use? What about 
an intersex individual? What about an 
individual born with X–X–Y sex 
chromosomes? What about an individual 
who lost external genitalia in an accident? 
The Department's interpretation resolves 
ambiguity by providing that in the case of a 
transgender individual using a sex-
segregated facility, the individual's sex as 
male or female is to be generally determined 




Because we conclude that the regulation is 
ambiguous as applied to transgender 
individuals, the Department's interpretation 
is entitled to Auer deference unless the Board 
demonstrates that the interpretation is plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation 
or statute. “Our review of the agency's 
interpretation in this context is therefore 
highly deferential.” “It is well established 
that an agency's interpretation need not be the 
only possible reading of a regulation—or 
even the best one—to prevail.” An agency's 
view need only be reasonable to warrant 
deference.  
 
Title IX regulations were promulgated by the 
Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare in 1975 and were adopted 
unchanged by the Department in 1980. Two 
dictionaries from the drafting era inform our 
analysis of how the term “sex” was 
understood at that time. The first defines 
“sex” as “the character of being either male 
or female” or “the sum of those anatomical 
and physiological differences with reference 
to which the male and female are 
distinguished....” The second defines “sex” 
as: 
 
the sum of the morphological, 
physiological, and behavioral 
peculiarities of living beings that 
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subserves biparental reproduction 
with its concomitant genetic 
segregation and recombination which 
underlie most evolutionary change, 
that in its typical dichotomous 
occurrence is usu[ally] genetically 
controlled and associated with special 
sex chromosomes, and that is 
typically manifested as maleness and 
femaleness .... 
 
Although these definitions suggest that the 
word “sex” was understood at the time the 
regulation was adopted to connote male and 
female and that maleness and femaleness 
were determined primarily by reference to 
the factors the district court termed 
“biological sex,” namely reproductive 
organs, the definitions also suggest that a 
hard-and-fast binary division on the basis of 
reproductive organs—although useful in 
most cases—was not universally descriptive. 
The dictionaries, therefore, used qualifiers 
such as reference to the “sum of” various 
factors, “typical dichotomous occurrence,” 
and “typically manifested as maleness and 
femaleness.” Section 106.33 assumes a 
student population composed of individuals 
of what has traditionally been understood as 
the usual “dichotomous occurrence” of male 
and female where the various indicators of 
sex all point in the same direction. It sheds 
little light on how exactly to determine the 
“character of being either male or female” 
where those indicators diverge.  
 
We conclude that the Department's 
interpretation of how § 106.33 and its 
underlying assumptions should apply to 
transgender individuals is not plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the text of the 
regulation. The regulation is silent as to 
which restroom transgender individuals are 
to use when a school elects to provide sex-
segregated restrooms, and the Department's 
interpretation, although perhaps not the 
intuitive one, is permitted by the varying 
physical, psychological, and social aspects—
or, in the words of an older dictionary, “the 
morphological, physiological, and behavioral 




Finally, we consider whether the 
Department's interpretation of § 106.33 is the 
result of the agency's fair and considered 
judgment. Even a valid interpretation will not 
be accorded Auer deference where it conflicts 
with a prior interpretation, where it appears 
that the interpretation is no more than a 
convenient litigating position, or where the 
interpretation is a post hoc rationalization.  
 
Although the Department's interpretation is 
novel because there was no interpretation as 
to how § 106.33 applied to transgender 
individuals before January 2015, “novelty 
alone is no reason to refuse deference” and 
does not render the current interpretation 
inconsistent with prior agency practice. As 
the United States explains, the issue in this 
case “did not arise until recently,” see id., 
because schools have only recently begun 
citing § 106.33 as justification for enacting 
new policies restricting transgender students' 
access to restroom facilities. The Department 
contends that “[i]t is to those ‘newfound’ 
policies that [the Department's] interpretation 
of the regulation responds.” We see no reason 
to doubt this explanation.  
 
Nor is the interpretation merely a convenient 
litigating position. The Department has 
consistently enforced this position since 
2014. Finally, this interpretation cannot 
properly be considered a post hoc 
rationalization because it is in line with the 
existing guidances and regulations of a 
number of federal agencies—all of which 
provide that transgender individuals should 
be permitted access to the restroom that 
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corresponds with their gender identities. 
None of the Christopher grounds for 





We conclude that the Department's 
interpretation of its own regulation, § 106.33, 
as it relates to restroom access by transgender 
individuals, is entitled to Auer deference and 
is to be accorded controlling weight in this 
case.9 We reverse the district court's contrary 
conclusion and its resultant dismissal of 




In many respects, we are in agreement with 
the dissent. We agree that “sex” should be 
construed uniformly throughout Title IX and 
its implementing regulations. We agree that it 
has indeed been commonplace and widely 
accepted to separate public restrooms, locker 
rooms, and shower facilities on the basis of 
sex. We agree that “an individual has a 
legitimate and important interest in bodily 
privacy such that his or her nude or partially 
nude body, genitalia, and other private parts” 
are not involuntarily exposed. It is not 
apparent to us, however, that the truth of 
these propositions undermines the conclusion 
we reach regarding the level of deference due 
to the Department's interpretation of its own 
regulations. 
 
The Supreme Court commands the use of 
particular analytical frameworks when courts 
review the actions of the executive agencies. 
G.G. claims that he is entitled to use the boys' 
restroom pursuant to the Department's 
interpretation of its regulations implementing 
Title IX. We have carefully followed the 
Supreme Court's guidance in Chevron, Auer, 
and Christopher and have determined that the 
interpretation contained in the OCR letter is 
to be accorded controlling weight. In a case 
such as this, where there is no constitutional 
challenge to the regulation or agency 
interpretation, the weighing of privacy 
interests or safety concerns11—
fundamentally questions of policy—is a task 
committed to the agency, not to the courts. 
 
The Supreme Court's admonition in Chevron 
points to the balance courts must strike: 
 
Judges are not experts in the field, and 
are not part of either political branch 
of the Government. Courts must, in 
some cases, reconcile competing 
political interests, but not on the basis 
of the judges' personal policy 
preferences. In contrast, an agency to 
which Congress has delegated policy-
making responsibilities may, within 
the limits of that delegation, properly 
rely upon the incumbent 
administration's views of wise policy 
to inform its judgments. While 
agencies are not directly accountable 
to the people, the Chief Executive is, 
and it is entirely appropriate for this 
political branch of the Government to 
make such policy choices—resolving 
the competing interests which 
Congress itself either inadvertently 
did not resolve, or intentionally left to 
be resolved by the agency charged 
with the administration of the statute 
in light of everyday realities. 
 
Not only may a subsequent administration 
choose to implement a different policy, but 
Congress may also, of course, revise Title IX 
explicitly to prohibit or authorize the course 
charted here by the Department regarding the 
use of restrooms by transgender students. To 
the extent the dissent critiques the result we 
reach today on policy grounds, we reply that, 
our Auer analysis complete, we leave policy 





G.G. also asks us to reverse the district court's 
denial of the preliminary injunction he sought 
which would have allowed him to use the 
boys' restroom during the pendency of this 
lawsuit. “To win such a preliminary 
injunction, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that 
(1) they are likely to succeed on the merits; 
(2) they will likely suffer irreparable harm 
absent an injunction; (3) the balance of 
hardships weighs in their favor; and (4) the 
injunction is in the public interest.” We 
review a district court's denial of a 
preliminary injunction for abuse of 
discretion. “A district court has abused its 
discretion if its decision is guided by 
erroneous legal principles or rests upon a 
clearly erroneous factual finding.” “We do 
not ask whether we would have come to the 
same conclusion as the district court if we 
were examining the matter de novo.” Instead, 
“we reverse for abuse of discretion if we form 
a definite and firm conviction that the court 
below committed a clear error of judgment in 
the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of 
the relevant factors.”  
 
The district court analyzed G.G.'s request 
only with reference to the third factor—the 
balance of hardships—and found that the 
balance of hardships did not weigh in G.G.'s 
favor. G.G. submitted two declarations in 
support of his complaint, one from G.G. 
himself and one from a medical expert, Dr. 
Randi Ettner, to explain what harms G.G. 
will suffer as a result of his exclusion from 
the boys' restroom. The district court refused 
to consider this evidence because it was 
“replete with inadmissible evidence 
including thoughts of others, hearsay, and 
suppositions.” 
 
The district court misstated the evidentiary 
standard governing preliminary injunction 
hearings. The district court stated: “The 
complaint is no longer the deciding factor, 
admissible evidence is the deciding factor. 
Evidence therefore must conform to the rules 
of evidence.” Preliminary injunctions, 
however, are governed by less strict rules of 
evidence: 
 
The purpose of a preliminary 
injunction is merely to preserve the 
relative positions of the parties until a 
trial on the merits can be held. Given 
this limited purpose, and given the 
haste that is often necessary if those 
positions are to be preserved, a 
preliminary injunction is customarily 
granted on the basis of procedures 
that are less formal and evidence that 
is less complete than in a trial on the 
merits. 
 
Thus, although admissible evidence may be 
more persuasive than inadmissible evidence 
in the preliminary injunction context, it was 
error for the district court to summarily reject 
G.G.'s proffered evidence because it may 
have been inadmissible at a subsequent trial. 
 
Additionally, the district court completely 
excluded some of G.G.'s proffered evidence 
on hearsay grounds. The seven of our sister 
circuits to have considered the admissibility 
of hearsay in preliminary injunction 
proceedings have decided that the nature of 
evidence as hearsay goes to “weight, not 
preclusion” and have permitted district courts 
to “rely on hearsay evidence for the limited 
purpose of determining whether to award a 
preliminary injunction.” We see no reason for 
a different rule to govern in this Circuit. 
Because preliminary injunction proceedings 
are informal ones designed to prevent 
irreparable harm before a later trial governed 
by the full rigor of usual evidentiary 
standards, district courts may look to, and 
indeed in appropriate circumstances rely on, 
hearsay or other inadmissible evidence when 
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deciding whether a preliminary injunction is 
warranted. 
 
Because the district court evaluated G.G.'s 
proffered evidence against a stricter 
evidentiary standard than is warranted by the 
nature and purpose of preliminary injunction 
proceedings to prevent irreparable harm 
before a full trial on the merits, the district 
court was “guided by erroneous legal 
principles.” We therefore conclude that the 
district court abused its discretion when it 
denied G.G.'s request for a preliminary 
injunction without considering G.G.'s 
proffered evidence. We vacate the district 
court's denial of G.G.'s motion for a 
preliminary injunction and remand the case 
to the district court for consideration of 
G.G.'s evidence in light of the evidentiary 




Finally, G.G. requests that we reassign this 
case to a different district judge on remand. 
G.G. does not explicitly claim that the district 
judge is biased. Absent such a claim, 
reassignment is only appropriate in “unusual 
circumstances where both for the judge's sake 
and the appearance of justice an assignment 
to a different judge is salutary and in the 
public interest, especially as it minimizes 
even a suspicion of partiality.” In 
determining whether such circumstances 
exist, a court should consider: (1) whether the 
original judge would reasonably be expected 
upon remand to have substantial difficulty in 
putting out of his or her mind previously 
expressed views or findings determined to be 
erroneous or based on evidence that must be 
rejected, (2) whether reassignment is 
advisable to preserve the appearance of 
justice, and (3) whether reassignment would 
entail waste and duplication out of proportion 
to any gain in preserving the appearance of 
fairness. 
G.G. argues that both the first and second 
Guglielmi factors are satisfied. He contends 
that the district court has pre-existing views 
which it would be unwilling to put aside in 
the face of contrary evidence about medical 
science generally and about “gender and 
sexuality in particular.” For example, the 
court accepted the Board's “mating” concern 
by noting: 
 
There are only two instincts—two. 
Everything else is acquired—
everything. That is, the brain only has 
two instincts. One is called self-
preservation, and the other is 
procreation. And procreation is the 
highest instinct in individuals who are 
in the latter part of their teen-age 
years. All of that is accepted by all 
medical science, as far as I can 
determine in reading information. 
 
The district court also expressed skepticism 
that medical science supported the 
proposition that one could develop a urinary 
tract infection from withholding urine for too 
long. The district court characterized gender 
dysphoria as a “mental disorder” and resisted 
several attempts by counsel for G.G. to 
clarify that it only becomes a disorder when 
left untreated. The district court also seemed 
to reject G.G.'s representation of what it 
meant to be transgender, repeatedly noting 
that G.G. “wants” to be a boy and not a girl, 
but that “he is biologically a female.” The 
district court's memorandum opinion, 
however, included none of the extraneous 
remarks or suppositions that marred the 
hearing. 
 
Reassignment is an unusual step at this early 
stage of litigation. Although the district court 
did express opinions about medical facts and 
skepticism of G.G.'s claims, the record does 
not clearly indicate that the district judge 
would refuse to consider and credit sound 
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contrary evidence. Further, although the 
district court has a distinct way of proceeding 
in court, the hearing record and the district 
court's written order in the case do not raise 
in our minds a question about the 
fundamental fairness of the proceedings, 
however idiosyncratic. The conduct of the 
district judge does not at this point satisfy the 
Guglielmi standard. We deny G.G.'s request 





For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of 
the district court is 
 
REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN 
PART, AND REMANDED. 
 
DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
I concur in Judge Floyd's fine opinion. I write 
separately, however, to note that while I am 
happy to join in the remand of this matter to 
the district court so that it may consider 
G.G.'s evidence under proper legal standards 
in the first instance, this Court would be on 
sound ground in granting the requested 
preliminary injunction on the undisputed 




In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, 
G.G. must demonstrate that (1) he is likely to 
succeed on the merits, (2) he is likely to suffer 
irreparable harm in the absence of an 
injunction, (3) the balance of hardships tips 
in his favor, and (4) the requested injunction 
is in the public interest. The record before us 




G.G. alleges that by singling him out for 
different treatment because he is transgender, 
the Board's restroom policy discriminates 
against him “on the basis of sex” in violation 
of Title IX. In light of the weight of circuit 
authority concluding that discrimination 
against transgender individuals constitutes 
discrimination “on the basis of sex” in the 
context of analogous statutes and our holding 
here that the Department's interpretation of 
34 C.F.R. § 106.33 is to be given controlling 
weight, G.G. has surely demonstrated a 





In support of his claim of irreparable harm, 
G.G. submitted an affidavit to the district 
court describing the psychological distress he 
experiences when he is forced to use the 
single-stall restrooms or the restroom in the 
nurse's office. His affidavit also indicates that 
he has “repeatedly developed painful urinary 
tract infections” as a result of holding his 
urine in order to avoid using the restroom at 
school. 
 
An expert declaration by Dr. Randi Ettner, a 
psychologist specializing in working with 
children and adolescents with gender 
dysphoria, provides further support for G.G.'s 
claim of irreparable harm. In her affidavit, 
Dr. Ettner indicates that treating a 
transgender boy as male in some situations 
but not in others is “inconsistent with 
evidence-based medical practice and 
detrimental to the health and well-being of 
the child” and explains why access to a 
restroom appropriate to one's gender identity 
is important for transgender youth. With 
respect to G.G. in particular, Dr. Ettner states 
that in her professional opinion, the Board's 
restroom policy “is currently causing 
emotional distress to an extremely vulnerable 
youth and placing G.G. at risk for accruing 
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lifelong psychological harm.” In particular, 
Dr. Ettner opines that: 
 
“[a]s a result of the School Board's 
restroom policy, ... G.G. is put in the 
humiliating position of having to use 
a separate facility, thereby 
accentuating his ‘otherness,’ 
undermining his identity formation, 
and impeding his medically necessary 
social transition process. The shame 
of being singled out and stigmatized 
in his daily life every time he needs to 
use the restroom is a devastating blow 
to G.G. and places him at extreme risk 
for immediate and long-term 
psychological harm.” 
 
The Board offers nothing to contradict any of 
the assertions concerning irreparable harm in 
G.G.'s or Dr. Ettner's affidavits. Instead, its 
arguments focus on what is purportedly 
lacking from G.G.'s presentation in support 
of his claim of irreparable harm, such as 
“evidence that [his feelings of dysphoria, 
anxiety, and distress] would be lessened by 
using the boy[s'] restroom,” evidence from 
his treating psychologist, medical evidence, 
and an opinion from Dr. Ettner 
“differentiating between the distress that 
G.G. may suffer by not using the boy[s'] 
bathroom during the course of this litigation 
and the distress that he has apparently been 
living with since age 12.”  
 
As to the alleged deficiency concerning Dr. 
Ettner's opinion, the Board's argument is 
belied by Dr. Ettner's affidavit itself, which, 
as quoted above, provides her opinion about 
the psychological harm that G.G. is 
experiencing “[a]s a result of the School 
Board's restroom policy.” With respect to the 
other purported inadequacies, the absence of 
such evidence does nothing to undermine the 
uncontroverted statements concerning the 
daily psychological harm G.G. experiences 
as a result of the Board's policy or Dr. Ettner's 
unchallenged opinion concerning the 
significant long-term consequences of that 
harm. Moreover, the Board offers no 
argument to counter G.G.'s averment that he 
has repeatedly contracted a urinary tract 
infection as a result of holding his urine to 
avoid using the restroom at school. 
 
The uncontroverted facts before the district 
court demonstrate that as a result of the 
Board's restroom policy, G.G. experiences 
daily psychological harm that puts him at risk 
for long-term psychological harm, and his 
avoidance of the restroom as a result of the 
Board's policy puts him at risk for developing 
a urinary tract infection as he has repeatedly 
in the past. G.G. has thus demonstrated that 
he will suffer irreparable harm in the absence 




Turning to the balance of the hardships, G.G. 
has shown that he will suffer irreparable harm 
without the requested injunction. On the 
other end of the scale, the Board contends 
that other students' constitutional right to 
privacy will be imperiled by G.G.'s presence 
in the boys' restroom. 
 
As the majority opinion points out, G.G.'s use 
of the restroom does not implicate the 
unconstitutional actions involved in the cases 
cited by the dissent. Moreover, students' 
unintentional exposure of their genitals to 
others using the restroom has already been 
largely, if not entirely, remedied by the 
alterations to the school's restrooms already 
undertaken by the Board. To the extent that a 
student simply objects to using the restroom 
in the presence of a transgender student even 
where there is no possibility that either 
student's genitals will be exposed, all students 
have access to the single-stall restrooms. For 
other students, using the single-stall 
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restrooms carries no stigma whatsoever, 
whereas for G.G., using those same 
restrooms is tantamount to humiliation and a 
continuing mark of difference among his 
fellow students. The minimal or non-existent 
hardship to other students of using the single-
stall restrooms if they object to G.G.'s 
presence in the communal restroom thus does 
not tip the scale in the Board's favor. The 





Finally, consideration of the public interest in 
granting or denying the preliminary 
injunction favors G.G. Having concluded that 
G.G. has demonstrated a likelihood of 
success on the merits of his Title IX claim, 
denying the requested injunction would 
permit the Board to continue violating G.G.'s 
rights under Title IX for the pendency of this 
case. Enforcing G.G.'s right to be free from 
discrimination on the basis of sex in an 
educational institution is plainly in the public 
interest.  
 
The Board contends that the public interest 
lies in allowing this issue to be determined by 
the legislature, citing pending legislation 
before Congress addressing the issue before 
the Court. But, as discussed above, the 
weight of authority establishes that 
discrimination based on transgender status is 
already prohibited by the language of federal 
civil rights statutes, as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court. The existence of proposed 
legislation that, if passed, would address the 
question before us does not justify forcing 
G.G. to suffer irreparable harm when he has 
demonstrated that he is likely to succeed on 





Based on the evidence presented to the 
district court, G.G. has satisfied all four 
prongs of the preliminary injunction inquiry. 
When the record before us supports entry of 
a preliminary injunction—as it amply does 
here—we have not hesitated to act to prevent 
irreparable injury to a litigant before us.  
 
Nevertheless, it is right and proper that we 
defer to the district court in this instance. It is 
to be hoped that the district court will turn its 
attention to this matter with the urgency the 
case poses. Under the circumstances here, the 
appropriateness and necessity of such prompt 
action is plain. By the time the district court 
issues its decision, G.G. will have suffered 
the psychological harm the injunction sought 
to prevent for an entire school year. 
 
With these additional observations, I concur 
fully in Judge Floyd's thoughtful and 




NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part: 
 
I concur in Part IV of the court's opinion. 
With respect to whether G.G. stated a claim 
under Title IX and whether the district court 
abused its discretion in denying G.G's motion 
for a preliminary injunction, I would affirm 
the ruling of the district court dismissing 
G.G.'s Title IX claim and denying his motion 
for a preliminary injunction. I therefore 
dissent from the majority's decision on those 
issues. 
 
G.G., a transgender boy who is 16, challenges 
as discriminatory, under the Equal Protection 
Clause and Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972, his high school's 
policy for assigning students to restrooms 
and locker rooms based on biological sex. 
The school's policy provides: (1) that the 
266 
 
girls' restrooms and locker rooms are 
designated for use by students who are 
biologically female; (2) that the boys' 
restrooms and locker rooms are designated 
for use by students who are biologically 
male; and (3) that all students, regardless of 
their sex, are authorized to use the school's 
three single-stall unisex restrooms, which the 
school created to accommodate transgender 
students. Under this policy, G.G., who is 
biologically female but who identifies as 
male, is authorized to use the girls' restrooms 
and locker rooms and the unisex restrooms. 
He contends, however, that the policy 
discriminates against him because it denies 
him, as one who identifies as male, the use of 
the boys' restrooms, and he seeks an 
injunction compelling the high school to 
allow him to use the boys' restrooms. 
 
The district court dismissed G.G.'s Title IX 
claim, explaining that the school complied 
with Title IX and its regulations, which 
permit schools to provide separate living 
facilities, restrooms, locker rooms, and 
shower facilities “on the basis of sex,” so 
long as the facilities are “comparable.”  
 
Strikingly, the majority now reverses the 
district court's ruling, without any supporting 
case law, and concludes that when Title IX 
and its regulations provide for separate living 
facilities, restrooms, locker rooms, and 
shower facilities on the basis of sex, the 
statute's and regulations' use of the term 
“sex” means a person's gender identity, not 
the person's biological status as male or 
female. To accomplish its goal, the majority 
relies entirely on a 2015 letter sent by the 
Department of Education's Office for Civil 
Rights to G.G., in which the Office for Civil 
Rights stated, “When a school elects to 
separate or treat students differently on the 
basis of sex [when providing restrooms, 
locker rooms, shower facilities, housing, 
athletic teams, and single-sex classes], a 
school generally must treat transgender 
students consistent with their gender 
identity.” Accepting that new definition of 
the statutory term “sex,” the majority's 
opinion, for the first time ever, holds that a 
public high school may not provide separate 
restrooms and locker rooms on the basis of 
biological sex. Rather, it must now allow a 
biological male student who identifies as 
female to use the girls' restrooms and locker 
rooms and, likewise, must allow a biological 
female student who identifies as male to use 
the boys' restrooms and locker rooms. This 
holding completely tramples on all 
universally accepted protections of privacy 
and safety that are based on the anatomical 
differences between the sexes. And, 
unwittingly, it also tramples on the very 
concerns expressed by G.G., who said that he 
should not be forced to go to the girls' 
restrooms because of the “severe 
psychological distress” it would inflict on 
him and because female students had 
“reacted negatively” to his presence in girls' 
restrooms. Surely biological males who 
identify as females would encounter similar 
reactions in the girls' restroom, just as 
students physically exposed to students of the 
opposite biological sex would be likely to 
experience psychological distress. As a 
result, schools would no longer be able to 
protect physiological privacy as between 
students of the opposite biological sex. 
 
This unprecedented holding overrules 
custom, culture, and the very demands 
inherent in human nature for privacy and 
safety, which the separation of such facilities 
is designed to protect. More particularly, it 
also misconstrues the clear language of Title 
IX and its regulations. And finally, it reaches 
an unworkable and illogical result. 
 
The recent Office for Civil Rights letter, 
moreover, which is not law but which is the 
only authority on which the majority relies, 
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states more than the majority acknowledges. 
In the sentence following the sentence on 
which the majority relies, the letter states 
that, to accommodate transgender students, 
schools are encouraged “to offer the use of 
gender-neutral, individual-user facilities to 
any student who does not want to use shared 
sex-segregated facilities [as permitted by 
Title IX's regulations].” This appears to 
approve the course that G.G.'s school 
followed when it created unisex restrooms in 
addition to the boys' and girls' restrooms it 
already had. 
 
Title IX and its implementing regulations are 
not ambiguous. In recognition of 
physiological privacy and safety concerns, 
they allow schools to provide “separate living 
facilities for the different sexes,” provided 
that the facilities are “proportionate” and 
“comparable,” and to provide “separate 
toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on 
the basis of sex,” again provided that the 
facilities are “comparable.” Because the 
school's policy that G.G. challenges in this 
action comports with Title IX and its 
regulations, I would affirm the district court's 




The relevant facts are not in dispute. G.G. is 
a 16 year-old who attends Gloucester High 
School in Gloucester County, Virginia. He is 
biologically female, but “did not feel like a 
girl” from an early age. Still, he enrolled at 
Gloucester High School for his freshman 
year as a female. 
 
During his freshman year, however, G.G. 
told his parents that he considered himself to 
be transgender, and shortly thereafter, at his 
request, he began therapy with a 
psychologist, who diagnosed him with 
gender dysphoria, a condition of distress 
brought about by the incongruence of one's 
biological sex and gender identity. 
 
In August 2014, before beginning his 
sophomore year, G.G. and his mother met 
with the principal and guidance counselor at 
Gloucester High School to discuss his need, 
as part of his treatment, to socially transition 
at school. The school accommodated all of 
his requests. Officials changed school 
records to reflect G.G.'s new male name; the 
guidance counselor supported G.G.'s sending 
an email to teachers explaining that he was to 
be addressed using his new name and to be 
referred to using male pronouns; G.G. was 
permitted to fulfill his physical education 
requirement through a home-bound program, 
as he preferred not to use the school's locker 
rooms; and the school allowed G.G. to use a 
restroom in the nurse's office “because [he] 
was unsure how other students would react to 
[his] transition.” G.G. was grateful for the 
school's “welcoming environment.” As he 
stated, “no teachers, administrators, or staff at 
Gloucester High School expressed any 
resistance to calling [him] by [his] legal name 
or referring to [him] using male pronouns.” 
And he was “pleased to discover that [his] 
teachers and the vast majority of [his] peers 
respected the fact that [he is] a boy.” 
 
As the school year began, however, G.G. 
found it “stigmatizing” to continue using the 
nurse's restroom, and he requested to use the 
boys' restrooms. The principal also 
accommodated this request. But the very next 
day, the School Board began receiving 
“numerous complaints from parents and 
students about [G.G.'s] use of the boys' 
restrooms.” The School Board thus faced a 
dilemma. It recognized G.G.'s feelings, as he 
expressed them, that “[u]sing the girls' 
restroom[s][was] not possible” because of the 
“severe psychological distress” it would 
inflict on him and because female students 
had previously “reacted negatively” to his 
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presence in the girls' restrooms. It now also 
had to recognize that boys had similar 
feelings caused by G.G.'s use of the boys' 
restrooms, although G.G. stated that he 
continued using the boys' restrooms for some 
seven weeks without personally receiving 
complaints from fellow students. 
The Gloucester County School Board 
considered the problem and, after two public 
meetings, adopted a compromise policy, as 
follows: 
 
Whereas the GCPS recognizes that 
some students question their gender 
identities, and 
 
Whereas the GCPS encourages such 
students to seek support, advice, and 
guidance from parents, professionals 
and other trusted adults, and 
 
Whereas the GCPS seeks to provide a 
safe learning environment for all 
students and to protect the privacy of 
all students, therefore 
 
It shall be the practice of the GCPS to 
provide male and female restroom 
and locker room facilities in its 
schools, and the use of said facilities 
shall be limited to the corresponding 
biological genders, and students with 
gender identity issues shall be 
provided an alternative appropriate 
private facility. 
 
Gloucester High School promptly 
implemented the policy and created three 
single-stall unisex restrooms for use by all 
students, regardless of their biological sex or 
gender identity. 
 
In December 2014, G.G. sought an opinion 
letter about his situation from the U.S. 
Department of Education's Office for Civil 
Rights, and on January 15, 2015, the Office 
responded, stating, as relevant here: 
 
The Department's Title IX regulations 
permit schools to provide sex-
segregated restrooms, locker rooms, 
shower facilities, housing, athletic 
teams, and single-sex classes under 
certain circumstances. When a school 
elects to separate or treat students 
differently on the basis of sex in those 
situations, a school generally must 
treat transgender students consistent 
with their gender identity. [The 
Office for Civil Rights] also 
encourages schools to offer the use of 
gender-neutral, individual-user 
facilities to any student who does not 
want to use shared sex-segregated 
facilities. 
 
G.G. commenced this action in June 2015, 
alleging that the Gloucester County School 
Board's policy was discriminatory, in 
violation of the U.S. Constitution's Equal 
Protection Clause and Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972. He sought 
declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and 
damages. With his complaint, G.G. also filed 
a motion for a preliminary injunction 
“requiring the School Board to allow [him] to 
use the boys' restrooms at school.” 
 
The district court dismissed G.G.'s Title IX 
claim because Title IX's implementing 
regulations permit schools to provide 
separate restrooms “on the basis of sex.” The 
court also denied G.G.'s motion for a 
preliminary injunction. As to the Equal 
Protection claim, the court has not yet ruled 
on whether G.G. failed to state a claim, but, 
at the hearing on the motion for a preliminary 
injunction, it indicated that it “will hear 
evidence” and “get a date set” for trial to 




From the district court's order denying G.G.'s 
motion for a preliminary injunction, G.G. 
filed this appeal, in which he also challenges 
the district court's Title IX ruling as 
inextricably intertwined with the district 





G.G. recognizes that persons who are born 
biologically female “typically” identify 
psychologically as female, and likewise, that 
persons who are born biologically male 
“typically” identify as male. Because G.G. 
was born biologically female but identifies as 
male, he characterizes himself as a 
transgender male. He contends that because 
he is transgender, the School Board singled 
him out for “different and unequal 
treatment,” “discriminat[ing] against him 
based on sex [by denying him use of the boys' 
restrooms], in violation of Title IX.” He 
argues, “discrimination against transgender 
people is necessarily discrimination based on 
sex because it is impossible to treat people 
differently based on their transgender status 
without taking their sex into account.” He 
concludes that the School Board's policy 
addressing restrooms and locker rooms thus 
illegally fails to include transgender persons 
on the basis of their gender identity. In 
particular, he concludes that he is 
“prevent[ed] ... from using the same 
restrooms as other students and relegat [ed] 
... to separate, single-stall facilities.” 
 
As noted, the School Board's policy 
designates the use of restrooms and locker 
rooms based on the student's biological sex—
biological females are assigned to the girls' 
restrooms and unisex restrooms; biological 
males are assigned to the boys' restrooms and 
unisex restrooms. G.G. is thus assigned to the 
girls' restrooms and the unisex restrooms, but 
is denied the use of the boys' restrooms. He 
asserts, however, that because neither he nor 
the girls would accept his use of the girls' 
restroom, he is relegated to the unisex 
restrooms, which is stigmatizing. 
 
The School Board contends that it is treating 
all students the same way, as it explains: 
 
The School Board's policy does not 
discriminate against any class of 
students. Instead, the policy was 
developed to treat all students and 
situations the same. To respect the 
safety and privacy of all students, the 
School Board has had a long-standing 
practice of limiting the use of 
restroom and locker room facilities to 
the corresponding biological sex of 
the students. The School Board also 
provides three single-stall bathrooms 
for any student to use regardless of his 
or her biological sex. Under the 
School Board's restroom policy, G.G. 
is being treated like every other 
student in the Gloucester Schools. All 
students have two choices. Every 
student can use a restroom associated 
with their anatomical sex, whether 
they are boys or girls. If students 
choose not to use the restroom 
associated with their anatomical sex, 
the students can use a private, single-
stall restroom. No student is 
permitted to use the restroom of the 
opposite sex. As a result, all students, 
including female to male transgender 
and male to female transgender 
students, are treated the same. 
 
While G.G. has pending a claim under the 
Equal Protection Clause (on which the 
district court has not yet ruled), only his 
preliminary injunction challenge and Title IX 
claim are before us at this time. 
 




No person in the United States shall, 
on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education 
program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance .... 
 
The Act, however, provides, 
“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary 
contained in this chapter, nothing contained 
herein shall be construed to prohibit any 
educational institution receiving funds under 
this Act, from maintaining separate living 
facilities for the different sexes.” Similarly, 
implementing Regulation 106.33 provides 
for particular separate facilities, as follows: 
 
A recipient may provide separate 
toilet, locker room, and shower 
facilities on the basis of sex, but such 
facilities provided for students of one 
sex shall be comparable to such 
facilities provided for students of the 
other sex. 
 
Thus, although Title IX and its regulations 
provide generally that a school receiving 
federal funds may not discriminate on the 
basis of sex, they also specify that a school 
does not violate the Act by providing, on the 
basis of sex, separate living facilities, 
restrooms, locker rooms, and shower 
facilities. 
 
While G.G. only challenges the definition 
and application of the term “sex” with respect 
to separate restrooms, acceptance of his 
argument would necessarily change the 
definition of “sex” for purposes of assigning 
separate living facilities, locker rooms, and 
shower facilities as well. All are based on 
“sex,” a term that must be construed 
uniformly throughout Title IX and its 
implementing regulations.  
 
Across societies and throughout history, it 
has been commonplace and universally 
accepted to separate public restrooms, locker 
rooms, and shower facilities on the basis of 
biological sex in order to address privacy and 
safety concerns arising from the biological 
differences between males and females. An 
individual has a legitimate and important 
interest in bodily privacy such that his or her 
nude or partially nude body, genitalia, and 
other private parts are not exposed to persons 
of the opposite biological sex. Indeed, courts 
have consistently recognized that the need for 
such privacy is inherent in the nature and 
dignity of humankind.  
 
Moreover, we have explained that separating 
restrooms based on “acknowledged 
differences” between the biological sexes 
serves to protect this important privacy 
interest. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
recognized, when ordering an all-male 
Virginia college to admit female students, 
that such a remedy “would undoubtedly 
require alterations necessary to afford 
members of each sex privacy from the other 
sex.” Such privacy was and remains 
necessary because of the inherent “[p]hysical 
differences between men and women,” 
which, as the Supreme Court explained, are 
“enduring” and render “the two sexes ... not 
fungible,” not because of “one's sense of 
oneself as belonging to a particular gender,” 
as G.G. and the government as amicus 
contend. 
 
Thus, Title IX's allowance for the separation, 
based on sex, of living facilities, restrooms, 
locker rooms, and shower facilities rests on 
the universally accepted concern for bodily 
privacy that is founded on the biological 
differences between the sexes. This privacy 
concern is also linked to safety concerns that 
could arise from sexual responses prompted 
by students' exposure to the private body 
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parts of students of the other biological sex. 
Indeed, the School Board cited these very 
reasons for its adoption of the policy, 
explaining that it separates restrooms and 
locker rooms to promote the privacy and 
safety of minor children, pursuant to its 
“responsibility to its students to ensure their 
privacy while engaging in personal bathroom 
functions, disrobing, dressing, and showering 
outside of the presence of members of the 
opposite sex. [That the school has this 
responsibility] is particularly true in an 
environment where children are still 
developing, both emotionally and 
physically.” 
 
The need to protect privacy and safety 
between the sexes based on physical 
exposure would not be present in the same 
quality and degree if the term “sex” were to 
encompass only a person's gender identity. 
Indeed, separation on this basis would 
function nonsensically. A biological male 
identifying as female could hardly live in a 
girls' dorm or shower in a girls' shower 
without invading physiological privacy 
needs, and the same would hold true for a 
biological female identifying as male in a 
boys' dorm or shower. G.G.'s answer, of 
course, is that he is not challenging the 
separation, on the basis of sex, of living 
facilities, locker rooms, and shower facilities, 
but only of restrooms, where the risks to 
privacy and safety are far reduced. This effort 
to limit the scope of the issue apparently 
sways the majority, as it cabins its entire 
discussion to “restroom access by 
transgender individuals.” But this effort to 
restrict the effect of G.G.'s argument hardly 
matters when the term “sex” would have to 
be applied uniformly throughout the statute 
and regulations, as noted above and, indeed, 
as agreed to by the majority. 
 
The realities underpinning Title IX's 
recognition of separate living facilities, 
restrooms, locker rooms, and shower 
facilities are reflected in the plain language of 
the statute and regulations, which is not 
ambiguous. The text of Title IX and its 
regulations allowing for separation of each 
facility “on the basis of sex” employs the 
term “sex” as was generally understood at the 
time of enactment. Title IX was enacted in 
1972 and the regulations were promulgated 
in 1975 and readopted in 1980, and during 
that time period, virtually every dictionary 
definition of “sex” referred to the 
physiological distinctions between males and 
females, particularly with respect to their 
reproductive functions. Indeed, although the 
contemporaneous meaning controls our 
analysis, it is notable that, even today, the 
term “sex” continues to be defined based on 
the physiological distinctions between males 
and females. Any new definition of sex that 
excludes reference to physiological 
differences, as the majority now attempts to 
introduce, is simply an unsupported reach to 
rationalize a desired outcome. 
 
Thus, when the School Board assigned 
restrooms and locker rooms on the basis of 
biological sex, it was clearly complying 
precisely with the unambiguous language of 
Title IX and its regulations. 
 
Despite the fact that the majority offers no 
case to support the definition of “sex” as 
advanced by G.G. and supported by the 
government as amicus, the majority 
nonetheless accepts that the meaning of the 
term “sex” in Title IX and its regulations 
refers to a person's “gender identity” simply 
to accommodate G.G.'s wish to use the boys' 
restrooms. But, it is not immediately apparent 
whether G.G., the government, and the 
majority contend that the term “sex” as used 
in Title IX and its regulations refers (1) to 
both biological sex and gender identity; (2) to 
either biological sex or gender identity; or (3) 
to only “gender identity.” In his brief, G.G. 
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seems to take the position that the term “sex” 
at least includes a reference to gender 
identity. This is the position taken in his 
complaint when he alleges, “Under Title IX, 
discrimination ‘on the basis of sex’ 
encompasses both discrimination based on 
biological differences between men and 
women and discrimination based on gender 
nonconformity.” The government seems to 
be taking the same position, contending that 
the term “sex” “encompasses both sex—that 
is, the biological differences between men 
and women—and gender [identity].” 
(Emphasis in original). The majority, 
however, seems to suggest that the term 
“sex” refers only to gender identity, as it 
relies solely on the statement in the Office for 
Civil Rights' letter of January 7, 2015, which 
said, “When a school elects to separate or 
treat students differently on the basis of sex 
[for the purpose of providing restrooms, 
locker rooms, and other facilities], a school 
generally must treat transgender students 
consistent with their gender identity.” But, 
regardless of where G.G., the government, 
and the majority purport to stand on this 
question, the clear effect of their new 
definition of sex not only tramples the 
relevant statutory and regulatory language 
and disregards the privacy concerns 
animating that text, it is also illogical and 
unworkable. 
 
If the term “sex” as used in the statute and 
regulations refers to both biological sex and 
gender identity, then, while the School 
Board's policy is in compliance with respect 
to most students, whose biological sex aligns 
with their gender identity, for students whose 
biological sex and gender identity do not 
align, no restroom or locker room separation 
could ever be accomplished consistent with 
the regulation because a transgender student's 
use of a boys' or girls' restroom or locker 
room could not satisfy the conjunctive 
criteria. Given that G.G. and the government 
do not challenge schools' ability to separate 
restrooms and locker rooms for male and 
female students, surely they cannot be 
advocating an interpretation that places 
schools in an impossible position. Moreover, 
such an interpretation would deny G.G. the 
right to use either the boys' or girls' 
restrooms, a position that G.G. does not 
advocate. 
 
If the position of G.G., the government, and 
the majority is that the term “sex” means 
either biological sex or gender identity, then 
the School Board's policy is in compliance 
because it segregates the facilities on the 
basis of biological sex, a satisfactory 
component of the disjunctive. 
 
Therefore, when asserting that G.G. must be 
allowed to use the boys' restrooms and locker 
rooms as consistent with his gender identity, 
G.G., the government, and the majority must 
be arguing that “sex” as used in Title IX and 
its regulations means only gender identity. 
But this construction would, in the end, mean 
that a school could never meaningfully 
provide separate restrooms and locker rooms 
on the basis of sex. Biological males and 
females whose gender identity aligned would 
be required to use the same restrooms and 
locker rooms as persons of the opposite 
biological sex whose gender identity did not 
align. With such mixed use of separate 
facilities, no purpose would be gained by 
designating a separate use “on the basis of 
sex,” and privacy concerns would be left 
unaddressed. 
 
Moreover, enforcement of any separation 
would be virtually impossible. Basing 
restroom access on gender identity would 
require schools to assume gender identity 
based on appearances, social expectations, or 
explicit declarations of identity, which the 
government concedes would render Title IX 




Certainly a school that has created 
separate restrooms for boys and girls 
could not decide that only students 
who dress, speak, and act sufficiently 
masculine count as boys entitled to 
use the boys' restroom, or that only 
students who wear dresses, have long 
hair, and act sufficiently feminine 
may use the girls' restroom. 
 
Yet, by interpreting Title IX and the 
regulations as “requiring schools to treat 
students consistent with their gender 
identity,” and by disallowing schools from 
treating students based on their biological 
sex, the government's position would have 
precisely the effect the government finds to 
be at odds with common sense. 
 
Finally, in arguing that he should not be 
assigned to the girls' restrooms, G.G. states 
that “it makes no sense to place a transgender 
boy in the girls' restroom in the name of 
protecting student privacy” because “girls 
objected to his presence in the girls' 
restrooms because they perceived him as 
male.” But the same argument applies to his 
use of the boys' restrooms, where boys felt 
uncomfortable because they perceived him as 
female. In any scenario based on gender 
identity, moreover, there would be no 
accommodation for the recognized need for 
physiological privacy. 
 
In short, it is impossible to determine how 
G.G., the government, and the majority 
would apply the provisions of Title IX and 
the implementing regulations that allow for 
the separation of living facilities, restrooms, 
locker rooms, and shower facilities “on the 
basis of sex” if “sex” means gender identity. 
The Office for Civil Rights letter, on which 
the majority exclusively relies, hardly 
provides an answer. In one sentence it states 
that schools “generally must treat transgender 
students consistent with their gender 
identity,” whatever that means, and in the 
next sentence, it encourages schools to 
provide “gender-neutral, individual-user 
facilities to any student who does not want to 
use shared sex-segregated facilities.” While 
the first sentence might be impossible to 
enforce without destroying all privacy-
serving separation, the second sentence 
encourages schools, such as Gloucester High 
School, to provide unisex single-stall 
restrooms for any students who are 
uncomfortable with sex-separated facilities, 
as the school in fact provided. 
 
As it stands, Title IX and its implementing 
regulations authorize schools to separate, on 
the basis of sex, living facilities, restrooms, 
locker rooms, and shower facilities, which 
must allow for separation on the basis of 
biological sex. Gloucester High School thus 
clearly complied with the statute and 
regulations. But, as it did so, it was 
nonetheless sensitive to G.G.'s gender 
transition, accommodating virtually every 
wish that he had. Indeed, he initially 
requested and was granted the use of the 
nurse's restroom. And, after both girls and 
boys objected to his using the girls' and boys' 
restrooms, the school provided individual 
unisex restrooms, as encouraged by the letter 
from the Office for Civil Rights. Thus, while 
Gloucester High School made a good-faith 
effort to accommodate G.G. and help him in 
his transition, balancing its concern for him 
with its responsibilities to all students, it still 
acted legally in maintaining a policy that 
provided all students with physiological 
privacy and safety in restrooms and locker 
rooms. 
 
Because the Gloucester County School Board 
did not violate Title IX and Regulation 
106.33 in adopting the policy for separate 
restrooms and locker rooms, I would affirm 
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the district court's decision dismissing G.G.'s 
Title IX claim and therefore dissent. 
 
I also dissent from the majority's decision to 
vacate the district court's denial of G.G.'s 
motion for a preliminary injunction. As the 
Supreme Court has consistently explained, 
“[a] preliminary injunction is an 
extraordinary remedy” that “may only be 
awarded upon a clear showing that the 
plaintiff is entitled to such relief,” and “ ‘[i]n 
exercising their sound discretion, courts of 
equity should pay particular regard for the 
public consequences in employing the 
extraordinary remedy.’ ” Given the facts that 
the district court fully and fairly summarized 
in its opinion, including the hardships 
expressed both by G.G. and by other 
students, I cannot conclude that we can “form 
a definite and firm conviction that the court 
below committed a clear error of judgment,” 
particularly when we are only now 
expressing as binding law an evidentiary 
standard that the majority asserts the district 
court violated. 
 





“Supreme Court grants emergency order to block transgender male 
student in Virginia from using boys' restroom” 
 
The Los Angeles Times 
David G. Savage 
August 3, 2016 
 
The Supreme Court intervened for the first 
time Wednesday in the controversy over 
transgender rights and blocked a lower court 
ruling that would have allowed a transgender 
boy to use the high school restroom that fits 
his “gender identity.” 
In an unusual 5-3 order, the justices granted 
an emergency appeal from a Virginia school 
board, which said it is fighting to “protect the 
basic expectations of bodily privacy of 
Gloucester County students.” 
The school board was seeking to be exempted 
from the Obama administration’s position 
that schools nationwide are required to allow 
transgender students to use the bathroom they 
prefer. 
Justice Stephen G. Breyer signaled he did not 
support the school board’s emergency 
appeal, but said he joined the court’s four 
conservatives as a “courtesy” to put the issue 
on hold until the justices can review the 
matter when they return in the fall.  
“In light of the facts that four justices have 
voted to grant the application referred to the 
court by the chief justice, that we are 
currently on recess and that granting the stay 
will preserve the status quo,” he wrote, “I 
vote to grant the application as a courtesy.” 
 
The issue began last year when a U.S. 
Department of Education lawyer advised 
school districts nationwide that a federal anti-
discrimination law known as Title IX, which 
forbids sex discrimination in education, also 
protects the rights of transgender students to 
use restrooms and changing facilities that are 
“consistent with their gender identity.” 
In April, the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of 
Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, upheld that policy 
and ruled for Gavin Grimm, a 17-year-old 
transgender boy who sued the school board. 
The appeals court issued an order telling 
Gloucester school officials they must abide 
by the administration’s interpretation and 
allow Grimm to use the boys’ restrooms. 
In Wednesday’s order, the high court said it 
had granted the school board’s emergency 
request to temporarily “stay the mandate” of 
the 4th Circuit until the school board can file 
an appeal when the court returns.  
The court’s action, while not a ruling, signals 
at least four justices are skeptical of the 
Obama administration’s stance. While that’s 
enough to grant a petition to review the lower 
court ruling, it will take at least five votes to 
issue a ruling. 
276 
 
Since the court has been ideologically split 
since the February death of Justice Antonin 
Scalia, a 4-4 tie on the transgender case is 
likely and would result in the affirmation of 
the 4th Circuit’s ruling. 
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia 
Sotomayor and Elena Kagan said they would 
have turned down the emergency appeal in 
the Gloucester case and allowed the lower 
court’s ruling to take effect. 
The request for an emergency stay was filed 
with Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., and 
Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence 
Thomas and Samuel A. Alito Jr. joined in 
granting it. 
Lawyers for the American Civil Liberties 
Union had urged the court to turn down the 
request on the grounds that the school board 
would suffer “no irreparable harm” if the teen 
was permitted to use the boys’ restroom. 
“We are disappointed that the court has 
issued a stay and that Gavin will have to 
begin another school year isolated from his 
peers and stigmatized by the Gloucester 
County school board just because he’s a boy 
who is transgender,” said Joshua Block, a 
senior ACLU staff attorney. “We remain 
hopeful that Gavin will ultimately prevail.” 
Wednesday’s order comes as a federal judge 
in North Carolina is weighing arguments on 
whether to put on hold the state’s 
controversial measure known as House Bill 
2. It says public restrooms and changing 
facilities, including in schools and colleges, 
must be segregated by sex, as defined by “the 
physical condition of being male or female 
which is stated on a person’s birth 
certificate.” 
Lawyers for the ACLU and Lambda Legal 
urged U.S. District Judge Thomas Schroeder 
on Monday to block the state from enforcing 
the measure while both sides prepare for a 
trial on the issue in November. The judge said 
he would rule on the request shortly. But the 
high court’s order may influence the judge’s 
decision. 
The appeal in the Gloucester case raises an 
issue that has long interested the conservative 
justices. Congress did not pass a new law to 
clarify the rights of transgender students, and 
the Education Department did not issue a new 
regulation. 
Instead, its lawyers sent a “guidance” to 
school officials advising them that in the 
department’s view, Title IX, adopted in 1972, 
means that excluding transgender students 
from facilities that fit their gender identity 
amounts to illegal sex discrimination. 
In their appeal, lawyers for the Gloucester 
school board said the case had “nationwide 
importance.” And they argued the high court 
should forbid federal executive agencies, 
including the Education Department, from 
issuing sweeping new interpretations of old 
regulations.   
The school board said it intended to file an 
appeal petition by the end of this month that 
formally asks the high court to review the 
4th Circuit’s decision. If the justices agree to 
hear the case, which now seems likely, it 
would be one of the court’s major cases of 
the coming term. If a 4-4 deadlock is 
averted, the case could yield the court’s first 
ruling on the issue of transgender rights.
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“Virginia School Board Asks Supreme Court to Block Order on 
Transgender Bathroom Use” 
 
The Wall Street Journal 
Jess Bravin 
July 13, 2016 
 
A Virginia school board asked the Supreme 
Court Wednesday to block a lower court 
order allowing a transgender student who 
identifies as male to use the boys’ restroom. 
The case is the first over transgender 
restroom use to reach the high court. It could 
provide the justices an opportunity to decide 
whether prohibitions of sex discrimination 
extend to gender identity—a position taken 
by some Obama administration agencies, but 
disputed by more than a dozen Republican-
leaning states. 
“For decades, our nation’s schools have 
structured their facilities and programs 
around the sensible idea that in certain 
intimate settings men and women may be 
separated ‘to afford members of each sex 
privacy from the other sex,’” the Gloucester 
County School Board said in its petition. 
The board wants to temporarily halt 
implementation of an April decision by a 
three-judge panel of the Fourth U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Richmond, Va., which 
ruled in favor of high-school junior Gavin 
Grimm that the policy violated federal law 
barring discrimination based on sex. 
Gavin was born female but has said that since 
age 12 he has identified as male. Gavin “has 
been diagnosed with gender dysphoria, a 
medical condition characterized by clinically 
significant distress caused by an 
incongruence between a person’s gender 
identity and the person’s birth-assigned sex,” 
the Fourth Circuit opinion said. He has 
undergone hormone therapy but not sex-
reassignment surgery, the court said, and 
“lives all aspects of his life as a boy.” 
School officials were allowing him to use the 
boys’ restroom, the appeals court said. He did 
so “without incident for about seven weeks,” 
but word of this “excited the interest of others 
in the community,” who complained to the 
school board. The board responded in 
December 2014 with a resolution limiting use 
of restrooms and locker rooms “to the 
corresponding biological genders,” adding 
that “students with gender-identity issues 
shall be provided an alternative appropriate 
private facility.” 
Gavin, 17 years old, through his mother, sued 
to block the policy. A federal-district court in 
Newport News, Va., dismissed the suit, 
finding that the federal educational sex-
equity law, known as Title IX, doesn’t extend 
to sexual orientation, gender identity and 
other categories beyond biological sex. 
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Federal courts in the past typically have 
rejected arguments that prohibitions of sex-
discrimination cover sexual orientation. The 
Fourth Circuit’s April opinion, however, 
relied heavily on new guidance from the U.S. 
Education Department addressing 
transgender questions. A January 2015 
opinion letter from the department’s Office 
of Civil Rights advised that schools 
“generally must treat transgender students 
consistent with their gender identity.” 
“This case presents one of the most extreme 
examples of judicial deference to an 
administrative agency this court will ever 
see,” the Gloucester school board said, noting 
that the Education Department’s opinion 
letter “was generated in response to an 
inquiry about the school board’s restroom 














The Gloucester board addressed its 
application to Chief Justice John Roberts, 
who apart from presiding over the Supreme 
Court oversees the Fourth Circuit. He can act 
on the request himself or refer it to the full 
court for action. No decision is expected 
before additional briefing by both sides in the 
case. 
In May, the Obama administration provided 
detailed guidance on bathroom use by 
transgender students by telling educators 
around the country they should allow 
students to use the bathroom and locker 
facilities of their chosen gender, saying 











June 1, 2016 
 
Arguing that “time is of the essence,” a 
federal appeals court judge on Tuesday called 
for a prompt appeal to the Supreme Court to 
sort out the rights of transgender students 
when they use restrooms at school.   Circuit 
Judge Paul V. Niemeyer helped clear the way 
for an early appeal by withholding a demand 
that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit vote on rehearing a test case on the 
issue. 
At issue in the case of G.G. v. Gloucester 
County School Board is the meaning of a 
1972 federal civil rights law that outlaws 
discrimination “because of sex” in federally 
funded education.  Specially at issue is 
whether that law — known as “Title IX” —  
provides protection to students who identify 
as having a gender other than what was 
assigned to them at birth. 
There is a widespread, and rapidly growing 
controversy over that and other transgender 
rights issues, and the case of sixteen-year-old 
“G.G.” could be the first to put the issue 
before the Supreme Court.  In some ways, the 
rapid development of the controversy 
parallels that over same-sex marriage rights, 
leading to the Supreme Court decision 
recognizing equal rights of gays and lesbians 
to marry, across the nation. 
In this case, G.G. is a sixteen-year-old 
student at Gloucester County High School in 
Gloucester Courthouse, Va., who was born a 
girl but now has the identity of a boy, and 
wishes to use the boys’ restroom at school.  
He won a two-to-one decision by a three-
judge panel of the Fourth Circuit on April 19, 
and the en banc Fourth Circuit on Tuesday 
turned down a plea by the school board to 
reconsider the controversy. 
Judge Niemeyer had dissented from the panel 
ruling, and said on Tuesday that the panel 
should itself reconsider.  But, he went on to 
say that he declined to call for a vote among 
his colleagues on the question of en banc 
review.  When there was no request for such 
a poll, the school board’s rehearing plea was 
denied. 
In withholding such a request, the judge said 
that “the momentous nature of the issue 
deserves an open road to the Supreme Court 
to seek the Court’s controlling construction 
of Title IX for national application.”  This 
case, he said, presented the legal issue 
clearly, without “the distraction of 
subservient issues.” 
Summarizing some of the arguments he had 
made as the dissenter on the panel, Judge 
Niemeyer concluded: “Time is of the 
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essence, and I can only urge the parties to 
seek Supreme Court review.” 
The county school board, in response to a 
lawsuit by G.G. and his mother, Deirdre 
Grimm, had sought to defend its policy of 
providing separate restrooms and locker 
rooms based upon a student’s biological sex 
— that is, the sex noted on the birth 
certificate.  Its policy also provided single-
stall restrooms that any student, of either sex 
or of transgender identity, could use.  G.G. 
and his mother contended that keeping him 
out of the boys’ restroom and confining him 
to a single-stall alternative was a form of 
discrimination based upon his gender 
identity. 
The Fourth Circuit panel majority did not 
itself rule on whether Title IX actually does 
provide protection against students based on 
their gender identity, in federally funded 
educational programs.   Instead, the panel 
majority chose to defer to the view of the U.S. 
Department of Education that Title IX’s 
reference to sex includes gender identity. 
Technically, the panel majority had invoked 
what is called “Auer deference.”   That is a 
reference to a 1997 Supreme Court decision 
in the case of Auer v. Robbins, declaring that 
federal courts should give deference to 
federal agencies’ interpretations of their own 
regulations, if those regulations are 
ambiguous.  (While there are some members 
of the Supreme Court who in recent years 
have called for a reconsideration of the Auer 
decision, the Justices passed up a request to 
do that earlier this month, in denying review 
of United Student Aid Funds v. Bible; Justice 
Clarence Thomas dissented alone.) 
After accepting the government’s view of the 
reach of Title IX, the Fourth Circuit panel 
ordered a federal trial judge to reconsider his 
ruling against G.G.’s claim, saying he had 
used the wrong legal analysis.  The majority 
opinion was written by Circuit Judge Henry 
F. Floyd, and joined by Senior Circuit Judge 
Andre M. Davis.  In a separation opinion, 
Judge Davis said he would have gone ahead 
and ruled in favor of G.G. now instead if 
returning it to the trial judge.   The panel did 
refuse G.G.’s request that the case be 
reassigned to a different trial judge on the 
premise that the judge who ruled against him 
was biased.   Judge Niemeyer agreed with 
leaving the case with the same judge, but 
dissented on all of the remainder of the 
majority ruling. 
While much of the nationwide controversy 
over transgender rights lately has focused on 
school students and on access to restrooms, 
the controversy also has included a dispute 
over whether transgender rights are also 
protected under Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, which outlaws discrimination 
based upon sex in the workplace.  The U.S. 
Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission has been active in promoting 
transgender workers’ rights. 
The Obama administration has taken a strong 
position in favor of transgender rights, and 
this month sent a nationwide letter to schools 
noting its position that Title IX does protect 
transgender students.  The administration 
also has sued the state of North Carolina over 
the legality of a state law that restricts 
transgender rights of students and workers 
across the state.   The administration also 
filed its views with the Fourth Circuit panel 
281 
 
in the G.G. case.  Presumably, it would take 
part in that case if it now moves on to the 
Supreme Court.  
Among a variety of newly filed lawsuits 
around the country on that issue, eleven states 
have sued the Obama administration in a 




“Federal appeals court sides with transgender teen, says bathroom case 
can go forward” 
 
The Washington Post 
Moriah Balingit 
April 19, 2016 
 
A federal appeals court in Richmond has 
ruled that a transgender high school student 
who was born as a female can sue his school 
board on discrimination grounds because it 
banned him from the boys’ bathroom. 
In backing high school junior Gavin Grimm, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit 
deferred to the U.S. Education Department’s 
position that transgender students should 
have access to the bathrooms that match their 
gender identities rather than being forced to 
use bathrooms that match their biological 
sex. The department has said that requiring 
transgender students to use a bathroom that 
corresponds with their biological sex 
amounts to a violation of Title IX, which 
prohibits sex discrimination at schools that 
receive federal funding. 
“It’s a complete vindication for the Education 
Department’s interpretation of Title IX,” said 
Joshua Block, an American Civil Liberties 
Union lawyer who represents Grimm. 
In a 2-to-1 decision, the 4th Circuit ordered a 
lower court to rehear the student’s claims that 
the Gloucester County, Va., school board’s 
bathroom policies — which restrict 
transgender students to using a separate 
unisex bathroom — violate federal law. The 
judges also ruled that the lower court should 
reconsider a request that would have allowed 
Grimm to use the boys’ bathroom at 
Gloucester High School while the case is 
pending. 
The 4th Circuit is the highest court to weigh 
in on the question of whether bathroom 
restrictions constitute sex discrimination, and 
the decision could have widespread 
implications on how U.S. courts interpret the 
issue as civil rights activists and local 
politicians battle over bathrooms. 
The question of which bathrooms 
transgender people can use has become a 
divisive political issue in several states, 
emerging as an emotional fight in South 
Dakota, Texas, Illinois, Mississippi and 
Virginia. In North Carolina, a law banning 
local protections for gay and transgender 
people — a measure centering on bathrooms 
— has sparked protests, boycotts and calls for 
an immediate repeal. 
Public bathrooms have become the latest 
battleground in the fight for LGBT rights, 
with conservative activists and some state 
lawmakers pushing restrictions that prevent 
transgender people from using bathrooms in 
accordance with their gender identity. 
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Activists have used the bathroom debate as a 
venue for rolling back broader civil rights 
protections, arguing that allowing 
transgender people into the supposedly safe 
spaces of single-sex bathrooms creates 
dangerous scenarios and violates privacy and 
common sense. 
The 4th Circuit judges wrote that 
interpretations of federal discrimination 
policies should be left to politicians, in this 
case the Obama administration’s Education 
Department. The court ruled that Grimm has 
an argument that his school board violated his 
rights based on those interpretations, but the 
court did not decide whether transgender 
students faced discrimination in Gloucester, 
leaving that question to the lower court. 
“At the heart of this appeal is whether Title 
IX requires schools to provide transgender 
students access to restrooms congruent with 
their gender identity,” the court’s opinion 
said. “We conclude that the Department’s 
interpretation of its own regulation . . . as it 
relates to restroom access by transgender 
individuals, is . . . to be accorded controlling 
weight in this case.” 
LGBT advocates celebrated Tuesday’s court 
decision and were hopeful that it would help 
turn back the tide of efforts by state 
lawmakers to get bathroom restrictions on the 
books. The Human Rights Campaign, which 
tracks bills related to lesbian, gay, bisexual 
and transgender issues, counted 14 states that 
debated bills that would restrict bathroom 
usage for transgender students. 
“I think this is going to be a wake-up call for 
legislators,” said Peter Renn, an attorney for 
an LGBT advocacy group. He said he 
believes that lawmakers contemplating 
bathroom restrictions for transgender people 
are “essentially on a collision course with 
federal law and federal courts.” 
Lawyer Mat Staver of Liberty Counsel, 
which has backed efforts to roll back LGBT 
protections for students, took a more cautious 
view, noting that the judges opted to send the 
case back down to the district court. “I don’t 
think this case has any definitive answer, and 
it’s not a definitive ruling on what Title IX 
says,” Staver said. 
The issue has been at the center of state-level 
debates in recent months, most notably in 
North Carolina, where Gov. Pat McCrory (R) 
recently signed into law a ban on local 
government measures that protect gay and 
transgender people from discrimination; he 
focused specifically on the bathroom issue in 
arguing that the ban was necessary to prevent 
local governments from allowing “a man to 
use a woman’s bathroom, shower or locker 
room.” A transgender university student and 
employee already have sued to overturn the 
new law and the 4th Circuit’s ruling could 
bolster their argument that bathroom 
restrictions are discriminatory, Renn said. 
The North Carolina law has sparked protests 
and economic boycotts in the state. Duke 
University leaders this week publicly 
condemned “in the strongest possible terms” 
the North Carolina law and called for its 
repeal. 
McCrory said in a video statement posted 
online Tuesday that he disagreed with the 4th 
Circuit’s ruling, calling it a “bad precedent.” 
South Dakota Gov. Dennis Daugaard (R) 
vetoed a bill that would restrict transgender 
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public school students from using bathrooms 
in accordance with their gender identity, 
arguing that schools were best equipped to 
handle accommodations for transgender 
students. 
Voters in Houston last year voted down a law 
that would have extended nondiscrimination 
protections to gay and transgender people, 
and a new law in Mississippi allows schools 
to require students to dress and use the 
bathroom in accordance with the gender on 
their birth certificate. 
The case in Virginia centers on Grimm, now 
a junior at Gloucester High School. Grimm, 
who was born with female anatomy, came 
out as male to his classmates in high school 
and began using the boys’ bathroom his 
sophomore year. Seven weeks later, angry 
parents raised concerns with the school 
board, prompting members to pass a policy 
that requires students to use school 
bathrooms corresponding with their 
“biological gender” and indicates that 
transgender students should use a separate, 
unisex bathroom. 
Grimm sued the school board in federal 
court, arguing that the new rule violated Title 
IX, the federal law that bars gender 
discrimination in the nation’s schools. He 
also asked for a preliminary injunction to 
allow him to use the boys’ bathroom while 
his case proceeded. 
Troy M. Andersen, chair of the Gloucester 
County School Board, and David Corrigan, 
the attorney representing the school board, 
did not respond to requests for comment 
Tuesday. 
Transgender students say that using the 
bathroom that corresponds with their gender 
identity is important for them — and others 
— to feel comfortable. A transgender boy 
who appears male may generally raise alarms 
if he is forced to use the girls’ bathroom. 
Grimm has said that the debate made him the 
subject of ridicule within his community. 
“Matters like identity and self-consciousness 
are something that most kids grapple with in 
this age range,” Grimm said in January. 
“When you’re a transgender teenager, these 
things are often very potent. I feel humiliated 
and dysphoric every time I’m forced to use a 
separate facility.” 
In a dissent, Judge Paul V. Niemeyer of the 
4th Circuit said the ruling “completely 
tramples on all universally accepted 
protections of privacy and safety that are 
based on the anatomical differences between 
the sexes.” 
“This unprecedented holding overrules 
custom, culture, and the very demands 
inherent in human nature for privacy and 
safety, which the separation of such facilities 
is designed to protect,” Niemeyer wrote.
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“Appeals Court Favors Transgender Student in Virginia Restroom Case” 
 
The New York Times 
Richard Fausset 
April 19, 2016 
 
Weeks after a new North Carolina law put 
transgender bathroom access at the heart of 
the nation’s culture wars, a federal appeals 
court in Richmond, Va., ruled on Tuesday in 
favor of a transgender student who was born 
female and wishes to use the boys’ restroom 
at his rural Virginia high school. 
Advocates for lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender people note that the ruling from 
the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit applies to North Carolina, 
where the controversial law approved last 
month limits transgender people to 
bathrooms in government buildings, 
including public schools, that correspond 
with the gender listed on their birth 
certificates. 
As a result of the ruling, those advocates say, 
that portion of the North Carolina law that 
applies to public schools now clearly violates 
Title IX — the federal law that prohibits 
gender discrimination in schools. 
“Our expectation is that the North Carolina 
schools reverse course immediately, as in 
tomorrow,” Sarah Warbelow, the legal 
director for the Human Rights Campaign, an 
L.G.B.T. rights group, said Tuesday night.  
The ruling in favor of Gavin Grimm, a junior 
at Gloucester High School in southeastern 
Virginia, does not immediately grant him the 
right to use the boys’ restrooms; rather, it 
directs a lower court that had ruled against 
him to re-evaluate Mr. Grimm’s request for a 
preliminary injunction to be able to use those 
restrooms. 
But it is the first time that a federal appellate 
court has ruled that Title IX protects the 
rights of such students to use the bathroom 
that corresponds with their gender identity. 
The ruling also comes as some school 
districts and state governments around the 
country are grappling with the question of 
whether transgender people should be 
allowed to go to the public facilities that 
correspond with their gender identity, or 
whether, as many conservatives believe, such 
access would infringe on the privacy rights of 
others. 
Boycotts and protests have followed the 
passage of the North Carolina law, but Gov. 
Pat McCrory has essentially stood by it. On 
Tuesday, Joshua Block, a lawyer with the 
American Civil Liberties Union, which 
brought the case on Mr. Grimm’s behalf, 
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argued that such state and local legislation 
violated federal law. 
“With this decision, we hope that schools and 
legislators will finally get the message that 
excluding transgender kids from the 
restrooms is unlawful sex discrimination,” he 
said in a statement. 
The North Carolina law has prompted the 
Obama administration to consider whether 
the state would be ineligible for billions of 
dollars in federal funding for schools, 
housing and highways. 
Mr. McCrory, a Republican who is seeking 
re-election in November, and other 
supporters of the law have played down 
suggestions that the Obama administration 
would rescind those billions. Mr. McCrory’s 
Democratic opponent, Roy Cooper, the 
state’s attorney general, has said in the past 
that the law may put the federal funding at 
risk and has refused to defend the state in a 
lawsuit challenging it. 
In a statement Tuesday, Mr. McCrory said he 
strongly disagreed with President Obama and 
Mr. Cooper’s objective “to force our high 
schools to allow boys in girls’ restrooms, 
locker rooms or shower facilities,” but would 
evaluate the effect of Tuesday’s ruling on 
North Carolina law and policy. 
The A.C.L.U. brought the case on behalf of 
Mr. Grimm, who was born female but 
identifies as a male, in June, seeking a 
preliminary injunction so that Mr. Grimm 
could use the boys’ restrooms at his school. 
The school administration initially allowed 
him to do so, but the local school board later 
approved a policy that barred him from the 
boys’ restrooms; according to court 
documents, the policy also “required students 
with ‘gender identity issues’ to use an 
alternative private facility” to go to the 
bathroom. 
Judge Robert G. Doumar of Federal District 
Court ruled against Mr. Grimm in September, 
dismissing his claim that the school board 
had violated Title IX, although the judge did 
allow his case to go forward under the equal 
protection clause of the 14th Amendment. 
The ruling by a three-judge panel on Tuesday 
reversed the lower court’s dismissal of the 
Title IX claim, stating that the District Court 
“did not accord appropriate deference” to 
regulations issued by the Department of 
Education. The department’s current 
guidelines dictate that schools “generally 
must treat transgender students consistent 
with their gender identity.” 
Roger Gannam, a lawyer with the 
conservative Liberty Counsel, which filed an 
amicus brief in the case on behalf of the 
defendant, the Gloucester County School 
Board, said Tuesday that the court had 
engaged in “blatant judicial legislation.” 
“It’s very disappointing, and it’s frightening, 
in a sense,” he said. 
Mr. Block of the A.C.L.U., in a phone 
interview, said he was confident that the 
District Court would rule in Mr. Grimm’s 
favor and allow him to use the restroom. And 
he noted that the five states covered by the 
Fourth Circuit — Virginia, North Carolina, 
Maryland, West Virginia and South Carolina 
— must now follow the federal Department 




The Obama administration has been 
aggressive in its efforts to ensure that 
transgender students can use the bathrooms 
in public schools that correspond with their 
gender identities. Some federal agencies have 
threatened to rescind funding to pressure 
some municipal governments in California 
and Illinois to change their policies and allow 
transgender students to do so. In June, the 
Justice Department filed a “statement of 
interest” in Mr. Grimm’s case. 
We are pleased with the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision, which agreed with the position that 
the United States advocated in its brief,” the 
Justice Department said in a statement 
Tuesday night. 
In an email, a clerk for the Gloucester school 
system said the superintendent, Walter 
Clemons, “has no comment at this time.” 
In a statement released through the A.C.L.U., 
Mr. Grimm said: “I feel so relieved and 
vindicated by the court’s ruling. Today’s 
decision gives me hope that my fight will 
help other kids avoid discriminatory 





“Federal Transgender Bathroom Access Guidelines Blocked by Judge” 
 
The New York Times 
Erick Eckholm and Alan Blinder 
August 22, 2016 
 
A federal judge has blocked the Obama 
administration from enforcing new 
guidelines that were intended to expand 
restroom access for transgender students 
across the country. 
Judge Reed O’Connor of the Federal District 
Court for the Northern District of Texas said 
in a 38-page ruling, which he said should 
apply nationwide, that the government had 
not complied with federal law when it issued 
“directives which contradict the existing 
legislative and regulatory text.” 
Judge O’Connor, whom President George W. 
Bush nominated to the federal bench, said 
that not granting an injunction would put 
states “in the position of either maintaining 
their current policies in the face of the federal 
government’s view that they are violating the 
law, or changing them to comply with the 
guidelines and cede their authority over this 
issue.” 
The judge’s order on Sunday, in a case 
brought by officials from more than a dozen 
states, was a victory for social conservatives 
in the continuing legal battles over the 
restroom guidelines, which the federal 
government issued this year. The culture war 
over the rights of transgender people, and 
especially their right to use public bathrooms 
consistent with their gender identities, has 
emerged as an emotional cause among social 
conservatives. 
The Obama administration’s assertion that 
the rights of transgender people in public 
schools and workplaces are protected under 
existing laws against sex discrimination has 
been condemned by social conservatives, 
who said the administration was illegally 
intruding into local affairs and promoting a 
policy that would jeopardize the privacy and 
safety of schoolchildren. 
The ruling could deter the administration 
from bringing new legal action against school 
districts that do not allow transgender 
students to use bathrooms and locker rooms 
of their choice. 
“We are pleased that the court ruled against 
the Obama administration’s latest illegal 
federal overreach,” Attorney General Ken 
Paxton of Texas said in a statement on 
Monday. “This president is attempting to 
rewrite the laws enacted by the elected 
representatives of the people and is 
threatening to take away federal funding 
from schools to force them to conform.” 
A spokeswoman for the Justice Department, 
Dena W. Iverson, said the department was 
289 
 
disappointed with the decision and was 
reviewing its options. 
In a statement, several civil rights 
organizations that had submitted a brief 
opposing the injunction called the ruling 
unfortunate and premature. 
“A ruling by a single judge in one circuit 
cannot and does not undo the years of clear 
legal precedent nationwide establishing that 
transgender students have the right to go to 
school without being singled out for 
discrimination,” the groups — Lambda 
Legal; the American Civil Liberties Union 
and the A.C.L.U. of Texas; the National 
Center for Lesbian Rights; the Transgender 
Law Center; and G.L.B.T.Q. Legal 
Advocates & Defenders — said in their 
statement. 
The ultimate impact of the Texas decision is 
unclear and is likely to be limited, legal 
experts said. For one thing, more senior 
courts in other regions have agreed with the 
administration that transgender students and 
workers are protected by existing laws 
against sex discrimination, and their 
decisions will not be altered by the Texas 
ruling. 
Also, the decision will not necessarily affect 
the outcome of other current cases. In the 
most prominent one, a federal court in North 
Carolina is weighing almost identical issues 
in suits brought by civil rights groups and the 
Justice Department that seek to block a state 
law requiring people in government 
buildings, including public schools, to use 
bathrooms that correspond to the gender on 
their birth certificates. 
Adding another major note of uncertainty, the 
United States Supreme Court has temporarily 
blocked a decision by the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals that required a school 
district in Virginia to allow a transgender boy 
to use the boys’ bathrooms. The Supreme 
Court issued a temporary injunction until it 
decides, probably this fall, whether to hear 
the case. 
If the Supreme Court does take the case and 
reaches a majority decision one way or 
another, then existing rulings by district and 
appeals courts could be superseded. If the 
Supreme Court takes the Virginia case but 
then is divided, four to four, on the issues, the 
Fourth Circuit’s existing decision in favor of 
transgender rights would take effect, 
although it would not be a nationally binding 
precedent. 
The Texas lawsuit, filed by Mr. Paxton on 
behalf of officials in 13 states, argued that the 
Obama administration had overstepped its 
authority in a series of pronouncements in 
recent years holding that discrimination 
against transgender people is a violation of 
existing laws against sex discrimination, 
including Title IX in federal education laws 
and Title VII in federal civil rights laws 
governing the workplace. 
In May, in the latest such statement, the 
federal Justice and Education Departments 
issued a letter to public schools stating that 
transgender people should be free to use 
bathrooms and locker rooms that match their 
gender identities, and that schools that 
refused could lose federal funds. 
“A school may not require transgender 
students to use facilities inconsistent with 
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their gender identity or to use individual-user 
facilities when other students are not required 
to do so,” the letter stated. 
The letter was quickly condemned by social 
conservatives, leading numerous state 
governments and school districts around the 
country to file lawsuits seeking to prevent the 
administration from taking action. 
The Obama administration, seeking to deflect 
the Texas lawsuit and another brought by 10 
other states, argued that the directive was not 
a regulation or mandate but rather an 
explanation of how the administration 
interpreted existing sex-discrimination 
protections. But it carried a threat that the 
administration might sue noncompliant 
school districts and seek to cut off vital 
federal education aid. 
The states argued not only that the 
administration was wrong as a matter of law, 
but also that it had failed to follow legal 
procedures for issuing what the states called 
a “new mandate” that “harms school districts 
from coast to coast by usurping lawful 
authority” and jeopardizing “billions of 
dollars in federal funding.” 
The Justice Department countered that the 
case was not suitable for litigation because 
the states had not shown evidence that they 
faced imminent harm, let alone a likelihood 
of success on the merits. 
If the administration brought action against 
school districts, the government and groups 
supporting lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender rights argued, the school districts 
or states could make their case in court. 
“There is a multistep procedure before a state 
might lose federal funding,” said Jon W. 
Davidson, the legal director of Lambda 
Legal. “The government would have to 
specifically challenge a state, the state could 
respond, the government could bring a 
lawsuit, and then litigation in the courts 
would decide whether the government’s 
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Ruling Below: Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 788 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 
2015) 
Trinity Lutheran Church, a church that operated preschool and daycare programs, filed federal 
and state constitutional claims against the Director of the Missouri Department of Natural 
Resources Solid Waste Management Program, on the grounds that denial of the church's 
application for grant for purchase of recycled tires to resurface the playground served as religious 
discrimination. The District Court for the Western District of Missouri dismissed the action. 
Trinity Lutheran appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit affirmed. 
Question Presented: Whether the exclusion of churches from an otherwise neutral and secular 
aid program violates the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses when the state has no valid 
Establishment Clause concern. 
 
TRINITY LUTHERAN CHURCH OF COLUMBIA, INC., Plaintiff–Appellant 
v. 
Sara Parker PAULEY, in her official capacity, Defendant–Appellee 
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s) 
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, et al., Amici on Behalf of Appellee(s). 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit 
Filed on May 29, 2015 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
LOKEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. 
(“Trinity Church”), filed this action alleging 
that Sara Pauley, acting in her official 
capacity as Director of the Missouri 
Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”), 
violated Trinity Church's rights under the 
United States and Missouri Constitutions by 
denying its application for a grant of solid 
waste management funds to resurface a 
playground on church property. The district 
court1 dismissed the Complaint for failure to 
state a claim and denied Trinity Church's 
post-dismissal motion for leave to file an 
amended complaint. Trinity Church appeals 




Trinity Church operates on its church 
premises a licensed preschool and daycare 
called the Learning Center. Initially 
established as a non-profit corporation, the 
Learning Center merged into Trinity Church 
in 1985. The Learning Center has an open 
admissions policy. It is a ministry of Trinity 
Church that teaches a Christian world view 
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and incorporates daily religious instruction in 
its programs. 
 
DNR offers Playground Scrap Tire Surface 
Material Grants, a solid waste management 
program. The grants provide DNR funds to 
qualifying organizations for the purchase of 
recycled tires to resurface playgrounds, a 
beneficial reuse of this solid waste. In 2012, 
Trinity Church applied for a grant to replace 
the Learning Center's playground surface, 
disclosing that the Learning Center was part 
of Trinity Church. On May 21, 2012, the 
Solid Waste Management Program Director 
wrote the Learning Center's Director, 
advising: 
 
[A]fter further review of applicable 
constitutional limitations, the department is 
unable to provide this financial assistance 
directly to the church as contemplated by the 
grant application. Please note that Article I, 
Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution 
specifically provides that “no money shall 
ever be taken from the public treasury, 
directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, 
section or denomination of religion.” 
 
A Solid Waste Management Program planner 
subsequently advised the Solid Waste 
Management District Director that Trinity 
Church's application ranked fifth out of forty 
four applications in 2012, and that fourteen 
projects were funded. 
 
Trinity Church commenced this action, 
asserting federal question jurisdiction over 
claims that the denial of its Scrap Tire 
application violated (i) the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, (ii) its 
First Amendment right to free exercise of 
religion, (iii) the First Amendment's 
Establishment Clause, and (iv) its First 
Amendment right of free speech. The 
Complaint invoked the district court's 
supplemental jurisdiction over a fifth cause 
of action, alleging that DNR's denial violated 
Article I, Section 7, of the Missouri 
Constitution. Trinity Church sought 
injunctive and declaratory relief against DNR 
“policies and actions in denying grants to 
applicants who are churches or connected to 
churches.” 
 
The district court granted Director Pauley's 
motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to 
state a claim. Trinity timely moved for 
reconsideration and for leave to amend its 
complaint to add a factual allegation that the 
DNR had previously given grants under the 
Scrap Tire Program to at least fifteen other 
religious organizations, including churches. 
The district court denied the motion to 
reconsider. It also denied leave to amend 
because Trinity Church “fail[ed] to provide 
any explanation for not amending its 
Complaint prior to the dismissal of this 
action.” The court further noted that the 
amendment was “futile” because, while 
Trinity Church argued the newly alleged fact 
“undermines Missouri's purported interest” 
in denying the application, Trinity Church 
“failed to identify any valid legal theory 
under which Missouri would need to show 
the existence of a compelling interest.” 
Trinity Church appeals every aspect of the 
district court's rulings, except the dismissal of 
its First Amendment free speech claim. We 
review the dismissal of a complaint for 
failure to state a claim de novo. We review 
the denial of leave to amend for abuse of 
discretion, but we review de novo legal 
conclusions underlying a determination of 
futility.  
 
II. The Federal Constitutional 
Claims 
 
“Missouri has a long history of maintaining a 
very high wall between church and state.” 
Two provisions in the Missouri Constitution 
“declaring that there shall be a separation of 
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church and state are not only more explicit 
but more restrictive than the Establishment 
Clause of the United States Constitution.” 
Those provisions, one of which is at the core 
of this dispute, were initially adopted in 1870 
and 1875. As re-adopted in the Missouri 
Constitution of 1945, they now provide: 
 
Art. I, § 7. That no money shall ever be taken 
from the public treasury, directly or 
indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, or 
denomination of religion, or in aid of any 
priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof, 
as such; and that no preference shall be given 
to nor any discrimination made against any 
church, sect, or creed of religion, or any form 
of religious faith or worship. 
 
Art. IX, § 8. Neither the general assembly, 
nor any county, city, town [etc.] shall ever 
make an appropriation or pay from any public 
fund whatever, anything in aid of any 
religious creed, church or sectarian purpose, 
or to help to support or sustain any private or 
public school ... or other institution of 
learning controlled by any religious creed, 
church or sectarian denomination whatever; 
nor shall any grant or donation ... ever be 
made by the state ... for any religious creed, 
church, or sectarian purpose whatever. 
 
Trinity Church's Complaint alleged that, by 
denying its grant application solely because it 
is a church, DNR (i) violated the Free 
Exercise clause because it “target[ed] 
religion for disparate treatment” without a 
compelling government interest; (ii) violated 
the Establishment Clause because the denial 
“was hostile to religion” and required DNR 
“to determine what is religious enough” to 
justify denial; and (iii) violated the Equal 
Protection Clause by discriminating against 
religious learning centers and day care 
organizations without a compelling 
government interest. Although Trinity 
Church couched these claims as an attack on 
DNR's “customs, policies and practices,” all 
its claims are plainly facial attacks on Article 
I, § 7, of the Missouri Constitution, which 
provides that “no money shall ever be taken 
from the public treasury, directly or 
indirectly, in aid of any church,” and which 
was cited by DNR as the sole basis for its 
denial. 
 
Viewed in this light, it is apparent that Trinity 
Church seeks an unprecedented ruling—that 
a state constitution violates the First 
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause 
if it bars the grant of public funds to a church. 
To prevail, Trinity Church must clear a 
formidable if not insurmountable hurdle, 
what appears to be controlling adverse 
precedent. In Luetkemeyer, a three-judge 
district court was convened in the Western 
District of Missouri to consider a claim that 
the First Amendment and the Equal 
Protection clause required Missouri to 
provide the same public transportation 
benefits for the pupils of church-related 
schools as were being provided to transport 
children to public schools. In denying 
plaintiffs injunctive and damage relief, the 
majority explained: 
 
“We conclude without hesitation that 
the long established constitutional 
policy of the State of Missouri, which 
insists upon a degree of separation of 
church and state to probably a higher 
degree than that required by the First 
Amendment, is indeed a ‘compelling 
state interest in the regulation of a 
subject within the State's 
constitutional power’ ... That interest, 
in our judgment, satisfies any 
possible infringement of the Free 
Exercise clause of the First 
Amendment or of any other 





The fact that Missouri has determined to 
enforce a more strict policy of church and 
state separation than that required by the First 
Amendment does not present any substantial 
federal constitutional question. 
 
Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of 
the United States. The Court summarily 
affirmed. Two Justices dissented, arguing the 
Court should have noted probable 
jurisdiction and set the case for argument on 
two questions, whether the different 
treatment of public-school and parochial-
school children violated equal protection 
principles, and whether the arbitrary denial of 
a general public service made the State an 
“adversary” of religion.  
 
When the Supreme Court summarily affirms 
a lower federal court, its decision “prevent[s] 
lower courts from coming to opposite 
conclusions on the precise issues presented 
and necessarily decided,” but the Court has 
affirmed only the judgment, not necessarily 
the rationale of the lower court. Here, while 
the parameters of the Supreme Court's 
summary affirmance in Luetkemeyer may not 
be free from doubt, given the issues 
addressed in the dissent from summary 
affirmance, we conclude that the Court 
necessarily decided that Article I, § 7, of the 
Missouri Constitution is not facially invalid. 
That conclusion is supported by the Court's 
prior summary affirmance in Brusca v. State 
of Mo. ex rel. State Bd. of Educ. 
 
Trinity Church requests injunctive relief 
compelling Missouri to provide grants 
directly to churches, funding that is 
prohibited by a provision of the Missouri 
Constitution that has been a bedrock 
principle of state law for nearly 150 years. 
Without question, a state constitutional 
provision is invalid if it conflicts with either 
religion clause of the First Amendment, or 
with the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal 
Protection Clause. We also recognize that the 
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence has evolved rather 
dramatically in the forty years since 
Luetkemeyer was decided. For example, it 
now seems rather clear that Missouri could 
include the Learning Center's playground in 
a non-discriminatory Scrap Tire grant 
program without violating the Establishment 
Clause. But the issue here is not what the 
State is constitutionally permitted to do, but 
whether the Free Exercise Clause, the 
Establishment Clause, or the Equal 
Protection Clause compel Missouri to 
provide public grant money directly to a 
church, contravening a long-standing state 
constitutional provision that is not unique to 
Missouri. 
 
No Supreme Court case, before or after 
Luetkemeyer, has granted such relief. Indeed, 
in Locke v. Davey, the Court upheld State of 
Washington statutes and constitutional 
provisions that barred public scholarship aid 
to post-secondary students pursuing a degree 
in theology. The Court noted the “popular 
uprisings against procuring taxpayer funds to 
support church leaders, which was one of the 
hallmarks of an ‘established’ religion.” In 
Locke, “the link between government funds 
and religious training [was] broken by the 
independent and private choice of 
[scholarship] recipients,” prompting the 
Court to examine carefully the “relatively 
minor burden” the scholarship exclusion 
placed on students taking devotional 
theology courses. By contrast, in this case 
there is no break in the link. Trinity Church 
seeks to compel the direct grant of public 
funds to churches, another of the “hallmarks 
of an ‘established’ religion.” Therefore, 
while there is active academic and judicial 
debate about the breadth of the decision, we 
conclude that Locke reinforces our decision 
that Luetkemeyer is controlling precedent 
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foreclosing Trinity Church's facial attack on 
Article I, § 7, of the Missouri Constitution. 
 
Justice Scalia, dissenting for himself and 
Justice Thomas in Locke, articulated a 
contrary view of the First Amendment's 
religion clauses: 
 
“When the State makes a public benefit 
generally available, that benefit becomes part 
of the baseline against which burdens on 
religion are measured; and when the State 
withholds that benefit from some individuals 
solely on the basis of religion, it violates the 
Free Exercise Clause no less than if it had 
imposed a special tax.” 
 
If the Court were to adopt this view, and if 
Justice Scalia's reference to withholding 
benefits to “individuals” were held to include 
direct public benefits to churches, then 
Article I, § 7, of the Missouri Constitution 
could not be validly applied to deny church 
participation in a host of publicly-funded 
programs. That may be a logical 
constitutional leap in the direction the Court 
recently seems to be going, but it is a leap of 
great magnitude from the Court's decisions in 
Luetkemeyer and in Locke. In our view, only 
the Supreme Court can make that leap. As the 
Court has often reminded us, a court of 
appeals “should follow the case which 
directly controls, leaving to this Court the 
prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” 
We therefore follow Luetkemeyer and the 
many Supreme Court of Missouri decisions 
concluding that Article I, § 7, of the Missouri 
Constitution does not conflict with the First 
Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause 
of the United States Constitution. 
 
For these reasons, we conclude that the 
district court correctly dismissed Trinity 
Church's federal constitutional claims for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted. 
III. The Missouri Constitutional 
Claim 
 
Trinity Church's fifth cause of action alleged 
that the DNR's grant denial violated the 
second clause of Article I, § 7, which forbids 
“any discrimination made against any 
church,” and that granting the application 
would not have violated the first clause 
because it would not have been “in aid of any 
church.” Though pleaded last, this was the 
only claim argued at length by Trinity Church 
at the hearing on defendant's motion to 
dismiss, and it was the lead argument in its 
brief on appeal (seemingly an implicit 
acknowledgment the federal constitutional 
claims are weak). This inversion of the 
theories pleaded distracted the district court 
from a very serious issue—after dismissing 
the federal claims, should the court have 
declined to exercise its supplemental 
jurisdiction over a state law claim that is 
based on an important provision of the 
Missouri Constitution and turns on the proper 
interpretation of rather ambiguous Supreme 
Court of Missouri precedents? We think that 
question should have been answered 
affirmatively, but we will nonetheless review 
the district court's dismissal of this claim on 
the merits. 
 
Under Missouri law, the district court had 
jurisdiction to decide the state law claim 
pleaded in the initial Complaint because 
whether Article I, § 7, permits DNR to deny 
Scrap Tire Program grants to all church 
applicants is an issue of law. Turning to the 
merits, we agree with the district court that 
the two clauses of Article I, § 7, must be 
interpreted in harmony. Therefore, if granting 
Trinity Church's application would have 
constituted “aid” to a church prohibited by 
the first clause of Article I, § 7, then denying 
the grant was not a discriminatory action 
prohibited by the second clause. So the 
district court properly focused on Trinity 
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Church's contention that a Scrap Tire 
Program grant is not “aid” within the 
meaning of the first clause of Article I, § 7, 
because it involves a quid pro quo, with the 
applicant undertaking obligations under the 
Scrap Tire Program in exchange for the 
granted funds. On appeal, Trinity Church 
argues the court erred in rejecting this 
interpretation of state law. 
 
Trinity Church bases its contention on the 
reasoning in two Supreme Court of Missouri 
decisions, Kintzele v. City of St. Louis, which 
Trinity Church did not cite to the district 
court, and Americans United v. Rogers, 
which the district court described as “grossly 
misrepresented” by Trinity Church. 
Concluding that the quid pro quo exception 
to Article I, § 7's, prohibition was not 
supported by any Missouri case, the court 
instead relied on the many Supreme Court of 
Missouri decisions that “strictly interpreted 
[Article I] Section 7 to prohibit public 
funding of religious institutions” in order to 
maintain “the higher wall of separation 
between church and state present in the 
Missouri Constitution.” 
 
Based on these decisions, the district court 
concluded that Trinity Church's state law 
claim under the Missouri Constitution must 
be dismissed because its “own pleadings 
demonstrate that funds from [DNR] in the 
form of the Scrap Tire Program would aid the 
Church and its Ministry Learning Center 
within the meaning of Missouri law.” We 
agree with this assessment of how the 
Supreme Court of Missouri would decide this 
claim. In Kintzele, plaintiffs alleged that a 
subsidized sale of land by the State to St. 
Louis University constituted an 
unconstitutional use of public funds in aid of 
a private sectarian school. The Court declined 
to invalidate the sale, concluding that, 
because Missouri law authorized “sale by 
negotiation at fair value,” and the State tried 
competitive bidding and thereafter sold the 
land to SLU at nearly twice the highest bid, 
“plaintiffs' contention of illegal ... subsidy 
from public funds cannot be sustained.” This 
decision in no way supports Trinity Church's 
claim that a Scrap Tire Program grant is not 
“aid.” 
 
In Americans United, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri upheld a statute providing tuition 
grants to students at approved public and 
private colleges. The statute was invalidated 
by the trial court, applying Article I, § 7, and 
Article IX, § 8. The State appealed. Noting 
that “[a]n act of the legislature is presumed to 
be valid and will not be declared 
unconstitutional unless it clearly and 
undoubtedly contravenes some constitutional 
provision,” the Court concluded it could not 
“with confidence declare that the statutory 
program” clearly contravened these 
constitutional provisions because “the 
parochial school cases with which the court 
has dealt in the past involved completely 
different types of educational entities than the 
colleges and universities herein involved.” 
The defendants' quid pro quo argument was 
noted but not adopted. 
 
Americans United demonstrates that Article 
I, § 7, will be difficult to apply in some cases, 
particularly when an expenditure authorized 
by state statute is challenged as beyond the 
State's constitutional authority. But that 
decision does not support Trinity Church's 
claim to affirmative relief in this case. In 
upholding the challenged program, the Court 
reaffirmed that the Missouri Constitution is 
“more restrictive than the First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution in 
prohibiting the expenditures of public funds 
in a manner tending to erode the absolute 
separation of church and state,” and it noted 
that the program was “designed and 
implemented for the benefits of the students, 
not of the institutions, and that the awards are 
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made to the students, not to the institutions. 
The legislative purpose in no wise includes 
supporting aiding or sustaining either public 
or private educational institutions.”  
 
We affirm the district court's dismissal of the 
state law claim under the Missouri 
Constitution in Trinity Church's original 
Complaint. 
 
IV. The Motion to Amend 
 
Following the district court's dismissal order, 
Trinity Church filed a motion to reconsider 
that included a motion for leave to amend its 
Complaint. The proposed Amended 
Complaint added a fact paragraph alleging 
that the DNR had previously awarded Scrap 
Tire Program grants to at least fifteen other 
religious organizations. It also added a 
paragraph to the Equal Protection Clause 
cause of action alleging that DNR “has 
allowed other similarly-situated religious 
organizations to participate in the Scrap Tire 
Program.” All other allegations in the ninety-
seven-paragraph Complaint were unchanged. 
Trinity Church attached as an exhibit a 
document dated October 19, 2010, that listed 
“Prior Recipients of Scrap Tire Surface 
Material Grants.” The district court denied 
the motion because Trinity Church failed to 
provide any explanation for failing to amend 
prior to dismissal of its action. 
 
“Post-dismissal motions to amend are 
disfavored.” While a post-dismissal motion 
may be granted if timely requested, “interests 
of finality dictate that leave to amend should 
be less freely available after a final order has 
been entered.” Numerous cases have ruled 
that unexcused delay is sufficient to justify 
denial of post-dismissal leave to amend.  
 
On appeal, Trinity Church for the most part 
ignores this well-established law, simply 
distinguishing the cases cited by the district 
court because Trinity Church was not “given 
any warning that it needed to amend its 
pleadings.” The briefs on appeal assert that 
Trinity Church learned in discovery that 
other religious entities had received grants, 
but counsel admitted at oral argument that 
Trinity Church obtained the October 2010 
listing attached to the proposed Amended 
Complaint from the DNR website, where it 
was doubtless available when Trinity Church 
filed its Complaint in January 2013. Thus, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in 
concluding that Trinity Church failed to 
provide a valid reason for its failure to amend 
prior to dismissal. 
 
The district court's alternative futility ruling 
is more problematic and warrants de novo 
consideration. The proposed amended 
pleading did not alter the allegations in the 
First Amendment causes of action based on 
the Free Exercise Clause and the 
Establishment Clause; it only alleged a 
different type of discrimination violating the 
Equal Protection Clause, discrimination 
between “similarly situated religious 
organizations.” Thus, when Trinity Church 
argued to the district court that its newly 
discovered evidence supported the claim that 
DNR's grant application denial “lacks a 
compelling interest,” the district court was 
right to observe that this added nothing to the 
original claims because, in the absence of a 
valid Free Exercise or Establishment Clause 
claim, the Equal Protection Clause claim was 
subject to rational basis review and no 
compelling interest need be shown. 
 
There is a problem lurking here, one that was 
camouflaged by Trinity Church's primary 
contention that Article I, § 7, violates the 
federal and state constitutions by mandating 
that churches be excluded from the Scrap 
Tire Program. The problem is that these 
constitutional claims take on an entirely new 
complexion if DNR is awarding Scrap Tire 
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grants to some churches, but not to others. If 
intentional, that would be a clear violation of 
the First Amendment, and no doubt of the 
Missouri Constitution as well. If the proposed 
Amended Complaint plausibly pleaded this 
dramatically new theory, did the district court 
abuse its discretion in failing to grant leave to 
amend, even if Trinity Church failed to 
clearly articulate the theory? We conclude 
not, for two distinct but related reasons. 
 
First, “a district court does not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to allow amendment of 
pleadings to change the theory of a case if the 
amendment is offered after summary 
judgment has been granted against the party, 
and no valid reason is shown for the failure to 
present the new theory at an earlier time.” In 
Littlefield, we affirmed the denial of leave to 
amend a dismissed § 1983 due process action 
to assert a new equal protection claim. That 
is directly analogous to the situation here. 
The facts were at hand to assert this narrower 
theory in the initial Complaint, but Trinity 
Church chose not to do so. “The district court 
did not abuse its discretion in concluding 
[this] tactical choice did not demonstrate 
diligence or good cause.” 
 
Second, the new theory we have identified 
would significantly alter the lawsuit's 
procedural landscape. Under the new theory, 
both the federal and state constitutional 
claims would turn on the fact bases for DNR's 
allegedly discriminatory treatment of 
similarly situated religious organizations, not 
on a Constitution-driven “policy” of not 
making any grants to churches. For the 
federal claims, this raises a serious question 
of what is called Pullman abstension—
“federal courts should abstain from decision 
when difficult and unsettled questions of 
state law must be resolved before a 
substantial federal constitutional question 
can be decided.” Here, a state court would be 
in the best position to decide the “difficult 
and unsettled” question of how Article I, § 7, 
and other provisions of the Missouri 
Constitution and statutes apply to DNR's 
fact-based decisions whether to award Scrap 
Tire Program grants to particular church-
related applicants. And state court resolution 
of that question would likely moot or resolve, 
and most certainly would affect, a federal 
court's resolution of the substantial, largely 
overlapping First Amendment and Equal 
Protection Clause issues. 
 
For the state law claim, the new theory 
appears to raise serious jurisdiction and 
venue issues under the Missouri 
Administrative Procedure Act. These issues 
would best be resolved by a state court, 
further supporting Pullman abstention. In 
these circumstances, even if the proposed 
Amended Complaint pleaded a new theory of 
relief that was not entirely futile, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
an untimely request to fundamentally alter 
the litigation. 
 




GRUENDER, Circuit Judge, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part. 
 
Trinity Lutheran Church (“Trinity 
Lutheran”) applied for a grant through the 
Learning Center, a daycare and preschool 
that Trinity Lutheran runs. This grant would 
allow the Learning Center to make its 
playground safer by swapping the gravel that 
covers it for a rubber surface made from 
recycled tires. The Missouri Department of 
Natural Resources (“the Department”), 
which administers this grant program, 
accepted Trinity Lutheran's application and 
ranked it fifth out of the forty-four 
applications from that year. The Department 
approved fourteen grant applications, but 
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Trinity Lutheran's was not among them. 
Relying solely on the Missouri Constitution's 
prohibition on using public funds to aid a 
church, Mo. Const. art. I, § 7, the Department 
denied Trinity Lutheran's grant application. 
Thus, but for the fact that the Learning Center 
was run by a church, it would have received 
a playground-surfacing grant. Where, as 
here, generally available funds are withheld 
solely on the basis of religion, the Supreme 
Court's decision in Locke v. Davey governs 
claims brought under the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment. Applying the 
careful balance struck by Locke, I would 
conclude that Trinity Lutheran has 
sufficiently pled a violation of the Free 
Exercise Clause as well as a derivative claim 
under the Equal Protection Clause. 
 
The court attempts to impose a barrier to full 
consideration of Locke. Trinity Lutheran, the 
court concludes, challenges the facial validity 
of Article I, § 7 of the Missouri Constitution 
by requesting a ruling that “a state 
constitution violates the First Amendment 
and the Equal Protection Clause if it bars the 
grant of public funds to a church.” Ante at 5. 
By framing Trinity Lutheran's claim this 
broadly, the court avoids fully grappling with 
Locke by merely pointing to an instance in 
which this state constitutional provision has 
been upheld. The court concludes that the 
Supreme Court's summary affirmance in 
Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, a case that 
concerned the separate issue of busing is one 
such application. 
 
But Trinity Lutheran does not mount the 
expansive facial challenge that the court 
attributes to it. Trinity Lutheran tries to bring 
an as-applied challenge; the complaint says 
so numerous times. However, determining 
whether a constitutional challenge is purely 
as-applied, purely facial, or somewhere in 
between turns on whether the plaintiff's 
“claim and the relief that would follow ... 
reach beyond the particular circumstances of 
the[ ] plaintiff [ ].” If they do, the claim is 
facial but only “to the extent of that reach.” 
When analyzing a claim and the relief that 
would follow, a court should “construe a 
plaintiff's challenge, if possible, to be as-
applied.” Trinity Lutheran, as the court 
acknowledges, frames its challenge as an 
attack on the Department's “customs, 
policies, and practices.” And Trinity 
Lutheran specifically requests a declaration 
that the Department's denial of its grant 
application was unconstitutional. Trinity 
Lutheran also specifically requests injunctive 
relief prohibiting the Department from 
discriminating against it in future grant 
applications. This claim and relief only 
implicate Trinity Lutheran. Consequently, 
Trinity Lutheran does not contend that 
Article I, § 7 of the Missouri Constitution is 
unconstitutional in all of its applications. 
 
This brings me to Locke. In the face of a Free 
Exercise challenge, the Court upheld a 
college scholarship program that prevented 
students from using the scholarship to pursue 
a degree in devotional theology, a course of 
study that the court characterized as “akin to 
a religious calling as well as an academic 
pursuit.” The Court began with the 
proposition that “there are some state actions 
permitted by the Establishment Clause but 
not required by the Free Exercise Clause.” 
Because the “State's disfavor of religion (if it 
can be called that)” in prohibiting recipients 
from using the scholarship to major in 
devotional theology “is of a far milder kind,” 
the Court concluded that the scholarship 
program was not presumptively 
unconstitutional. In upholding the program, 
the Court found that it “goes a long way 
toward including religion in its benefits”—
for example, by allowing recipients to attend 
pervasively religious schools that are 
accredited and to take devotional-theology 
courses. To the Court, this “relatively minor 
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burden” was justified by a “historic and 
substantial state interest” of not funding “an 
essentially religious endeavor.” This interest, 
the Court explained, was rooted in our 
nation's history of “popular uprisings against 
procuring taxpayer funds to support church 
leaders” as well as the founding-era decisions 
of many states to “place[ ] in their 
constitutions formal prohibitions against 
using tax funds to support the ministry.” 
Considering this “historic and substantial 
state interest” alongside the “relatively minor 
burden,” the Court found no violation of the 
Free Exercise Clause.  
 
Locke did not leave states with unfettered 
discretion to exclude the religious from 
generally available public benefits. To the 
contrary, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion 
for seven members of the Court was careful 
to acknowledge its parameters. “The [Locke ] 
opinion thus suggests, even if it does not 
hold, that the State's latitude to discriminate 
against religion is confined to certain 
‘historic and substantial state interest[s],’ and 
does not extend to the wholesale exclusion of 
religious institutions and their students from 
otherwise neutral and generally available 
government support.” Locke “suggests the 
need for balancing interests: its holding that 
‘minor burden[s]’ and ‘milder’ forms of 
‘disfavor’ are tolerable in service of ‘historic 
and substantial state interest[s]’ implies that 
major burdens and categorical exclusions 
from public benefits might not be permitted 
in service of lesser or less long-established 
governmental ends.” Simply put, the Locke 
Court “indicated that the State's latitude with 
respect to funding decisions has limits.” 
 
Applying the balancing of interests 
contemplated by Locke, I conclude that 
Trinity Lutheran has sufficiently pled a Free 
Exercise violation. The disfavor of religion 
here is more pronounced than in Locke. The 
student in Locke could use his scholarship to 
attend a pervasively religious school that was 
accredited and to take courses in devotional 
theology there. And a pervasively religious 
school that received scholarship money even 
could require its students to take devotional-
theology classes. The program, as the Court 
put it, went “a long way toward including 
religion in its benefits.” The same cannot be 
said here. Trinity Lutheran has pled that the 
Department categorically prohibited the 
Learning Center from receiving a 
playground-surfacing grant because it is run 
by a church. This blanket prohibition is 
different in kind from the disfavor of religion 
that was present in Locke. Whereas the Locke 
program excluded religious study while also 
including it, the Department has entirely 
excluded the Learning Center from receiving 
a playground-surfacing grant. Much like the 
Tenth Circuit, I read Locke to impose some 
bounds on such a “wholesale exclusion of 
religious institutions and their students from 
otherwise neutral and generally available 
government support.”  
 
The Department's reason for singling out the 
Learning Center differs from the historic and 
substantial state interest in Locke, where the 
state sought to avoid paying for the training 
of clergy, “an essentially religious endeavor.” 
The sheer religiosity of this activity led the 
court to remark that “we can think of few 
areas in which a State's antiestablishment 
interests come more into play.” It is true that 
the Department's interest in enforcing Article 
I, § 7 of the Missouri Constitution is historic 
in the sense that this provision is 
longstanding. But the state's interest in Locke 
traced to concerns that were specific to 
paying for training the clergy. The Court was 
unequivocal about this point: “[T]he only 
interest at issue here is the State's interest in 
not funding the religious training of clergy.” 
Here, by contrast, the Department seeks to 
enforce a general prohibition on aid to a 
church that is in no way specific to the 
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playground-surfacing grant program. This 
case therefore lacks the correspondence 
between the past and the Department's 
present interest that the Court found 
significant in Locke.  
 
Perhaps more importantly, the substantial 
antiestablishment interest identified in Locke 
is not present here. Unlike a student 
preparing for the ministry, which is “an 
essentially religious endeavor,” 
schoolchildren playing on a safer rubber 
surface made from environmentally-friendly 
recycled tires has nothing to do with religion. 
If giving the Learning Center a playground-
surfacing grant raises a substantial 
antiestablishment concern, the same can be 
said for virtually all government aid to the 
Learning Center, no matter how far removed 
from religion that aid may be. When the 
Locke Court spoke of a substantial 
antiestablishment concern, I seriously doubt 
it was contemplating a state's interest in not 
rubberizing a playground surface with 
recycled tires.  
 
In light of the Department's negligible 
antiestablishment interest, I conclude that the 
court overstates the significance of the 
Department's concern about giving a grant 
directly to the Learning Center, rather than 
having the money filtered through the 
independent choice of private individuals. 
“Although private choice is one way to break 
the link between government and religion, it 
is not the only way.” Indeed, even though the 
playground-surfacing program involves a 
direct transfer of funds to the Learning 
Center, the court concludes that “it now 
seems rather clear that Missouri could 
include the Learning Center's playground in 
a non-discriminatory Scrap Tire program 
without violating the Establishment Clause.” 
I agree. And I, of course, agree with the court 
that, in many cases, a concern about giving 
money directly to a church-run school may 
amount to a historic and substantial state 
interest. Indeed, were it to be uncovered 
during discovery that the Learning Center 
regularly uses its playground for religious 
activities, my Free Exercise concern would 
be less acute. However, at this stage of the 
litigation, I cannot conclude that the 
Department's concern about direct funding 
for a rubber playground surface translates 
into a historic and substantial 
antiestablishment concern. 
 
In concluding that Trinity Lutheran has stated 
a claim under the Free Exercise Clause, I 
acknowledge that “[t]he precise bounds of 
the Locke holding ... are far from clear.” 
However, the best reading of Locke, in my 
view, is that in the absence of a historic and 
substantial interest, the Department's 
“latitude to discriminate against religion ... 
does not extend to the wholesale exclusion of 
religious institutions and their students from 
otherwise neutral and generally available 
government support.” I therefore respectfully 
dissent from the court's affirmance of the 
dismissal of Trinity Lutheran's Free Exercise 
claim. Because this claim is linked to Trinity 
Lutheran's Equal Protection claim, I dissent 
from the court's disposition of this claim as 
well. Moreover, because I would reverse the 
district court's dismissal of Trinity Lutheran's 
complaint, I need not reach the separate 
question of whether the district court abused 
its discretion by denying Trinity Lutheran's 
motion to amend that complaint. I otherwise 
concur in the court's opinion. 
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“Supreme Court agrees to hear case over separation of church and state” 
 
The Washington Post 
Robert Barnes 
January 15, 2016 
 
The Supreme Court on Friday agreed to hear 
another legal battle over the separation of 
church and state, and will determine whether 
Missouri improperly excluded a church 
playground from a state program that 
provided safer play surfaces. 
Trinity Lutheran Church in Columbia applied 
to be part of a state initiative that recycles 
tires so that it could replace the pea gravel in 
its day-care center’s playground with a 
bouncier surface. Although the church’s 
application ranked high in the state’s 2012 
Playground Scrap Tire Surface Material 
Grant Program, it was ultimately turned 
down. 
A letter from the Missouri Department of 
Natural Resources said including the church 
would violate a section of the Missouri 
constitution that says “no money shall ever be 
taken from the public treasury, directly or 
indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, or 
denomination of religion.” 
A judge agreed with the state, and the entire 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit split 
on the question. 
The conservative Alliance for Defending 
Freedom brought the case to the Supreme 
Court and said constitutional protections 
against the establishment of religion could 
not be invoked to deny the church’s 
application for a playground surface. 
“Trinity does not seek funding for an 
essentially religious endeavor where the 
state’s anti-establishment concerns may be 
heightened,” the church said in its petition to 
the court. 
“Trinity seeks a grant for a rubber pour-in-
place playground surface where its children 
and those from the community play. Seeking 
to protect children from harm while they play 
tag and go down the slide is about as far from 
an ‘essentially religious endeavor’ as one can 
get.” 
ADF Senior Counsel Erik Stanley said in a 
statement that the case is about “religious 
hostility.” 
“This case has huge implications for state 
constitutional provisions across the nation 
that treat religious Americans and 
organizations as inferiors solely because of 
their religious identity,” he said. 
The state responded that its actions did not 
raise the kind of issues the court needed to 
settle. 
The question in the case is “not whether a 
state can exclude churches and other 
religious institutions from a program that 
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otherwise provides benefits to everyone,” 
wrote Missouri Attorney General Chris 
Koster (D). “Rather, it is whether states are 
required by the U.S. Constitution to violate 
their own constitutions and choose a church 
to receive a grant when that means turning 
down nonchurch applicants.” 
Both sides say the case will require justices 
to reexamine a 2004 Supreme Court ruling 
that said states that offer college scholarships 




















The Missouri case is the latest reflecting the 
court’s recent interest in religious rights. It 
already has accepted cases that ask whether 
religious groups are protected from having to 
comply with the Affordable Care Act’s 
requirement that employees receive 
contraceptive services. 







“Playground spat looms as key church-state separation case” 
 
The Washington Times 
Valerie Richardson 
January 20, 2016 
 
A playground spat over surfacing made out 
of scrap tires is looming as a pivotal church-
state separation case, one that religious 
freedom advocates say could provide relief 
from what they see as government hostility 
toward faith. 
The U.S. Supreme Court teed up the battle 
when it agreed last week to consider Trinity 
Lutheran Church v. Pauley, a 2013 lawsuit 
filed by the church after the state of Missouri 
rejected its application for a grant to replace 
its preschool’s playground pebbles with 
repurposed rubber from old tires. 
State officials said the preschool was 
ineligible because it was run by a church, 
citing an 1875 Missouri constitutional 
amendment — known as the Blaine 
Amendment — prohibiting public funds from 
being used “in aid of any church.” 
Three dozen states have similar amendments, 
but they “shouldn’t be applied in a way that 
would treat churches and religious 
organizations worse than everybody else 
simply because they’re a church,” said Erik 
Stanley, Alliance Defending Freedom senior 
counsel. 
The 8th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld last 
year the trial court’s ruling against Trinity 
Lutheran, but if that decision is allowed to 
stand, “it could spell disaster for all kinds of 
participation by churches and other religious 
groups in what are evenhanded government 
programs,” he said. 
“Taken to the extreme, it could even mean 
that a state could justify not providing fire 
protection to a church,” Mr. Stanley said. 
“They could say, ‘That’s aid to a church. And 
so we’re not going to do that under our state 
constitutional provision.’”  
The church said in its appeal to the high court 
that though the preschool itself may be part 
of its ministry, the grant — and the 
playground — were meant for purely secular 
purposes. 
“Seeking to protect children from harm while 
they play tag and go down the slide is about 
as far from an ‘essentially religious 
endeavor’ as one can get,” the church argued. 
That the Supreme Court has agreed to hear 
the case has groups that promote a strict 
separation of church and state on high alert. 
The fear is that the court could loosen a 2004 
decision that held that Washington state 
could exclude a college student seeking a 
divinity degree from its tuition-aid program. 
“We were surprised that the Supreme Court 
took this case, and we are definitely 
concerned that the Supreme Court has taken 
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this case,” said Alex Luchenitser, associate 
legal director for Americans United for 
Separation of Church and State. “It is 
possible that this case could erode state 
constitutional restrictions on the public 
funding of religious institutions.” 
The case is also being watched by 
constitutional scholars. 
“Regardless of outcome, the case will be one 
for the history books,” said Noah Feldman, 
Harvard professor of constitutional and 
international law, in a column for Bloomberg 
View. 
When states began passing their own Blaine 
amendments in the late 1800s, a key issue 
was whether Catholic schools could receive 
public funds. More recently, courts have 
wrestled with whether the amendments 
forbid state tax dollars from being used for 
everything from church-run halfway houses 
to soup kitchens. 
Blaine amendments 
It’s possible that the high court could 
examine the constitutionality of Blaine 
amendments, which go beyond the U.S. 
Constitution’s prohibition against the 
establishment of a state religion. Critics 
contend the provisions, named after James 
Blaine, a House speaker and senator from 
Maine who ran unsuccessfully for president 
in 1884, are rooted in anti-Catholic animus. 
Eric Rassbach, deputy general counsel for 
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, said, 
“I would be surprised if the court simply 
passes the history by.” 
“It’s a bit like if they were adjudicating a Jim 
Crow statute and they didn’t mention 
anything about Jim Crow,” Mr. Rassbach 
said. “This is Jim Crow for Catholics. You 
don’t have to look too deeply into the second 
half of the century in the United States to see 
where these provisions were coming from. 
‘Rum, Romanism and rebellion’ — that’s the 
kind of stuff that was going on during that 
time period when these state Blaine 
amendments were enacted.” 
But Mr. Luchenitser disputes that 
interpretation of the amendments’ history, 
arguing that state legislators had plenty of 
other reasons for adding the provisions to 
their constitutions, including a healthy regard 
for the separation of church and state. 
“That’s what the groups like the Alliance 
Defending Freedom and the Becket Fund 
charge, but that’s a very questionable reading 
of history,” he said. “It’s true that there were 
some people who made anti-Catholic 
statements, but what was going on in the 19th 
century was the Catholic Church was the 
leading group that was seeking funding for 
private religious schools.” 
Mr. Luchenitser added that “there’s a lot of 
debate and controversy about this.” 
Supporters of Trinity Lutheran’s effort to win 
state dollars for the playground say they don’t 
expect the court to go so far as to strike down 
the Blaine amendments, but they want to see 
the court give churches more leeway in 
accessing public funds, especially when the 
purpose is clearly religion-neutral. 
“A good outcome would be if the Supreme 
Court said, ‘No, you cannot enforce these 
Blaine amendments to exclude religious 
institutions from equally distributed grant 
programs or contracting programs or what 
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have you just because they’re religious. 
That’s an exclusion that just doesn’t make 
sense,’” said Mr. Rassbach. 
Mr. Stanley, who represents Trinity 
Lutheran, said his client’s appeal to the 
Supreme Court is “much more narrow and 
focused.” 
“The best outcome for Trinity Lutheran 
would be to apply these amendments, even if 
they remain, in an evenhanded and neutral 
fashion that treats religious groups on the 
same terms as everyone else,” Mr. Stanley 
said. 
Ten states filed a brief in support of Trinity 
Lutheran’s request for a high court hearing, 
saying that previous judicial rulings 
“arguably push ‘no aid’ into the realm of 
discrimination against religion.” 
In his brief, Missouri Attorney General Chris 
Koster, a Democrat, argued that the question 
is not “whether a state can exclude churches 
and other religious institutions from a 











“Rather, it is whether states are required by 
the U.S. Constitution to violate their own 
constitutions and choose a church to receive 
a grant when that means turning down 
nonchurch applicants,” he said. 
Mr. Luchenitser said he could foresee a 
ruling in which the court identifies 
“circumstances where the funding does not 
actually support a religious facility or a 
religious activity or religious teachings,” and 
that “only in those circumstances the states 
cannot treat religious and nonreligious 
institutions differently in deciding who can 
get public funds.” 
“We wouldn’t support such a ruling; we’d be 
disappointed,” he said. “But it would be 
better than a more expansive ruling that 








January 19, 2016 
 
Is the separation of church and state 
unconstitutional? 
You read that right. The U.S. Supreme Court 
said Friday that it would consider whether 
Missouri’s constitution, which bars state aid 
to religious groups, violates the U.S. 
Constitution by discriminating against 
religion. 
This claim sounds crazy, and to those who 
wrote the Missouri constitutional provision in 
the 1870s, it would’ve been. But the claim, in 
fact, isn’t utterly absurd -- if you consider the 
historical circumstances in which the 
provision was drafted. And although it’s a 
long shot to change existing church-state law, 
the case has the potential to be a landmark. 
Start with the very simple facts: Trinity 
Lutheran Church of Columbia, Missouri, 
applied for state funds to improve its 
playground. Under the U.S. Constitution as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court, a church 
may get generally available funds from the 
government. But under Missouri’s 
constitution, the church isn’t eligible for the 
funds, so it can’t get the money. 
The relevant state provision -- Article 1, 
Section 7 -- says “no money shall ever be 
taken from the public treasury, directly or 
indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, or 
denomination of religion … and that no 
preference shall be given to nor any 
discrimination made against any church, sect, 
or creed.” 
As written, this provision is framed more 
strongly than the Establishment Clause of the 
federal constitution, which never mentions 
money but says Congress may not enact an 
establishment of religion. 
In a 2004 case, Locke v. Davey, the U.S. 
Supreme Court said that it was permissible 
for Washington state’s constitution to bar 
state funding of religion to a greater extent 
than the Establishment Clause requires. 
Under that precedent, Trinity Lutheran would 
seem to have no case. Missouri can do what 
Washington does: Protect the separation of 
church and state without violating the 
religious liberty of religious funding 
applicants. 
Here’s where things get complicated. The 
Missouri provision was adopted in 1875, in 
the wake of a national effort to pass a federal 
constitutional amendment that would have 
similarly enacted a ban on state funding of 
religious institutions. That effort was 
spearheaded by Maine Republican 
presidential candidate James G. Blaine, and 




The Blaine Amendment was deeply 
politicized. At the time, it was understood by 
everyone to be targeted at Catholic 
institutions. The word “sectarian” was code 
for Catholic. 
Republicans hoped to force Democrats into 
the tough political position of either 
supporting the amendment and alienating 
Catholic voters, or opposing it and letting 
themselves be criticized for opposing the 
separation of church and state. Republicans 
had gotten the idea from Ohio, where a brutal 
denominational fight over state funding of 
Catholic institutions had helped elect 
Governor Rutherford B. Hayes. 
In congressional debates, concern for the 
separation of church and state was 
interspersed with blatant anti-Catholicism 
from Republicans. The federal amendment 
failed, but it arguably helped the Republicans 
reach a tie in the general election, which then 
led to the political deal that made Hayes 
president. 
But numerous versions of the Blaine 
Amendment, or “baby Blaines,” passed in 
other states. Missouri’s provision is typical of 
them. In historic terms, the amendments 
played a meaningful role in strengthening the 
separation of church and state as an American 
ideal. They had little immediate effect in 
practice, since states already weren’t funding 
Catholic institutions. 
Historians of church-state relations, myself 
included, have pointed out the anti-Catholic 
origins of the state Blaine amendments. The 
crucial question for the U.S. Supreme Court 
is whether this aspect of the history should be 
used to render the state amendments 
inoperative as violations of free religious 
exercise of the equal protection of the law. 
In Locke v. Davey, the court ducked the issue, 
saying it hadn’t been shown that Washington 
state’s constitutional provision, enacted more 
than 25 years after Missouri’s, was a state 
Blaine. 
The court could conceivably duck the issue 
again. Trinity Lutheran will argue that its 
case isn’t covered by the Locke precedent 
because its playground-resurfacing project is 
different from the money at issue in that case, 
which prevented students from using 
scholarship money to major in theology. The 
court would then have room to say that where 
there isn’t a strong connection to religion, 
states must give funding to religious 
institutions on equal terms with nonreligious 
ones. But the distinction with Locke is highly 
tenuous, since the court said in that case that 
the scholarship funding wouldn’t have 
violated the Establishment Clause. 
For Trinity Lutheran to win, it probably 
needs the court to go into the seedy history of 
the Blaine Amendment and say that state 
Blaine amendments violate federal equal 
protection laws because of the bias inherent 
in their adoption. Their best precedent is 
Romer v. Evans, a 1996 case in which the 
court struck down a Colorado state 
constitutional amendment that was inspired 
by anti-gay animus. 
In my view, that outcome would be 
defensible but probably wrong. The Blaine 
history is certainly replete with nasty anti-
Catholic bias reminiscent of today’s 
Islamophobia. But the animus was at all 
times intertwined with a legitimate 
309 
 
constitutional aim -- namely, separation of 
church and state. And strong separation 
remains a plausible constitutional vision, 
even though the court no longer embraces it -
- for example, by allowing state funding of 























Regardless of outcome, the case will be one 
for the history books.
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August 10, 2015 
 
Trinity Lutheran Child Learning Center is, its 
website reports, a “ministry of Trinity 
Lutheran Church” that “provides 
opportunities for children to grow spiritually, 
physically, socially, and cognitively.” As one 
would expect at a pre-kindergarten, one place 
this growth happens is on the swings and 
slides that are spread around the Learning 
Center’s colorful and inviting playground. 
The Learning Center is – again, as one would 
expect – committed and attentive to its 
students’ safety. So, a few years ago, the 
school’s staff decided that rubber surfaces 
made from recycled scrap tires were better 
for kids’ knees and elbows than pebbles, 
mulch, rocks, or pavement. As it happens, 
Missouri’s Department of Natural Resources 
has a program that distributes Playground 
Scrap Tire Surface Material Grants – that is, 
money – to qualifying entities so they can buy 
recycled tires for precisely this purpose. 
Recycling, solid-waste disposal, kids’ safety 
and growth . . . everybody wins. 
But Trinity Church’s application was denied, 
and for one reason only: It is a church. In 
other respects, the Learning Center is a 
qualifying institution and its application was 
strong (ranked fifth out of the forty-four that 
were submitted). Nevertheless, the director of 
the scrap-tire-grants program informed the 
school that the department was “unable to 
provide this financial assistance directly to 
the church” because the funding would 
violate a provision of the Missouri 
Constitution that states “no money shall ever 
be taken from the public treasury, directly or 
indirectly, in aid of any church, section or 
denomination of religion.” 
The Church challenged this denial as a 
violation of the Constitution of the United 
States, but the federal trial court, and then the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 
sided with the Department. In the latter 
court’s view, the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution permit 
Missouri to discriminate in this way, in 
keeping with what the court called the state’s 
“long history of maintain a very high wall 
between church and state.” Last January, the 
Supreme Court agreed to take the case and 
answer the question “[w]hether the exclusion 
of churches from an otherwise neutral and 
secular aid program violates the Free 
Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses when 
the state has no valid Establishment Clause 
concern.” 
Less than one month later, Justice Antonin 
Scalia died. As a result, some of the last 
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year’s most closely watched, high-profile 
cases turned out differently than, probably, 
they would have had he lived. Given that 
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in the 
Court’s last major aid-to-religion case, Locke 
v. Davey, provides strong and clear support 
for Trinity Church’s argument that 
Missouri’s discriminatory policy is 
unconstitutional, many wonder whether, 
once again, his absence will – as his presence 
and votes so often did in the religious-
freedom context – drive the result in Trinity 
Lutheran. 
The Eighth Circuit panel appeared to regard 
Trinity Church’s claim as having been 
already decided, and rejected, by the 
Supreme Court. As the panel noted, the Court 
had summarily affirmed, in Luetkemeyer v. 
Kaufmann, a federal district court’s ruling 
that the “no aid” provision in Missouri’s 
constitution did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause and served a “compelling 
state interest” in “maintaining a very high 
wall between church and state.’” (Two 
Justices dissented.)  And, in Locke v. Davey, 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote for a 
seven-Justice majority that the state of 
Washington could, in keeping with its own 
no-aid provision, deny scholarship funds to 
an otherwise eligible student who chose to 
pursue a degree in “devotional theology.” 
The Supreme Court may and should read 
Locke more narrowly, as some other lower 
courts have done. That case was about the 
specific and special issue of public funding 
for the training of clergy and shouldn’t 
determine the outcome in a case about 
recycled scrap tires being used to upgrade a 
pre-school playground. The decision’s 
recognition that there is some “play in the 
joints” between what the Constitution 
requires and what it permits can and should 
be regarded not as providing a blank check to 
states seeking to discriminate, in the name of 
extra-strict “separation,” against religious 
beneficiaries and activities. The Justices 
should take account of the fact that 
Luetkemeyer reflected a way of thinking 
about aid to religious schools that they have, 
for good reasons, abandoned. In recent 
decades, the doctrine and precedents having 
to do with this matter have emphasized 
neutrality, not strict separation, and have 
asked whether a program is even-handed, not 
whether it might, somehow, “advance” 
religion. 
In this way, the law has reconnected with a 
foundational point that was the basis for its 
first decision in the area, Everson v. Board of 
Education, in which Justice Hugo Black 
(who was certainly not a proponent of aid to 
parochial schools) insisted that public 
officials may not exclude citizens “of any . . . 
faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from 
receiving the benefits of public welfare 
legislation.” Similarly, in the Court’s 
landmark (and still controversial) decision in 
Employment Division v. Smith, the Justices 
noted that the First Amendment forbids 
governments from “impos[ing] special 
disabilities on the basis of religious views or 
religious status.” A dozen years earlier, in his 
concurring opinion in McDaniel v. Paty, 
Justice William Brennan had forcefully made 
the same point: Generally speaking, 
“government may not use religion as a basis 
of classification for the imposition of duties, 
penalties, privileges or benefits.” 
But again: Justice Scalia is no longer on the 
Court. Even if Justice Anthony Kennedy, 
who voted with the majority in Locke but 
whose record in nearly thirty years’ worth of 
aid-to-religion cases is consistent with 
Trinity Church’s nondiscrimination 
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argument, sides with the school, joining the 
three remaining Republican appointees, we 
could see not a helpful clarification but 
instead a confusion-prolonging tie. 
Church-state aficionados should, in addition 
to speculating about vote-counts or 
compromises aimed at avoiding yet another 
“affirmed by an equally divided Court,” be 
listening and watching for hints regarding, or 
answers to, at least three questions. 
First, will the Justices acknowledge, and 
perhaps even engage, the actual history and 
purpose of no-aid provisions like the one 
invoked by Missouri in this case? The Eighth 
Circuit did not mention the term “Blaine 
Amendments” and instead gestured vaguely 
to, again, a “long history of maintaining a 
very high wall between church and state” and 
to Missouri’s embrace of a “more restrictive” 
version of separation. In fact, though – as 
Philip Hamburger, John McGreevy, Joseph 
Viteritti, Lloyd Jorgenson, and many others 
have shown – provisions like Missouri’s 
were adopted by states (and sometimes 
required by the federal government) not to 
implement an abstraction like “separation” 
but rather to marginalize and undermine 
Roman Catholicism in America. These 
provisions’ origins, regardless of how the 
laws are justified or described today, are not 
easily disentangled from nineteenth-century 
America’s pervasive anti-Catholicism and 
nativism or from a broader ideological, 
nationalist project of using state-mandated 
public schooling to inculcate “American” 
values and loyalties. Justice Thomas 
discussed this history in his 2000 opinion in 
Mitchell v. Helms and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist mentioned it in a footnote in 
Locke. Will the Justices, in Trinity Lutheran, 
deal with the elephant in the room? 
Second, will the Democratic appointees – and 
especially Justices Stephen Breyer and Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, who dissented in Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris, the Court’s landmark, five-
to-four school-voucher ruling – agree with 
the Eighth Circuit panel that “Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence has evolved rather 
dramatically” and that “it now seems rather 
clear that Missouri could include the 
Learning Center’s playground in a non-
discriminatory Scrap Tire grant program 
without violating the Establishment Clause”? 
In other words, will an eight-member Court, 
which is for now split fairly evenly on many 
hot-button topics but which will almost 
certainly change significantly, and move to 
the left, in the next few years, signal to 
judges, legislators, and activists that Zelman 
is and will remain settled law? Or, will there 
be hints from the Democratic appointees that 
Zelman – like, many liberal academics and 
observers hope, Heller v. District of 
Columbia, Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission, Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District 
No. 1, etc. – could be revisited, revised, or 
narrowed, that choice-based reforms are 
again suspect, and that the school-voucher 
question is again up for grabs? 
Third, and related: Will any of the Justices 
examine or embrace the claim, advanced in 
the amicus brief filed by the Lambda Legal 
Defense and Education Fund that the 
Constitution should be read to disallow 
government from cooperating, even through 
neutral programs, with religious 
organizations that “discriminate on the basis 
of religion and other grounds”? I have argued 
in academic writing that it is a mistaken 
oversimplification to equate invidious and 
irrational “discrimination” by governments 
with religious organizations’ efforts to 
operate in keeping with their religious 
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teachings, character, and mission. The 
government, of course, may and should not 
discriminate on the basis of religion. 
However, there is not (or, at least, there 
should not be) anything objectionable about 
a religious school or social-welfare agency 
hiring for mission. Nor does the latter 
become objectionable, let alone 
unconstitutional, simply because the 
religious actor is cooperating with the 
government to do good works like feeding 
the hungry, caring for the sick, or educating 
the young. Unfortunately, some seem 
determined to wage an aggressive culture-
war campaign that conflates religious 
commitments with “bigotry.” Will the Court 
resist, or enlist in, this effort? 
 
“Separation of church and state” is an 
important idea. Correctly understood and 
reasonably implemented, it is a limit on 
government that protects religious freedom 
by preventing the government from 
corrupting religion or interfering in religious 
groups’ affairs. It does not require, though, 
and the Constitution’s neutrality principle 
should not permit, the pointless 




“Catholic bishops urge Supreme Court on playground funding” 
 
The Washington Times 
April 28, 2016 
 
The denial of a playground resurfacing grant 
to a Lutheran school empowers religious 
discrimination, not constitutional principles, 
the U.S. Catholic bishops said in a Supreme 
Court brief. 
“Missouri’s religious discrimination not only 
contravenes the First Amendment, it is 
profoundly demeaning to people of faith,” the 
U.S. bishops said in their April 21 amicus 
curiae brief. 
The brief backs Trinity Lutheran Church of 
Columbia, Mo. in its suit against the Missouri 
government. 
The church’s learning center had sought a 
state grant for playground resurfacing with 
scrap tire material to improve playground 
safety at its preschool and daycare center. 
The grant could have totaled $30,000 in aid 
to the school. The Missouri Department of 
Natural Resources rejected the grant 
application. 
The Catholic bishops’ brief argued that 
constitutional law does not authorize a 
blanket exclusion from public programs that 
provide “religiously neutral benefits” for 
secular purposes. 
“Otherwise  the  government  could  exclude 
religious  institutions  from  basic  public  
services  like police and fire protection.” 
 
 
 The Catholic bishops said the religious 
school was otherwise eligible, but the State of 
Missouri denied it solely due to its religious 
affiliation. 
Since 1875, the Missouri state constitution 
has barred public money for the direct or 
indirect aid of any church or any minister or 
teacher. 
The bishops’ brief rejected the claim that 
such a grant would violate the Establishment 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. This claim 
could be used as “a pretext for penalizing 
religious groups whose beliefs or practices 
diverge from government-prescribed 
orthodoxy,” they said. 
“Official discrimination based on religion is 
no less invidious or stigmatizing than 
discrimination based on other protected 
traits,” the brief said. “It sends a message that 
religious people and their institutions are 
second-class citizens who deserve special 
disabilities and are not entitled to participate 
on equal terms in government programs.” 
In 2015 the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld a district court ruling against the 
school, on the grounds the U.S. constitution 
permits the provisions of the Missouri 
constitution. The Supreme Court could hear 
the case in its late 2016 session. 
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Other signatories to the Catholic bishops’ 
brief include the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints, the National Catholic 
Educational Association, the Salvation Army 
and the General Synod of the Reformed 
Church in America. 
Many groups have filed separate briefs in 
favor of the Lutheran Church. These include 
a brief from eighteen mostly Republican-run 
states, The Oklahoman reports. 
